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Worker Mobilization In Twenty-First Century Liberalism
Abstract
Over the past decades, capitalist democracies across the OECD have transitioned from manufacturing to
models for growth based on dynamic services. In many countries, the transition to the knowledge
economy has been accompanied by a process of liberalization, whereby market forces are disembedded
from institutions for social protection. As a result, inequality has risen and insecurity has spread. While
some scholars suggest that liberalization is an unavoidable structural characteristic of the knowledge
economy, this dissertation offers an alternative.
I argue that rising inequality and spreading insecurity are the result of a shift in the discourse surrounding
production, and that this shift has restructured the balance of power between employers and workers.
This discursive approach captures the threat that workers face in the knowledge economy by illustrating
the connection between employers’ orientation to shareholder value and their adoption of new strategies
to control the workplace. Focusing on discursive contests in the workplace sheds light on the strategies
that workers can develop to protect their rights despite their distance from labor’s traditional power
resources, particularly unions.
I trace workers’ responses to downsizing at four sites of multinational technology firms in the US and
Germany in order to uncover the causal mechanisms that explain why workers acquiesce to dismissals in
some cases but resist in others. In the knowledge economy, managers justify dismissals in a primarily
financial discourse that disposes workers to believe that downsizing is the unavoidable consequence of
global market forces. Workers can redeploy this discourse to critique management’s justification and
motivate workers to pressure management into considering alternatives to downsizing. I find that workers
mobilize against downsizing when they develop counterhegemonic strategies that credibly demonstrate
that collective action can be effective. National institutions do not automatically protect workers from
employer discretion, but with enough creativity, workers can find ways to activate them.
By illustrating the causal mechanisms that shape power relations in the knowledge economy, this
dissertation develops a theoretical framework for explaining variation in workers’ rights in twenty-first
century liberalism.
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ABSTRACT
WORKER MOBILIZATION IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LIBERALISM
Sidney A. Rothstein
Julia Lynch
Over the past decades, capitalist democracies across the OECD have transitioned
from manufacturing to models for growth based on dynamic services. In many
countries, the transition to the knowledge economy has been accompanied by a
process of liberalization, whereby market forces are disembedded from institutions
for social protection. As a result, inequality has risen and insecurity has spread.
While some scholars suggest that liberalization is an unavoidable structural
characteristic of the knowledge economy, this dissertation offers an alternative.
I argue that rising inequality and spreading insecurity are the result of a shift in the
discourse surrounding production, and that this shift has restructured the balance
of power between employers and workers. This discursive approach captures the
threat that workers face in the knowledge economy by illustrating the connection
between employers’ orientation to shareholder value and their adoption of new
strategies to control the workplace. Focusing on discursive contests in the
workplace sheds light on the strategies that workers can develop to protect their
rights despite their distance from labor’s traditional power resources, particularly
unions.
I trace workers’ responses to downsizing at four sites of multinational technology
firms in the US and Germany in order to uncover the causal mechanisms that
explain why workers acquiesce to dismissals in some cases but resist in others. In
the knowledge economy, managers justify dismissals in a primarily financial
discourse that disposes workers to believe that downsizing is the unavoidable
consequence of global market forces. Workers can redeploy this discourse to
critique management’s justification and motivate workers to pressure management
into considering alternatives to downsizing. I find that workers mobilize against
downsizing when they develop counterhegemonic strategies that credibly
demonstrate that collective action can be effective. National institutions do not
automatically protect workers from employer discretion, but with enough creativity,
workers can find ways to activate them.
By illustrating the causal mechanisms that shape power relations in the knowledge
economy, this dissertation develops a theoretical framework for explaining
variation in workers’ rights in twenty-first century liberalism.
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Chapter 1. The Tech Sector as a Harbinger of Liberalization
Remaining non-union is an essential for survival for most of our companies. If we had
the work rules that unionized companies have, we’d all go out of business. This is a
very high priority for management here. We have to retain flexibility in operating our
companies.
Robert Noyce, Co-Founder and Former CEO of Intel.
Quoted in Alan Hyde, Working in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of a HighVelocity Labor Market (M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 155.

Tech workers earn more than workers in other sectors, but they are equally
vulnerable to mass dismissals. Computer programmers, software developers, data
engineers, user interface designers, application support analysts, information
technology coordinators, network systems administrators, technical support
specialists – anyone can be targeted when executives decide to downsize. In
contrast to workers in other sectors, however, those in tech are unlikely to be
rehired once they are over 40. For older workers in the tech sector, dismissal means
unemployment.
Moreover, unlike workers in other sectors, tech workers often oppose
collective action in general and unions in particular. While workers in peripheral
sectors across the OECD have responded to rising insecurity by joining unions in a
wave of union revitalization, tech workers largely remain without traditional power
resources when confronting the threat of dismissal. Over the past several decades, a
process of liberalization has unfolded across the OECD’s wealthy democracies,
whereby market forces have been disembedded from national institutions for social
protection. As a result, employer discretion has increased and workers’ job security
has declined. While these trends have spread across many sectors of the economy,
no sector embodies the disembedded liberalism of the twenty-first century more
than tech.
1

Since the end of the postwar economic boom, wealthy democracies began
abandoning manufacturing in favor of models for economic growth based on
services. Confronted by declining profits in their primary markets, firms sought to
avoid competing on price by developing new technologies to distinguish their
products from competitors’. The conspicuous economic success of Silicon Valley
drove countries across the globe to liberalize national institutions in their efforts to
replicate the Valley’s “flexible” labor market. Employment in the tech sector has
grown tremendously over the past several decades, at the same time that countries
have abandoned traditional institutions for social protection and firms increasingly
adopt the orientation to shareholder value that puts workers’ job security at risk.
Seeking to produce innovative technologies, tech firms hired hundreds of
thousands of engineers and technical specialists, but the growing power of
shareholders over corporate decision-making directs managers to increase their
firm’s stock price above all else. In the tech sector, where labor is by far the most
expensive element of production, shareholders encourage downsizing as the most
effective way to increase a firm’s financial performance in the short term. The rise of
dual labor markets across the OECD following the transition to services has received
significant attention, but the spread of the orientation to shareholder value exposes
workers in the core to the same degree of insecurity as workers in peripheral
sectors.
This dissertation argues that the process of liberalization that has unfolded
across the OECD’s wealthy democracies has been driven by a wholesale discursive
transformation, which has restructured the balance of power between employers
and workers in the workplace. As employers have increasingly adopted an
orientation to shareholder value, managers frame the employment relationship in
primarily financial terms, justifying downsizing as the unavoidable response to
ineluctable market forces. At the same time, this market-revering discourse
reinforces workers’ ambivalence toward unions, particularly among workers with
advanced skills and high wages, and, by removing countervailing power from the
workplace, disposes workers to find management’s financial framing of the
2

employment relationship persuasive. Situating the employment relationship in
financial terms restructures workers’ preferences for collective action by leading
them to believe that mobilizing will do nothing to protect them from dismissals, so
that the most rational response to downsizing is acquiescence. Workers in some
countries are formally protected against dismissals by national institutions
regulating the labor market, but even the most robust institutions, such as
Germany’s, rely on worker mobilization to be enforced. By undermining workers’
motivation to participate in collective action, the spread of market-revering
discourses has not just eroded institutions’ effectiveness, but has led to entirely new
dynamics of political economic conflict.
Relying on four case studies of workers’ responses to downsizing in the
United States and Germany, I show how market forces in both countries have been
disembedded from national institutions for regulating the labor market. While
existing scholarship on liberalization has largely focused on institutional change at
the national or sectoral levels, I argue that understanding these macro
transformations requires explaining the micro-level discursive conflicts that drive
them. Tracing conflicts in the workplace between managers and workers over
downsizing illustrates that the erosion of institutions for social protection across the
OECD’s wealthy democracies over the past several decades is hardly a structural
consequence of the shift to models for economic growth based on services. On the
contrary, these institutional changes are the result of highly contingent struggles
between managers and workers. Moreover, these micro-level struggles show that,
while liberalization has undermined labor’s traditional power resources, it has also
introduced the conditions for labor organizers to develop novel tactics.
I argue that, despite the challenges posed by liberalization, workers can
protect their job security when labor organizers deploy creative discursive
strategies in the workplace. Workers mobilize to enforce national institutions for
regulating the labor market when they believe that participating in collective action
could potentially avert dismissals. Organizers can undermine managers’ justification
for downsizing by framing dismissals in a discourse that demonstrates to workers
3

their power to shape conditions in the workplace. To develop this argument, I
selected pairs of firms that faced the same market uncertainties, were subject to the
same corporate governance structures, and had access to the same cash reserves in
order to highlight how organizers can develop discursive strategies to protect
workers against downsizing despite facing unfavorable material conditions. While
equally vulnerable, not all workers lose their jobs when threatened with mass
dismissals. This dissertation explains how liberalization affects workers’ job
security by focusing on the discursive contests between managers and workers
surrounding dismissals in the tech sector.
1. The rise of the tech sector
As countries across the OECD transition to models for economic growth based on
services, the political economies of wealthy democracies have undergone broad
transformations, including the rise of a sector focused on producing technological
innovation. In 2005, 65% of the exports from OECD countries comprised mediumand high-technology products, with Germany leading the group, closely followed by
the US.1 The tech sector contributed the greatest gains in labor productivity in the
OECD over the past several decades.2 In Germany, labor productivity growth in tech
represented 13% of overall value-added of labor productivity growth even though
only 2% of GDP was invested in the tech sector.3 Similarly, in the US during the
1990s, labor productivity growth in the tech sector was nearly three times that of
manufacturing.4 These productivity gains are significant because they incentivize
tech firms to continue hiring. Indeed, since 1990, employment in tech has increased

OECD, “OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scorecard 2007: Innovation and
Performance in the Global Economy” (Paris: OECD, 2007), 214.
2 OECD, OECD Information Technology Outlook 2010 (OECD Publishing, 2010), 129–30.
3 OECD, “Briefing Note on Germany,” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scorecard
2007 (Paris: OECD, 2007), 4.
4 Christopher Kask and Edward Sieber, “Productivity Growth in High-Tech Manufacturing
Industries,” Monthly Labor Review, no. 16 (March 2002): 16.
1
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across the OECD.5 From 1995 to 2010, employment in the tech sector increased by
22% in the US and by 60% in Germany.6
Since the early twentieth century, the coming technological age has been
welcomed by those heralding the “knowledge worker,” “symbolic analysts,” or
“creative class.”7 Despite this excitement, those who actually drive technological
innovation remain notoriously difficult to define.8 In this dissertation, a tech worker
is a professional with a technology-oriented position who earns wages significantly
above average.9 Tech workers may focus on software or hardware, databases or
web pages, and may have formal training or be self-taught. What is important is that
tech workers’ expertise qualifies them to exercise discretion over technical topics in
a particular jurisdiction, which may not be violated by those without the necessary
qualifications.10 Along with the historical legacies of skilled labor, tech workers’
Daniel Oesch, “Occupational Structure and Labor Market Change in Western Europe since
1990,” in The Politics of Advanced Capitalism (New York: Cambridge, 2015), 123.
6 OECD, OECD Information Technology Outlook 2010, 2010; OECD, “OECD Internet Economy
Outlook 2012” (OECD Publishing, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdinternet-economy-outlook-2012-9789264086463-en.htm.
7 Peter Drucker, Landmarks of Tomorrow (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959); Robert
Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism (New York: Vintage
Books, 1992); Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s Transforming Work,
Leisure, Community and Everyday Life (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
8 Daniel E. Hecker, “High-Technology Employment: A NAICS-Based Update,” Monthly
Labor Review, July 2005, 57–72.
9 OECD, “OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scorecard 2007: Innovation and
Performance in the Global Economy,” 65; In the US, tech workers’ salaries are typically at
least twice the national average, while the gap is smaller in Germany, but growing. See
“Information Technology (IT) Services Industry Salaries - Information Technology (IT)
Services Industry Salary Survey - PayScale,” accessed May 25, 2017,
http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Industry=Information_Technology_(IT)_Services/
Salary; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Real Disposable Personal Income: Per Capita,”
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, January 1, 1959,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A229RX0; “Software Engineer Salary (Germany),”
accessed May 25, 2017,
http://www.payscale.com/research/DE/Job=Software_Engineer/Salary; “National
Economy & Environment - Earnings and Earnings Differences - Development of Gross
Earnings - Federal Statistical Office (Destatis),” accessed May 26, 2017,
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/EarningsLabo
urCosts/EarningsEarningsDifferences/Tables/LongTimeSeriesD.html.
10 Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988).
5
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experiences in the workplace lead them to harbor a distinct set of preferences,11
namely an aversion to collective action in general and unions in particular, which
makes them especially vulnerable to dismissals, given the sector’s structural
characteristics.
Despite widespread euphoria about the tech sector, the past decades offer
some sobering lessons. In OECD countries, the majority of employment growth in
the tech sector is highly concentrated: 250 firms employed 70% of the tech
workforce in 2009.12 The result is that when a few firms do poorly, hundreds of
thousands of workers are affected. Technology products are exposed to a high
degree of international competition, driven by low labor costs and rapid
technological change, and may have a higher price-elasticity than regular goods, all
of which fuel significant volatility in the tech sector as firms constantly seek to avoid
commoditization.13
In June 2001, nearly 700,000 workers were fired in a single month when the
tech bubble burst.14 (See Figure 1.1) After months of downsizing, unemployment in
Silicon Valley in January 2003 stood at 9%, while the national average was 4%.15
Workers in Germany were also affected by the bursting of the bubble: the two states
Charles Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Classes (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002); Peter Meiksins and Chris Smith, “Why American Engineers Aren’t Unionized:
A Comparative Perspective,” Theory and Society 22, no. 1 (February 1, 1993): 57–97,
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993448; Charles C. Heckscher, White-Collar Blues: Management
Loyalties In An Age Of Corporate Restructuring (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Herbert
Kitschelt and Philipp Rehm, “Occupations as a Site of Political Preference Formation,”
Comparative Political Studies 47, no. 12 (2014): 1670–1706.
12 OECD, OECD Information Technology Outlook 2010 (OECD Publishing, 2010), 132.
13 David Hope and David Soskice, “Growth Models, Varieties of Capitalism, and
Macroeconomics,” Politics & Society 44, no. 2 (June 1, 2016): 217,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329216638054; Clair Brown and Ben Campbell, “Technical
Change, Wages, and Employment in Semiconductor Manufacturing,” Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 54, no. 2A (March 2001): 450, https://doi.org/10.2307/2696103; John
Zysman, “Escaping the Commodity Trap: Toward Sustainable Growth,” A Position Paper for
the BRIE-ETILA Conference on August 29th, 2014, July 8, 2014.
14 OECD, OECD Information Technology Outlook 2010, 2010, fig. 3.13.
15 US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Unemployment Rate in Santa Clara County, CA
[CASANT5URN], 1990-2005” (FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), accessed April 21,
2017, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CASANT5URN.
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with the highest tech concentrations, Bavaria and Baden-Würtemburg saw the trend
of decreasing unemployment reversed so that, in 2001, unemployment increased in
each state by 12% and 6% respectively.16

Figure 1.1 Dismissals in the tech sector compared to all sectors in the OECD, 20002009 (thousands)
(Source: OECD Information Technology Outlook 2010)

Despite this volatility, tech workers’ job security often appears superior to
that of many workers. With unemployment in Greece spiking to nearly 30% in 2013,
concern for tech workers’ vulnerability may seem misplaced, especially when so
much commentary on Silicon Valley emphasizes the “high-velocity” nature of labor
markets in the tech sector, which implies speedy rehiring.17 For many tech workers,
however, labor market volatility is high-velocity in one direction only: out. Rampant
age discrimination in the tech sector means older workers are more likely to be
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, “Arbeitsmarkt 2001,” Sondernummer Amtliche Nachrichten Der
Bundesanstalt Für Arbeit (Nürnberg: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, n.d.), 73.
17 OECD (2017), “Unemployment Rate (Indicator),” accessed July 20, 2017,
https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm; Alan Hyde, Working in Silicon
Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor Market (M.E. Sharpe, 2003).
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dismissed, and much more likely to remain unemployed than younger workers.18
Xia and Kleiner show that, in the tech sector, “a 45-year-old is likely to stay
unemployed 40 weeks longer than a job seeker who is 25.”19 Macro-level data
suggests that this pattern leads dismissed older workers to find re-employment in
other sectors. The tech sector has employed millions since the 1990s, and has grown
significantly since that period.20 However, while 12% of the US workforce is older
than 55, they comprise only 5% of the tech sector.21 Unemployed tech workers may
receive greater social benefits in countries like Germany, but the global spread of
Silicon Valley’s management practices implies that older workers there are
increasingly subject to the risk of long-term unemployment due to downsizing.22 As
the OECD’s wealthy democracies adopt models for economic growth based on
promoting tech, this vulnerability to unemployment is likely to become more
widespread.
Beyond its effects on patterns of unemployment, downsizing in the tech
sector illustrates the broader structural challenge of regulating employer discretion
in the workplace, particularly given liberalization. Firms often claim that market
volatility requires downsizing, but history suggests otherwise. In the 1980s, for
instance, German automobile manufacturers faced stiff competition from new
companies in Asia, but instead of downsizing to reduce costs, they negotiated with
labor unions to design more effective production methods.23 However, when firms
adopt the orientation to shareholder value, downsizing may be the only option that
Geoffrey Wood, Adrian Wilkinson, and Mark Harcourt, “Age Discrimination and
Working Life: Perspectives and Contestations - a Review of the Contemporary Literature,”
International Journal of Management Reviews 10, no. 4 (December 2008): 433,
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2370.2008.00236.x.
19 Aiwu Xia and Brian Kleiner, “Discrimination in the Computer Industry,” Equal
Opportunities International 20, no. 5/6/7 (2001): 116–20.
20 Hecker, “High-Technology Employment: A NAICS-Based Update.”
21 Xia and Kleiner, “Discrimination in the Computer Industry.”
22 Steven Casper, “Can New Technology Firms Succeed in Coordinated Market Economies?
A Response to Herrmann and Lange,” Socio-Economic Review 7, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 209–15,
https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwn034.
23 Wolfgang Streeck, “Ch. 1: Productive Constraints: On the Institutional Conditions of
Diversified Quality Production” (Newbury Park, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 1992), 1–40.
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managers consider. Fligstein and Shin write that, “the basic shareholder value
hypothesis is that where profits are low, managers ought to engage in
reorganization, the main forms of which are mergers and layoffs.”24 When firms
adopt business strategies to capture value on financial markets, managers face
increased pressure from shareholders to dismiss workers. Firms have adopted the
orientation to shareholder value across the OECD, which is reflected in the rise of
merger and acquisition activity, as investors play a greater role in firms’ business
decisions.25 (See Figure 1.2)
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Figure 1.2 Mergers and Acquisitions involving Restructuring in the OECD, 19972015
(Data retrieved from Zephyr, May 26, 2017.)

Neil Fligstein and Taekjin Shin, “Shareholder Value and the Transformation of the US
Economy, 1984-2000,” Sociological Forum 22, no. 4 (December 2007): 409.
25 Claire A. Hill and Steven Davidoff Solomon, Research Handbook on Mergers and Acquisitions
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), chap. 1.
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Even firms that do not implement business practices associated with the orientation
to shareholder value have adopted a primarily financial discourse in the workplace,
which restructures the power relations between mangers and workers.26 Tech
workers are especially vulnerable, because their firms are likely to adopt the
orientation to shareholder value, given the intertwined history of tech and the
financial sector. Moreover, tech firms are likely to face sudden drops in price, and
tech workers’ high labor costs put a target on their back. Furthermore, tech
workers’ occupational identity disposes them to be persuaded by management’s
justification for mass dismissals, which discourages them from mobilizing to protect
their jobs.
When firms announce mass dismissals, not every worker is affected. Workers
with high wages may be more vulnerable, those with low performance ratings, or
simply those who hold non-managerial positions.27 However, once dismissals are
announced, the only way for workers to protect their jobs is by mobilizing. Union
resources have been decisive in supporting workers’ efforts to build power in the
workplace against their employers.28 However, the rise of tech has introduced a
growing group of workers who generally avoid membership in unions at the same
time that the spread of liberalization has undermined labor’s traditional power
Peer C. Fiss and Edward J. Zajac, “The Diffusion of Ideas over Contested Terrain: The
(Non)Adoption of a Shareholder Value Orientation among German Firms,” Administrative
Science Quarterly 49, no. 4 (December 2004): 501–34; Ulrich Jürgens, Katrin Naumann, and
Joachim Rupp, “Shareholder Value in an Adverse Environment: The German Case,”
Economy and Society 29, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 54–79,
https://doi.org/10.1080/030851400360569; Hajo Holst, “Finanzialisierung als
‚Investifizierung‘: Innovationsarbeit und Portfolio-Arbeitsorganisation,” Zeitschrift für
Soziologie 45, no. 3 (2016): 145–161, https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-2015-1009.
27 John C. Dencker, “Who Do Firms Lay Off and Why?,” Industrial Relations 51, no. 1 (January
2012): 152–69; Adam Goldstein, “Revenge of the Managers: Labor Cost-Cutting and the
Paradoxical Resurgence of Managerialism in the Shareholder Value Era, 1984 to 2001,”
American Sociological Review 77, no. 2 (April 2012): 268–94.
28 Matthew J. Bidwell, “What Happened to Long-Term Employment? The Role of Worker
Power and Environmental Turbulence in Explaining Declines in Worker Tenure,”
Organization Science 24, no. 4 (March 21, 2013): 1061–82; Jiwook Jung, “Through the
Contested Terrain Implementation of Downsizing Announcements by Large U.S. Firms,
1984 to 2005,” American Sociological Review 81, no. 2 (2016): 347–73,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416629756.
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resources for protecting workers from dismissals. Once managers at a tech firm
have announced dismissals, what explains variation in the job security of these
otherwise privileged workers?
2. Tech and the dynamics of liberalization
Existing approaches to liberalization present job insecurity as an inevitable feature
of the knowledge economy. According to these approaches, labor market mobility is
a structural characteristic of producing technology because workers in the tech
sector prefer mobility over protection. Their preferences for mobility lead this
growing proportion of the workforce to destabilize labor’s traditional power
resources by choosing to not enforce institutions for economic governance and to
not join unions. Scholars thus insist that job insecurity is unavoidable because, with
their power resources blunted, organized labor can do little to protect workers from
the global market forces driving capitalist development ineluctably toward the
knowledge economy. This structural approach suggests that the effects of
liberalization at the micro-level of the workplace are directly tied to the macro-level
of the global economy. Such views of liberalization may be admired for their
parsimony, but by treating workers’ vulnerability as a static feature of twenty-first
century liberalism, rather than an ongoing process, they overlook the political
struggles surrounding attempts to disembed market forces from institutions for
social protection.
Structural approaches to liberalization are not wrong that labor’s traditional
power resources have declined significantly. National institutions regulating the
labor market have been reformed so that, for example, employers may more easily
hire workers on fixed contracts.29 Moreover, even where institutions have remained
robust, they are no longer effective, because many institutions rely on worker

Bruno Palier and Kathleen Thelen, “Institutionalizing Dualism: Complementarities and
Change in France and Germany,” Politics & Society 38, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 119–48; Anke
Hassel, “The Paradox of Liberalization — Understanding Dualism and the Recovery of the
German Political Economy,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 52, no. 1 (2014): 57–81.
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mobilization for enforcement.30 While workers traditionally limited employer
discretion by enforcing institutions through union mobilization, the workers of the
knowledge economy are ambivalent toward collective action in general and unions
in particular,31 leading to a decline in union membership and a drop in collective
action across the OECD.32 Unable to rely on institutions or unions, workers in the
knowledge economy have little recourse against employer discretion.
At the same time, structural approaches to liberalization insist that workers
in the knowledge economy have little reason to oppose employer discretion,
because both employers and workers prefer labor market mobility.33 Given
employers’ preferences for control over hiring and firing,34 their preference for
flexibility is hardly surprising, and scholars explain that the dynamics of the
knowledge economy lead workers to prefer flexibility as well. Skilled workers prefer
to move between firms so that they can leverage the demand for their skills in order
to receive higher wages.35 Such flexibility is possible only when restrictions on
hiring and firing are lifted, which leads workers in the knowledge economy to

Janice Fine, “Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: Can CoEnforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?,” Politics & Society 45, no. 3
(September 1, 2017): 359–88, https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329217702603.
31 Bernhard Ebbinghaus, “Trade Union Movements in Post-Industrial Welfare States:
Opening up to New Social Interests?,” in The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States: Adapting
Post-War Social Policies to New Social Risks (London: Routledge, 2006), 123–42; Thomas
Haipeter, “The Interests of White-Collar Workers and Their Representation in the German
Manufacturing Sector: New Initiatives, Opportunity Structures, Framing and Resources:
Interest Representation and White-Collar Initiatives,” Industrial Relations Journal 47, no. 4
(July 2016): 304–21, https://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12141.
32 Lucio Baccaro and Chris Howell, Trajectories of Neoliberal Transformation: European Industrial
Relations Since the 1970s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
33 Casper, “Can New Technology Firms Succeed in Coordinated Market Economies?”;
Matthew M. C. Allen, “Comparative Capitalisms and the Institutional Embeddedness of
Innovative Capabilities,” Socio-Economic Review 11, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 771–94,
https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwt018; Kathleen Thelen, Varieties of Liberalization and the New
Politics of Social Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 26.
34 Patrick Emmenegger, “The Politics of Job Security Regulations in Western Europe: From
Drift to Layering,” Politics & Society 43, no. 1 (2015): 92.
35 Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to
Education, 3rd ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1994).
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oppose both institutions for social protection as well as unions.36 As far as the
structure of the knowledge economy introduces workers who support
liberalization, the rise of job insecurity over the past two decades of economic
transformation appears inevitable.
The structural approach to liberalization provides an accurate descriptive
account that job insecurity has risen, but it cannot explain why this is the case. First,
skills are notoriously difficult to define,37 especially in the knowledge economy,38
and the link between workers’ skills and their preferences is far from
straightforward.39 Second, in the knowledge economy, even if workers’ preferences
align with employers’ regarding mobility, workers never prefer insecurity over
protection: no worker wants to lose their job. Third, scholars show that employers
have actively lobbied to dismantle institutions for job security,40 and labor
continues to fight to save workers from dismissal.41 Taken together, this evidence
suggests that liberalization has undermined workers’ power resources and their job

Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, “Social Protection and the
Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State,” in Varieties of Capitalism: The
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001),
145–83; Torben Iversen, Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005); Anne Wren, Motü Fodor, and Soitira Theodoropoulou, “The
Trilemma Revisited: Institutions, Inequality, and Employment Creation in an Era of ICTIntensive Service Expansion,” in The Political Economy of the Service Transition (Oxford
University Press, 2013).
37 Marius R. Busemeyer, “Asset Specificity, Institutional Complementarities and the Variety
of Skill Regimes in Coordinated Market Economies,” Socio-Economic Review 7, no. 3 (May 29,
2009): 375–406.
38 Abigail Marks and Dora Scholarios, “Revisiting Technical Workers: Professional and
Organisational Identities in the Software Industry,” New Technology, Work and Employment
22, no. 2 (2007): 98–117.
39 Wolfgang Streeck, “Skills and Politics, General and Specific,” in The Political Economy of
Collective Skill Formation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 317–52.
40 Daniel Kinderman, “Challenging Varieties of Capitalism’s Account of Business Interests:
Neoliberal Think-Tanks, Discourse as a Power Resource and Employers’ Quest for
Liberalization in Germany and Sweden,” Socio-Economic Review, accessed June 8, 2017,
https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mww040.
41 Alexander Reisenbichler and Kimberly J. Morgan, “From ‘Sick Man’ to ‘Miracle’
Explaining the Robustness of the German Labor Market During and After the Financial
Crisis 2008-09,” Politics & Society 40, no. 4 (December 1, 2012): 549–79.
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security not due to structural characteristics of the knowledge economy, but
because of a shift in ongoing contests between employers and labor.
3. Liberalization as a wholesale discursive shift
Liberalism in the twenty-first century has so far been characterized by
disembedding market forces from institutions for economic governance, but this
phenomenon is an ongoing political process, not a structural feature of
contemporary capitalism. I treat liberalization as description, rather than a cause, of
threats to worker’ rights, and seek to explain why liberalization has occurred. I
argue that liberalization has been driven by a widespread shift in the discursive
context of production, which has unbalanced the relationship between employers
and workers in the workplace. By undermining labor’s traditional power resources,
this discourse has increased employer discretion. At the same time, however, this
discursive shift also provides opportunities for workers to develop novel strategies
to protect their rights. Insecurity is not a structural characteristic of the transition to
the knowledge economy. Instead, workers’ conditions remain contingent on their
ability to resist employer discretion, and, in the chapters that follow, I show that, in
the knowledge economy, workers can build power in the workplace by developing
specific discursive strategies.
Researchers agree that the past decades have seen a rise in discourses that
revere market forces, but they disagree about how these discourses affect politics.
Schmidt and Thatcher point to the spread of “a commitment to certain core
principles focused on market competition and a limited state,” but they argue that
these discourses are not in themselves responsible for dismantling institutions for
economic governance.42 Similarly, Schulze-Cleven and Weishaupt acknowledge the
spread of liberalizing discourses, but show that, at the national level, countries have

Vivien A. Schmidt and Mark Thatcher, “Theorizing Ideational Continuity: The Resilience
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remained committed to long-standing norms of social protection.43 Others, however,
such as Hopkin and Lynch, link the rise of income inequality in Europe to the spread
of neoliberal ideas.44 Building on these existing approaches, I treat liberalization as a
discursive shift in the workplace, rather than at the national level. Focusing on the
context of production highlights the discourse that employers use to control
workers,45 and thus provides a tighter link between the macro-level transition to the
knowledge economy and micro-level changes to workers’ security.
In the 1990s, when countries began adopting the Silicon Valley model to
support the transition to the knowledge economy,46 employers imported the
market-revering discourse that developed alongside the tech sector. Since its early
days in Silicon Valley, the knowledge economy has been characterized by framing
scientific production in a primarily financial discourse. In the public sphere,
employers lobbied for institutional reform by arguing that producing technological
innovation requires disembedding market dynamics from institutions for economic
governance.47 In the workplace, employers focused on producing value for
shareholders, leading to the development of a primarily financial discourse, in
which workers are assessed, and working conditions shaped, by their firm’s
financial performance.48 Even in Germany, where robust complementarities

Tobias Schulze-Cleven and J. Timo Weishaupt, “Playing Normative Legacies Partisanship
and Employment Policies in Crisis-Ridden Europe,” Politics & Society 43, no. 2 (June 2015):
269–99.
44 Jonathan Hopkin and Julia Lynch, “Winner-Take-All Politics in Europe? European
Inequality in Comparative Perspective,” Politics & Society 44, no. 3 (2016): 341.
45 Michael Burawoy and Erik Olin Wright, “Coercion and Consent in Contested Exchange,”
Politics & Society 18, no. 2 (1990): 251–66.
46 Casper, “Can New Technology Firms Succeed in Coordinated Market Economies?”
47 Elizabeth Popp Berman, “Not Just Neoliberalism: Economization in US Science and
Technology Policy,” Science, Technology, & Human Values 39, no. 3 (May 1, 2014): 397–431,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243913509123; Fred Block and Matthew R. Keller, eds., State of
Innovation: The U.S. Government’s Role in Technology Development (Boulder, CO: Paradigm
Publishers, 2011).
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between institutions have limited formal changes to national institutions, employers
have reshaped the workplace by adopting the primarily financial discourse of
shareholder value.49 Workplace-level discourse thus reflects both the macro-level
transition to the knowledge economy, as well as a micro-level shift in management
strategies. Analyzing this discourse offers a promising platform for explaining why
employer discretion has increased, and workers’ security decreased, with the
transition to the knowledge economy.
When employers frame the employment relationship in a primarily financial
discourse, they directly threaten labor’s power resources. Workers can rely on many
resources beyond formal institutions and unions to build power against employer
discretion, such as their position in the organization of production or their position
in civil society, but each of these resources becomes effective only through collective
action.50 Employers’ framing of the employment relationship in primarily financial
terms threatens workers’ power resources because it restructures workers’
preferences toward collective action. It does so through two channels. First, this
discourse leads workers to see themselves as individuals with market power, rather
than sharing a common identity with other workers, which leads them to avoid
membership in unions.51 Second, workers participate in collective action only if they
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believe that mobilizing could be effective in protecting their rights,52 but the marketrevering discourses of liberalization imply that collective action will be ineffective
against the global market forces that shape the workplace. When employers frame
the employment relationship in a primarily financial discourse, they can persuade
workers that working conditions are “embedded in market structures and habits of
behavior that no one seems powerful enough to change.”53 Liberalization thus
threatens workers’ job security by limiting their capacity to mobilize.
In the chapters that follow, I refer to liberalization as the overarching
development in which the discursive shift associated with the knowledge economy
undermines workers’ power resources. By tracing the contingent processes that
constitute liberalization, I emphasize that workers are not necessarily weaker, but
that management’s primarily financial discourse disposes workers to not take
advantage of their power resources. To articulate this distinction between necessity
and contingency, I extend existing approaches to liberalization that focus on
workers’ occupational identities. Rather than following the asset theory of politics in
treating occupational identity from the perspective of atomistic individualism, I
approach occupational identity from the perspective of collective action, because
this is the critical factor in job security. As Polleta and Jasper emphasize, individuals’
identities are multifaceted, and their choice to participate in collective action
depends in large part on which aspects of their identities are activated by a
particular movement.54 Moreover, as I show in the following chapters, the transition
to the knowledge economy has been characterized by employers’ reshaping
workers’ identities by introducing new assumptions about their agency. I argue that
workers can nonetheless build power in the knowledge economy by strategically
PG Klandermans, “Mobilization and Participation in Trade Union Action: An ExpectancyValue Approach,” Journal of Occupational Psychology 57, no. 2 (June 1984): 107–20; John E.
Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism, and Long Waves (London:
Routledge, 1998).
53 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, “Illusions of Necessity in the Economic Order,” American
Economic Review 68, no. 2 (1978): 369.
54 Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,”
Annual Review of Sociology 27, no. 1 (2001): 283–305.
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redeploying management’s discourse in the workplace. In the section that follows, I
describe how the following chapters develop and test this argument.
4. The argument in brief
This dissertation develops a discursive account of liberalization by explaining
variation in tech workers’ job security. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I
argue that workers’ job security depends on whether they mobilize in the workplace
to enforce national institutions by bringing collective legal cases against their
employers. Second, as I demonstrate in four case studies presented in the following
chapters, tech workers decide to participate in collective action when organizers
deploy creative discursive strategies that demonstrate that mobilizing could be
effective in protecting their jobs. I develop this argument by comparing tech
workers’ responses to dismissals through two pairs of case studies in the US and
Germany. Focusing on two worksites at IBM in the US, and at Infineon and Siemens
in Germany, I show that, after these firms adopted an orientation to delivering
shareholder value, they abandoned previous commitments to lifetime employment
and dismissed thousands of tech workers. I explain why workers in two of the cases
resisted downsizing, while in the other two they acquiesced.
In Chapter 2, I extend the discursive analysis of liberalization introduced
above in order to outline how firms’ orientation to shareholder value threatens tech
workers’ job security. I propose two necessary conditions that must be met in order
for workers to mobilize and show how management’s framing of the employment
relationship in a primarily financial discourse makes it difficult for labor organizers
to meet these conditions. When a firm focuses on delivering value to shareholders
above all else, managers secure their control of the workplace through a hegemonic
discourse that frames the employment relationship in primarily financial terms.
Management’s hegemonic discourse shapes workers’ occupational identities by
disposing them to understand the employment relationship as determined by
market forces beyond their control. As long as workers believe they have no power
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to shape conditions in the workplace, mobilizing against downsizing is irrational,
leading workers to acquiesce to dismissals.
However, I argue that organizers can nonetheless mobilize workers by
demonstrating that collective action can be effective in saving their jobs. Doing so
requires that organizers develop a counterhegemonic strategy to redeploy
management’s own discourse in order to undermine their economic justification for
dismissals. Developing a counterhegemonic discourse depends on organizers’
creative interpretation of management’s framing of the employment relationship
and their identification of the inherent contradictions underlying management’s
financial discourse. After developing this causal mechanism for building worker
power in twenty-first century liberalism, I then apply it to tech workers. Through a
series of four case studies, I further refine this mechanism, showing that it can travel
effectively between multiple production regimes, as well as different national
settings.
4.1 The discursive context of production
While organizers’ creativity is central to their ability to mobilize tech workers
against dismissals, they do not do so in a vacuum. Chapter 3 introduces the concept
of the discursive context of production by tracing the historical development of
Silicon Valley. I show how the state’s support for technological innovation
buttressed entrepreneurs’ framing of the tech sector in a primarily financial
discourse, which shapes workers’ occupational identities in a manner that
minimizes their agency over working conditions. By embedding the workplace in
the context of global markets, the primarily financial discourse surrounding the tech
sector undermines workers’ traditional notions of solidarity and disposes them to
believe that working conditions are ineluctably shaped by market forces beyond
their control. As a result, workers in tech are inclined to acquiesce to downsizing,
because they do not recognize the potential effectiveness of collective action in
protecting their jobs. Countries that have adopted the Silicon Valley model for
growth have also adopted this discursive context of production, and I propose that
19

this shift to a primarily financial discourse in the workplace is what explains the
threat to workers’ job security under liberalization.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I test and refine this hypothesis by comparing workers’
responses to downsizing at two IBM workplaces in the US, one in Burlington,
Vermont, and the other in San Jose, California. I selected two sites in very different
locations in order to illustrate how variation in the discursive context of production
shapes power relations in the workplace. Although IBM as a firm adopted the
orientation to shareholder value in the late 1990s, variation in the discursive
context of production at the local level shaped how this affected workers’ job
security. Despite facing the same threat of dismissals and having access to the same
institutional resources, hundreds of workers at Burlington participated in collective
action against dismissals, while, in San Jose, only a handful of workers did so.
When management at IBM Burlington downsized in 2001, they followed
executives’ orders by framing dismissals in a primarily financial discourse. Despite
executives’ commitments to a liberalizing discourse revolving around global
financial markets, Burlington still embodied a Fordist workplace. Managers there
had spent decades establishing a hegemonic discourse that embedded the
workplace in local norms of reciprocity, and workers were disposed to believe that
working conditions were determined by management, rather than market forces
external to the firm. As a result, when managers announced dismissals, organizers
were able to appeal to workers’ occupational identities in order to persuade them
that collective action could be effective in protecting against downsizing. In Chapter
4, I show how organizers at Burlington redeployed management’s own hegemonic
discourse to persuade workers that collective action could be effective in protecting
their jobs. Hundreds of dismissed workers at Burlington participated in a collective
legal case against IBM, which was eventually settled in workers’ favor. I trace how
organizers developed a counterhegemonic strategy to meet the two conditions
necessary for mobilizing workers and suggest how the shift toward financial
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discourse associated with the knowledge economy could pose challenges to such
strategies.
While Chapter 4 identifies a causal mechanism in the discursive strategies
that workers developed to protect against downsizing in a Fordist context, Chapter
5 highlights how the discursive context of the knowledge economy challenges these
strategies. Workers at IBM San Jose were dismissed at the same rate as workers in
Burlington, and although they also had the option to join the collective legal case,
their participation was significantly lower. Chapter 5 shows that, just as at
Burlington, management framed dismissals in the primarily financial discourse of
shareholder value and organizers presented mobilization in normative terms.
However, workers at San Jose were not persuaded by organizers’ appeals because
they had formed occupational identities based on an understanding of the
employment relationship in primarily financial terms. This identity disposed
workers to believe they were powerless against dismissals, because they saw
downsizing as the unavoidable consequence of market forces external to the firm.
They believed that participating in collective action would be an irrational waste of
effort.
Workers at San Jose formed different occupational identities than their
colleagues in Burlington due to the different discursive context of production in
Silicon Valley. Just as at Burlington, the hegemonic discourse that management
established in the workplace reflected the local history of regulation, but in San Jose
this discourse disposed workers to understand the employment relationship as
shaped by global market forces beyond their control. At the same time, labor
organizers in San Jose failed to adapt their strategy to this discursive context.
Instead, they simply repeated the normative discursive strategy they received from
their colleagues in Burlington. Because workers at San Jose were disposed to find
management’s primarily financial framing of the employment relationship
persuasive, they were not convinced that collective action could be effective in
protecting their jobs, and they chose to acquiesce to downsizing. The post-Fordist
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context of production in Silicon Valley did not, however, guarantee organizers’
failure. Had they been more creative, organizers at San Jose could have framed
collective action in the primarily financial discourse that resonated with workers’
occupational identity.
After demonstrating the importance of the discursive context of production
and highlighting the role of organizers’ creativity in shaping workers’ job security, I
investigate how the causal mechanism that supported worker mobilization in
Burlington can be adapted to the discursive context of the knowledge economy. I
turn to the two German case studies in Part Two to illustrate that organizers’
creativity is just as important in Germany’s rich institutional setting as in the US’s
liberal environment of weak institutions.
4.2 Organizers’ counterhegemonic strategies
Part Two extends the causal mechanism identified in Burlington and San Jose in
order to explain variation in tech workers’ responses to dismissals in Germany.
Unlike Part One, where Burlington was situated in a Fordist context, Part Two
concerns workers embedded in the post-Fordist context of production at two firms
equally committed to the shareholder value orientation. Exploring what led workers
at Siemens to mobilize against dismissals and workers at Infineon to acquiesce
provides evidence for the two conditions necessary for worker mobilization under
twenty-first century liberalism. Given Germany’s robust institutions for industrial
relations, one would expect that workers there stand a better chance of defending
against dismissals. Enforcing these institutions, however, relies on workers
mobilizing in the workplace, which means that workers’ job security is as contingent
on workers’ collective action as in the US.
In Chapter 5, I introduce the institutions for industrial relations in Germany,
illustrating how legislation for dismissal protection and codetermination have
become less effective at protecting workers’ rights over the past two decades. While
the transition to the knowledge economy has weakened worker power in Germany
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just as in the US, I show that Germany’s institutions for industrial relations provide
resources for mobilizing in the workplace. In part, this is due to institutions’ support
for works councilors to act as labor organizers, a role that has largely been absent in
German industrial relations. I argue that, just as in the US, German workers can
mobilize against liberalization when they develop a counterhegemonic discourse to
exploit the inherent contradictions underlying the discursive context of production
in the tech sector.
Chapters 6 and 7 compare two cases of workers responding to downsizing in
Germany in order to illustrate that counterhegemonic strategies are effective in
building worker power in the knowledge economy. Nearly one thousand workers
were dismissed from Infineon’s headquarters in 2001 when works councilors
decided to acquiesce to management’s downsizing strategy. Management at
Infineon framed dismissals in the primarily financial discourse of shareholder value
to persuade its works council and workers that downsizing was unavoidable due to
market forces external to the firm. Similar to IBM, workers at Infineon constructed
occupational identities on the basis of management’s hegemonic discourse, which
disposed them to find managers’ primarily financial framing of dismissals
persuasive. Despite their access to significant institutional resources, workers
lacked an alternative account of dismissals that challenged management’s economic
justification. Believing they were powerless against the measures, workers chose to
acquiesce, which highlights that organizers’ creativity is as important to workers’
job security in Germany as in the US. While Germany’s institutions for industrial
relations allowed the works council at Infineon to establish their credibility with
workers, they did not demonstrate that collective action could be effective against
downsizing, so workers did not mobilize.
Just as at Infineon, management at Siemens established a hegemonic
discourse in the workplace based on the orientation to shareholder value, and, in
2002, they announced downsizing as the unavoidable consequence of market forces
external to the firm. Workers at Siemens, however, mobilized against dismissals and
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succeeded in stopping the measures. Chapter 7 traces how works councilors at
Siemens developed a counterhegemonic strategy that redeployed management’s
own discourse in order to undermine their justification for dismissals. I show how
works councilors exploited the contradictions inherent to management’s primarily
financial discourse in order to meet the two conditions necessary for mobilizing
workers. The path of downsizing at Siemens illustrates that the causal mechanism
that explains worker mobilization under Fordism and American institutions at IBM
Burlington can also explain why workers mobilize to defend their rights in the
context of the knowledge economy and German institutions.
At Siemens, works councilors leveraged their institutionally mandated
position in order to effectively become labor organizers, a role otherwise absent
from industrial relations in Germany. While works councilors are prohibited from
calling strikes and otherwise disturbing production, works councilors at Siemens
were able to use their access to workers and to Siemens’ business data in order to
persuade workers that mobilization against dismissals could be effective. Although
disposed to believe they were powerless against downsizing, workers at Siemens
came to see that downsizing was the consequence of management’s poor business
decisions. As a result, workers participated in collective action to pressure
management to consider alternative business strategies that avoided dismissals.
Taken together, these four case studies illustrate that in twenty-first century
liberalism tech workers can protect their jobs against downsizing when organizers
develop a counterhegemonic discourse to undermine management’s justification for
dismissals. By encouraging management to adopt the orientation to shareholder
value, liberalization has altered the trajectory of political economic development in
the US and Germany by relocating industrial conflict to the workplace and
increasing the centrality of discursive strategies to protecting workers’ job security.
As the tech sector grows across the OECD’s wealthy democracies, and firms
increasingly adopt an orientation to shareholder value, industrial relations will
continue to evolve. However, in contrast to existing accounts of liberalization,
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disintegrating job security is by no means a necessary structural characteristic of
these developments. While it is true that employers consistently seek out
production environments with the lowest costs, the path of capitalist development
is contingent on employers’ discretion and workers’ resistance to it rather than an
inexorable structural dynamic. In order to situate the industrial relations of
contemporary wealthy democracies in the context of capitalist development, we
must therefore turn to “the struggles of newly emerging working classes that are
successively made and strengthened as an unintended outcome of the development
of historical capitalism, even as old working classes are being unmade.”55 This
dissertation presents an account of liberalization by tracing the processes by which
tech workers develop power resources in the workplace to mobilize against mass
dismissals. By shaping how broader structural transformations affect the workplace,
workers play a central role in directing the path of liberalism in the twenty-first
century.

55

Silver, Forces of Labor, 20.

25

Chapter 2. Worker Power under Liberalization
In this chapter, I argue that workers can develop power resources under
liberalization by developing strategies to challenge management’s discourse in the
workplace. As argued in the previous chapter, liberalization is constituted by a
wholesale discursive shift that leads managers to frame the employment
relationship in a primarily financial discourse. As capitalist democracies across the
OECD transition to the knowledge economy, firms have increasingly adopted an
orientation to producing shareholder value. This shareholder value orientation
motivates managers to downsize when their firms face business challenges and
encourages them to justify dismissals as necessary for the firm’s survival. Rather
than contesting the global market forces that make downsizing seem unavoidable,
workers in the knowledge economy are disposed to acquiesce to dismissals. This
chapter argues that workers can nonetheless resist management’s threats of
downsizing. I propose that when workers develop counterhegemonic strategies,
they can mobilize against downsizing and protect their jobs even when management
insists that dismissals are unavoidable.
Building on existing research on worker mobilization, I argue that workers
mobilize only when labor organizers meet two necessary conditions. First,
organizers must demonstrate to workers that collective action could be potentially
effective in meeting their interests. Second, organizers must do so in a discourse
that workers find persuasive. Management’s framing of the employment
relationship in the primarily financial discourse of shareholder value amplifies both
of these challenges for workers facing dismissals. Not only do managers insist that
market forces external to the firm require downsizing, but they do so in a discourse
that workers are disposed to find persuasive. Nonetheless, I argue that the primarily
financial discourse that management adopted with the transition to the knowledge
economy is inherently contradictory, which provides organizers a set of resources
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for demonstrating that collective action could protect against dismissals in a
discourse that workers find persuasive. I propose that workers will mobilize to
protect their jobs when organizers leverage these contradictions to redeploy
management’s own discourse in challenging the justification for dismissals.
After briefly reviewing existing approaches to worker power under
liberalization, I introduce my discursive approach. I outline the two conditions
necessary for worker mobilization and show why liberalization, considered as a
wholesale discursive shift, poses such a threat to worker power. Applying the
concepts of hegemony and counterhegemonic strategy, I propose how workers can
build power under liberalization and offer two hypotheses supporting these
propositions. The remainder of the chapter describes the research methods relied
on in order to develop and test this argument.
1. Worker power
Existing approaches to worker power provide a broad palette for describing the
ways in which liberalization has weakened workers vis-à-vis management, but they
cannot explain why worker power varies in the knowledge economy. Mirroring the
existing approaches to liberalization presented in the previous chapter, worker
power is all too often attributed to structural and institutional factors, rather than
workers’ own agency and creativity. Without accounting for contingency in the
workplace, we cannot explain why some workers in the tech sector succumb to
downsizing while others succeed in protecting their job security.
Structural factors, such as whether a product market is growing or shrinking,
no doubt play a role in worker power. Cowie and Silver, among many others,
illustrate that the dynamics of global trade can drastically shape workers’
bargaining power vis-à-vis management.56 It seems like common sense that when
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wages are cheaper in Mexico than in the US, American unions can do little to protect
against offshoring. However, researchers show that while international wage
differentials certainly shape worker power, they are not determinative. As Cowie
himself suggests, and Levesque and Murray demonstrate, transnational organizing
strategies can provide workers bargaining power against employers’ capital
mobility.57 Thus, while liberalization has increased employers’ structural advantage
over workers, this cannot explain why workers are able to protect their rights in
some cases but not in others.
Institutions also play a central role in worker power, but they too are not
determinative. Doellgast shows that workers in countries with robust institutions
for industrial relations have greater bargaining power vis-à-vis management than
workers in countries without them, even when both countries face significant
pressure to liberalize.58 Scholars have long shown that unions and encompassing
collective bargaining also strengthen worker power. Nonetheless, these institutions
are effective only when workers activate them,59 and the growing inequalities
within countries illustrate that national-level institutions are no guarantee of
worker power in the workplace.60 Liberalization has seen significant institutional
changes that disadvantage workers, but without examining how these institutions
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are interpreted and applied, it is impossible to explain how exactly they shape
worker power.61
Alternative approaches to worker power illustrate that workers’ ability to
meet their interests vis-à-vis management depends on their ability to mobilize.62
While institutional and structural factors certainly play a role in whether workers
develop the capacity for collective action, this can often turn in large part on
organizers’ strategic capacity, which “is based on the innovative, often guileful,
exercise of agency.”63 As unions have seen a selective revitalization across the
OECD’s capitalist democracies, scholars explaining the phenomenon have
increasingly turned to research on social movements to coin the term “social
movement unionism.”64 What the research on union revitalization makes clear is
that framing strategies related to mobilization are crucial for building worker power
under liberalization.65
As argued in the previous chapter, liberalization is constituted by a wholesale
discursive shift that upends labor’s traditional power resources. In order to mobilize
workers who do not identify with traditional notions of solidarity, labor organizers
must frame their appeals for collective action in new discourses.66 This challenge is
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particularly stark in the tech sector, where workers are especially unlikely to
identify with the labor movement. In the next section, I argue that organizers’
discursive strategies are crucial to worker power due to two conditions that are
necessary to worker mobilization.

1.1 Necessary conditions for mobilization: potential effectiveness and
persuasiveness
In order for workers to mobilize against their employer, organizers must satisfy two
necessary conditions. They must: (a) demonstrate the potential effectiveness of
collective action, and (b) do so in a discourse that workers find persuasive. Spelling
out these conditions underlines why liberalization poses a significant challenge to
workers’ rights, but also identifies a set of strategies that organizers can use to
defend workers against downsizing.
The first necessary condition, that organizers demonstrate the potential
effectiveness of collective action, echoes findings from the social movements
literature. Piven and Cloward argue that individuals and groups will not mobilize
unless they believe that they have the power to change their situation.67 Elaborating
on Piven and Cloward, McAdam introduced the term “cognitive liberation” to name
the process by which a group comes to recognize its power to change the conditions
it faces.68 Labor scholars apply the concept of cognitive liberation to workers’
mobilization in the workplace, with Kelly arguing that, “it is vital that aggrieved
individuals blame an agency for their problems, rather than attributing them to
uncontrollable forces or events. That agency can then become the target for
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collective organization and action.”69 Demonstrating the potential effectiveness of
collective action is a necessary condition for mobilization because individuals
choose whether to participate based on weighing the expected costs and benefits.70
However, while workers’ calculations about the instrumentality of collective
action may adhere to a rational choice framework, the standards of assessment
depend on organizers’ discursive strategies. Organizers must “make such
instrumentality plausible, often in the face of counter-arguments by the opposition.
The degree of success achieved in spreading a positive attitude towards the goals of
action depends on how plausible the instrumentality has been made.”71 Individuals
decide to participate based on calculating whether the benefits of participation
outweigh its costs. Of course, normative considerations and emotions play a role in
individuals’ decision to participate in collective action, along with simply false
understandings of their situation.72 Nonetheless, individuals always decide to
participate in collective action based on the sense that doing so will be
consequential for some result, which may be affective as much as material.
Dismissals, however, present a situation where a worker’s livelihood is threatened,
so that the decision to participate in collective action must be weighed against the
especially material costs and benefits of searching for another job or identifying
other means of being re-employed. As long as managers frame dismissals as beyond
workers’ agency, collective action presents no benefits, although the costs can be
quite high.
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Workers will acquiesce to dismissals not because there are no potential
benefits of participating in collective action, but because workers believe this to be
the case. Klandermans points out that workers’ calculations about the
instrumentality of collective action depend on discursive contests between
management and organizers.73 Workers may come to doubt management’s framing
of dismissals if they are exposed to an alternative discourse, such as one that
attributes dismissals to management error. As the case studies that follow
demonstrate, management in the tech sector has by and large succeeded in framing
the employment relationship in a primarily financial discourse of global markets,
which makes tech workers unlikely to develop an alternative.
Workers will mobilize to protect their jobs only when organizers persuade
workers that collective action can be effective. In the next section, I outline why
liberalization poses such a threat to worker power before outlining how organizers
can develop counterhegemonic strategies to mobilize tech workers against
downsizing.
1.2 The threat of liberalization
I argue that liberalization undermines worker power by making it difficult for labor
organizers to meet the two conditions necessary for mobilizing workers. As
illustrated in the previous chapter, the discursive shift in management’s strategies
for control has led to a broad-spectrum shift in workers’ identities away from
classical notions of solidarity. Scholars note how the emerging forms of worker
identity require organizers to innovate new strategies for mobilization. Extending
these approaches to add greater specificity, I argue that liberalization threatens
worker power by (a) undermining workers’ beliefs that collective action can be
effective in protecting their jobs, and (b) realigning workers’ standards for
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credibility so that they find management’s economic justifications for downsizing
persuasive.
As countries across the OECD transition to the knowledge economy, firms
increasingly orient their production strategies to produce value for shareholders.
This orientation to shareholder value encourages management to frame the
employment relationship in a primarily financial discourse, which persuades
workers that collective action can do little to protect their jobs. Under liberalization,
managers’ discourse in the workplace revolves around the concept that external
market forces set tight parameters on the employment relationship. One
increasingly common practice is to link workers’ wages to the firms’ financial
performance.74 This ensures that workers believe that their working conditions are
shaped directly by market forces beyond managers’ control. By adopting specific
accounting practices in concert with a financial discourse in the workplace,
managers reinforce the notion that the firm’s performance depends on external
market forces, so that when the firm performs poorly, dismissals are unavoidable
because they are simply demanded by the market. When workers find
management’s strong conception of market forces persuasive, they believe it is
senseless to mobilize against dismissals because their agency over working
conditions is highly limited. In such a scenario, collective action would be ineffective
and thus not worth the costs, leading workers to acquiesce to the threat of
dismissals rather than mobilizing.
The white-collar workers who constitute the core of the knowledge economy
are particularly affected by management’s hegemonic discourse. High-skilled
workers have long avoided participating in collective action and joining unions
because they believed that they can more effectively protect their rights through
Alexander Börsch, Global Pressure, National System: How German Corporate Governance Is
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individual action.75 Even in Germany, where engineers traditionally belonged to the
metalworkers’ union, IG Metall, white-collar workers increasingly prefer to solve
problems independently.76 Tech workers are likely to view collective action as
limiting, rather than improving, their ability to influence management.77 These
trends are consistent with Boltanski and Chiapello’s observations that management
has reshaped workers’ identities to increase their compliance in the workplace.78 In
contrast to Boltanski and Chiapello’s account, however, I show that management’s
discourse is primarily financial, and that it is based on inherent contradictions that
limit workers’ power on the one hand, while offering opportunities for resistance on
the other. Management’s discursive shift with the transition to the knowledge
economy reinforces high-skilled workers’ propensity to avoid collective action by
undermining their sense of collective agency.
The discursive strategies that management developed with the orientation to
shareholder value are effective at persuading workers to acquiesce because they
deploy a specialized language of expertise. This language of expertise restructures
workers’ standards of credibility so that they are persuaded by managers’ framing
of the employment relationship. The discourse of financial markets requires
credentials in order to participate. Managers demonstrate these credentials by using
specific words and acronyms that do not belong to everyday speech, such as “EVA
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[economic value added],” “FCF [free cash flow],” “EBITDA [earnings before interest,
tax, depreciation, and amortization].”79 One acquires these credentials either by
attending business school or sharing a career similar to managers. Financial
discourse thus performs important boundary-work in the workplace by delineating
the subjects over which managers exercise jurisdiction.80 Establishing jurisdiction
over a particular subject allows managers to exclude competing claims on the basis
that their expertise gives them superior insight. Therefore, if managers can frame a
particular issue in financial discourse, whether it is performance evaluations or
downsizing, they can prevent workers from questioning their decisions by arguing
that the overarching power of financial markets makes critique pointless and
resistance ineffective.
While some spheres, such as accounting, readily lend themselves to being
described in financial discourse, managers also engage in what Boyer calls
“epistemophagy,” a process of applying specialized discourse, along with its
particular epistemic claims, in order to exercise jurisdiction over a new sphere.81
This is what makes financial discourse performative, rather than descriptive. When
managers frame phenomena in financial terms, other actors perceive them as
though they really were financial. According to Froud et al., “discourses of
shareholder value ‘produce’ financialized management practices rather than
‘represent’ practices that already exist.”82 When managers justify their actions in
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financial discourse they cloak their own agency, making it appear as though external
financial dynamics directly determine firm strategy. Financial discourse thus creates
the world it describes,83 which is one where workers are unable to exercise agency
over their working conditions. When firms adopt the orientation to shareholder
value, managers implement a primarily financial discourse that persuades workers
to acquiesce to dismissals.
Liberalization threatens worker power because it reshapes the discursive
context of the workplace so that workers adopt an occupational identity that
disposes them to find management credible rather than recognizing the
opportunities for collective action. This shift in workers’ identity is one consequence
of management deploying a primarily financial discourse to establish hegemony in
the workplace.
Ensuring workers’ acquiescence to downsizing is an extension of the general
problem that managers face, which is that they must convince workers to contribute
their labor power to the firm, even though the firm receives the vast majority of the
benefits of their efforts. Generally barred from resorting to violence, employers
solve this problem by establishing a hegemonic system of control “in which the
conflicting interests of workers and capitalists are coordinated in such a way that
workers spontaneously consent to their own exploitation.”84 Employers establish
hegemony structurally by constructing wage systems that compensate workers for
their effort, but they also establish hegemony discursively by legitimizing a type of
common sense in the workplace that minimizes workers’ agency over working
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conditions.85 This common sense is based in a handful of foundational concepts:
“Hegemony is obtained through the construction of nodal points, which discursively
fix the meaning of institutions and social practices and articulate the ‘common
sense’ through which a given conception of reality is established.”86 Hegemony is
effective because this common sense mystifies the production process by obscuring
workers’ surrender of their labor power and leads them to believe that the
production process is an enjoyable game, for instance, rather than exploitation.87
Under liberalization, management can persuade workers to acquiesce to
dismissals because their hegemonic discourse constructs workers’ occupational
identities in a manner that leads them to believe they have minimal agency over
working conditions. Framing the employment relationship in a primarily financial
discourse leads workers to understand their participation in production not in
relation to their managers but to market forces external to the firm. In comparison
to these global market forces, workers appear powerless.
Establishing a hegemonic discourse allows management to construct the
rules of the game in the workplace, structuring how workers understand their
ability to shape their working conditions. Importantly, these rules are internalized
in workers’ dispositions. Management’s control of the workplace “is complete and
fully viable only if it is durably objectified not only in things, that is, in the logic,
transcending individual agents, of a particular field, but also in bodies, in durable
dispositions to recognize and comply with the demands immanent in the field.”88
Hegemony can also be established across a mode of production, or an entire national
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Providing workers with conceptual schema that lead them to comply with
management, a hegemonic discourse effectively anchors managers’ control without
requiring constant observation or sanction.89
By framing the employment relationship in primarily financial discourse,
management establishes hegemony by providing workers a set of basic underlying
beliefs about the way the world works. These beliefs constitute the basis of
occupational identity by disposing workers to perceive the world in a certain way
and act accordingly. As a result, workers comply with management without
consciously choosing to do so. Workers’ identities are composed of beliefs so basic
that they are rarely if ever explicitly articulated, because they comprise the
structure of workers’ perceptions, rather than the objects they perceive.90 However,
workers’ identities can be inferred by isolating the basic assumptions underlying
their discourse and can be observed in their behavior. Certain actions will remain
obscured by their dispositions, which, like all dispositions, recognize only a limited
set of all the paths of action that are available. By closing off certain paths of action
as either non-existent or irrational, workers’ occupational identities ensure their
compliance with managers’ direction.
Management’s hegemonic discourse allows them to control the workplace
from inside the worker outwards, so to speak, rather than from outside the worker
inwards because it
ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in
each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and
action, tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices and their
constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit
norms.91
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By framing the employment relationship in primarily financial discourse,
management consistently communicates that the workplace is shaped directly by
market forces external to the firm. As a result, workers form an occupational
identity that may enable them to exercise considerable jurisdiction over technical
matters but tightly limits their ability to shape working conditions.
The spread of the shareholder value orientation encourages workers to
acquiesce to downsizing because it allows managers to establish a hegemonic
financial discourse that frames the employment relationship as though it were
shaped by market forces external to the firm. This primarily financial discourse
introduces a highly restricted understanding of workers’ agency, whereby workers
are unable to affect conditions in the workplace. While hegemonic strategies ensure
that workers contribute their labor power to production, identities are durable and
adaptable,92 so they can affect other elements of employment, such as how workers
respond to downsizing.
The transition to the knowledge economy undermines worker power
because it threatens the two conditions necessary for mobilizing in the workplace.
When firms adopt the orientation to shareholder value, managers establish a
primarily financial discourse as hegemonic in the workplace. As a result, workers
come to understand their agency over working conditions as significantly limited by
global market forces beyond their control. In addition, this discourse reshapes
workers’ standards of credibility by disposing them to find management’s framing
of the employment relationship persuasive. These two threats to worker power are
significant and durable because they are inscribed in workers’ occupational
identities, which take form around management’s financial discourse. While
observable across the OECD’s wealthy democracies, the threat of liberalization to
worker power is most stark in the tech sector, where market turbulence often
results in thousands of dismissals. At the same time, the tech sector offers an arena
92
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for identifying how workers can nonetheless build power resources under
liberalization.
Cause

Causal mechanism: Discursive transformation
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Figure 2.1. The process of liberalization

40

2. The possibility of counterhegemonic strategy
Building worker power under liberalization is difficult because the discursive shift
accompanying firms’ orientation to shareholder value undermines the two
conditions necessary for mobilization. With the transition to the knowledge
economy, management has succeeded in shaping workers’ identities so that they fail
to recognize the potential effectiveness of collective action and so that workers are
disposed to be persuaded by management’s primarily financial framing of the
employment relationship. Despite these challenges, I argue that labor organizers can
mobilize workers by developing a counterhegemonic discursive strategy.
Demonstrating the potential effectiveness of collective action to workers in
the knowledge economy is difficult because organizers must align their framing
strategies with workers’ occupational identities. Snow et al. describe this act of
alignment as “resonance,” and write that framing is effective only when it achieves a
“degree of resonance with the current life situation and experience of the potential
constituents.”93 Workers may apply a wide variety of different frames to understand
their “current life situation,” which means that the most promising strategy for
generating resonance is for organizers to engage the management’s hegemonic
discourse, which workers generally recognize as persuasive.94 In the knowledge
economy, workers’ occupational identities dispose them to understand dismissals
through management’s primarily financial hegemonic discourse. Organizers’
framing will resonate with workers only if it echoes management’s characterization
of dismissals as beyond workers’ control. However, while redeploying the form of
management’s own discourse, organizers must present workers with alternative
substantive arguments, namely, that they have the capacity to protect themselves
from downsizing.
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Despite significant differences in context, existing studies of
counterhegemonic discourse show that it can be an effective strategy for challengers
to re-use the discourse of the dominant in order to undermine the very claims that
support domination.95 I approach counterhegemonic discourse through the lens of
research on social movement framing, which outlines how creative actors use
discursive strategies to mobilize collective action. An effective framing strategy
results in “the linkage of individual and SMO [social movement organization]
interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and
beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complimentary.”96
Because they must coordinate their activities toward shared goals and must agree
on at least a minimum of tactics, individuals participate in collective action only
when they believe that other potential members share their orientations. Organizers
play a critical role in fulfilling this necessary condition for collective action by
developing a discourse that articulates to workers their shared goals and illustrates
the potential effectiveness of collective action.
Participating in collective action is rational only if actors are capable of
affecting the conditions that threaten them. The discursive shift accompanying the
transition to the knowledge economy thus underscores Snow and Benford’s
proposition that attributional framing is the most important element of organizers’
discursive strategies.97 As illustrated above, managers attribute dismissals to
market forces beyond workers’ control, which discourages them from mobilizing by
presenting collective action as irrational. In order to mobilize workers to defend
against dismissals, organizers must persuade workers that downsizing is caused by
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factors within their control, whether that is managers’ discretion or their firm’s
performance. Framing management’s actions as unjust often helps motivate
workers’ collective action, but “the emergence of an injustice frame must be
accompanied by a corresponding shifting in attributional orientation” because “the
development and adoption of an injustice frame is not sufficient to account for the
direction of action.”98 In order to frame dismissals in a manner that convincingly
attributes them to factors within workers’ control, organizers face a distinct
challenge under conditions of liberalization, but also a particular opportunity.
Counterhegemonic strategies are made possible by management’s reliance
on discursive tactics to establish their control of the workplace. Discourse is an
effective method of control due to its subtlety and ubiquity, but “the multivocal
nature of discourse provides the means for challengers to find gaps, contradictions,
and silences in this taken-for-grantedness of hegemonic genres.”99 Furthermore, the
very structure of hegemony lends itself to resistance. While managers’ hegemonic
discourse denies the possibility of workers’ agency, “every order is the temporary
and precarious articulation of contingent practices. Things could always have been
otherwise and every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities.”100
Managers’ explicit limitations on workers’ agency in the workplace implicitly
suggests an alternative order in which workers do have the power to shape their
working conditions. A counterhegemonic discourse articulates such an alternative
order. In the knowledge economy, for instance, where workers are disposed to be
persuaded by management’s insistence that dismissals are unavoidable, organizers
can develop a counterhegemonic discourse to illustrate alternative responses to
market forces and thus undermine managers’ justification for downsizing.

Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
Participation,” 474.
99 Marc Steinberg, “The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic Analysis of
Repertoires of Discourse among Nineteenth-Century Cotton Spinners,” American Journal of
Sociology 105, no. 3 (November 1999): 751.
100 Moufe, “Critique as Counter-Hegemonic Intervention.”
98

43

Actors have developed effective counterhegemonic discourses in a wide
variety of contexts, from everyday forms of resistance in rural Malaysia, to
dissidents’ opposition to the German Democratic Republic in East Berlin, to
renegotiating state boundaries.101 In each case, creative actors redeployed the
hegemonic discourse of those in power to accumulate enough evidence of
contradictions and gaps in that discourse that they were able to articulate the
possibility that collective action could succeed in defending their rights.
Even before liberalization, management typically relied on a hegemonic
discourse to maintain their authority, so counterhegemonic strategies are well
suited to the workplace.102 Scholars have shown that workers can deploy broader
norms from civil society in order to question management’s practices, 103 while in
other cases, workers use management’s own discourse to resist particular decisions.
Badigannavar and Kelly, for instance, trace how workers at a university redeployed
management’s own economic justifications for downsizing in order to demonstrate
that these claims were invalid.104 Redeploying management’s own discourse can be
limiting in some cases, but in others, in can be highly effective because it allows
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workers to express their grievances and their strategy for collective action in a
discourse that is broadly recognized in the workplace as persuasive.105
Hypothesis I: The contradictions inherent to financial discourse
Counterhegemonic strategies of resistance are particularly effective in cases of
“political economic domination,” where hegemonic discourses “simultaneously and
contradictorily create the space for the expression of opposing discourses.”106 This is
due in part to actors’ recognition that the reality they perceive exceeds the
discourse provided by those in power: “a hegemonic discourse always remains
‘radically incommensurable’ with the whole. This is because it can never perfectly
map onto and describe the social as totality.”107 When creative actors recognize that
reality offers them more possibilities than what those in power acknowledge, they
can develop alternative discourses to articulate those possibilities. By articulating
the possibilities for agency in a counterhegemonic discourse, creative actors make
new forms of collective action possible in practice.
I propose that management’s primarily financial framing of employment is
based on a set of inherent contradictions, and hypothesize that these contradictions
offer workers the opportunity to develop effective counterhegemonic strategies.
Scholars have noted that firms’ adoption of the orientation to shareholder value
increases management’s propensity to not only frame the employment relationship
in primarily financial discourse but also to structure compensation in a manner that
ties workers’ rewards to the firm’s financial performance.108 Systems of “variable
Christian Lévesque and Gregor Murray, “Renewing Union Narrative Resources: How
Union Capabilities Make a Difference,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 51, no. 4 (2013):
787; Steinberg, “The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action.”
106 Susan Gal, “Language and Political Economy,” Annual Review of Anthropology 18 (1989):
360.
107 Spicer and Böhm, “Moving Management: Theorizing Struggles against the Hegemony of
Management,” 1671.
108 John C. Dencker and Chichun Fang, “Rent Seeking and the Transformation of
Employment Relationships The Effect of Corporate Restructuring on Wage Patterns,
Determinants, and Inequality,” American Sociological Review 81, no. 3 (April 28, 2016): 17,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416642419.
105

45

pay” are based on the principle that workers earn more when the firm captures
greater profits. While increasingly popular with the shift to the knowledge economy,
variable pay is based on a fundamental contradiction concerning workers’ agency.
On the one hand, management implies that workers have the power to shape firm
performance, which is why they deserve higher pay when the firm performs better.
However, on the other hand, management implies that workers’ agency is
significantly limited by market forces, because if the firm performs poorly, workers
may receive lower pay, even if they exerted a great degree of effort.
Without a stable principle to determine the balance of power between
workers and market forces external to the firm, systems of variable pay enable
managers to exercise greater discretion over compensation because they can adjust
workers’ pay based on ad hoc judgments of what workers deserve. The popularity of
variable pay in the knowledge economy is consistent with observations that
managers’ discretion has risen considerably over the past several decades.109
While reinforcing managers’ discretion in the workplace, this contradictory
understanding of workers’ agency also provides workers the resources to develop
an effective counterhegemonic strategy. As articulated above, the primary challenge
to worker power in the knowledge economy is that management’s hegemonic
discourse disposes workers to believe that collective action will be ineffective in
protecting their rights. Under these conditions, workers are likely to believe
management’s argument that downsizing is unavoidable due to market conditions
external to the firm, and, on the basis of this belief, workers are likely to acquiesce
rather than mobilize to defend their jobs. Variable pay, however, is based in part on
the assumption that workers are powerful enough to shape their firm’s performance
against market forces. If workers can amplify this underlying assumption, they can
articulate an alternative to management’s argument that market forces require
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downsizing. As long as workers are powerful enough to shape their firm’s
performance, they should also be powerful enough to enact a business strategy that
can improve their firm’s position and thereby avoid dismissals.
Management’s primarily financial framing of the employment relationship
thus reinforces their power over workers on the one hand, while, on the other, also
providing opportunities for resistance. I hypothesize that workers in the knowledge
economy can mobilize to protect their rights when they exploit the contradictions
underlying management’s primarily financial framing of the employment
relationship.
Hypothesis II: Workers can mobilize under conditions of liberalization when
they develop counterhegemonic discourse
Although management’s primarily financial framing of the employment relationship
provides workers with distinct resources for mobilization, these resources must be
activated in order to be effective. I propose that workers can activate these
resources by developing counterhegemonic strategies.
As outlined above, a counterhegemonic strategy involves a challenger
redeploying the discourse of the dominant in order to undermine the conditions of
domination. The contradictions inherent to management’s primarily financial
framing of the employment relationship provide workers a discourse that, on the
one hand, supports management’s domination, while, on the other hand, illustrating
the possibility of workers’ power. Thus, the discursive shift accompanying the
transition to the knowledge economy provides conditions conducive to developing
counterhegemonic strategies.
A counterhegemonic approach to the primarily financial framing of the
employment relationship can fulfill the two conditions necessary for workers to
mobilize in the knowledge economy. First, exposing the contradictions underlying
management’s hegemonic discourse makes visible an alternative conception of
worker power, whereby workers are able to shape how their firm performs against
47

external market forces. By amplifying this alternative conception of workers’
agency, organizers can demonstrate to workers that collective action could be
effective in protecting their rights. Moreover, a counterhegemonic approach to
management’s discourse can demonstrate the potential effectiveness of worker
power in terms that they find persuasive. Workers are disposed to believe
management’s framing of the employment relationship and, as illustrated above,
this framing already articulates a strong conception of worker power. I hypothesize
that organizers can mobilize workers in the knowledge economy by developing a
counterhegemonic strategy to redeploy management’s primarily financial discourse.
2.1 The causal aspects of counterhegemonic strategy
While the discursive shift accompanying the transition to the knowledge economy
provides promising conditions for organizers to develop counterhegemonic
strategies, the effectiveness of these strategies is far from guaranteed. This section
identifies the causally relevant aspects of the counterhegemonic strategy that I
propose will be effective at mobilizing workers.
I take workers’ mobilization as the outcome that must be explained under
conditions of liberalization. Sometimes workers mobilize and sometimes they do
not, and this decision whether to participate in collective action against dismissals
plays a direct role in whether they are protected against downsizing. While
mobilization is certainly not a sufficient condition – given the contingencies of
management’s decision making, as well as that of labor courts, in addition to other
contextual factors – it is a necessary condition, given that mobilization is required
for enforcing national institutions for industrial relations in many countries,
including the US and Germany. Thus, the causal mechanism embodied by framing
described above is hypothesized to explain variation in workers’ participation in
collective action rather than job security tout court.
Workers’ mobilization in the workplace varies in relation to management’s
announcement of downsizing, which I take as the initial cause or “independent
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variable.” When management announces downsizing, workers must choose whether
to acquiesce or resist. I offer a causal mechanism of framing in three parts in order
to explain why workers acquiesce sometimes when managers announce
downsizing, and why sometimes they resist.110
The first step in explaining the path of workers’ responses to downsizing is
identifying whether organizers advocate collective action or not. Organizers must
attempt to persuade workers to participate in collective action if their framing
strategies are to be effective. As I illustrate in the chapters that follow, even if
organizers have established their credibility with workers, this counts for little if
they do not harness that credibility to mobilize workers.
The second step marks the critical difference between cases where workers
acquiesce and those where they resist. In addition to advocating collective action, in
the knowledge economy, organizers must frame dismissals in a financial discourse.
As I argued above, organizers must make the case for collective action in a discourse
that workers find credible. With the transition to the knowledge economy, workers
are disposed to believe management’s primarily financial framing of the
employment relationship, which means that organizers must redeploy this
discourse if they are to persuade workers to mobilize. I describe this action of
redeploying management’s discourse as a counterhegemonic strategy.
Counterhegemonic strategy is what allows organizers to fulfill the second necessary
condition for mobilizing workers.
Third, organizers’ framing strategy is effective only when workers believe
that mobilization can be effective. I propose that organizers can fulfill the first
necessary condition for mobilizing workers when they develop a counterhegemonic
strategy to frame downsizing in a financial discourse. I include this step as part of
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the causal mechanism because it can be the case that organizers advocate collective
action and frame downsizing in a financial discourse without persuading workers
that mobilization could be effective. In such a case, workers would not mobilize.
Therefore, meeting this step is a critical part of the causal mechanism I develop to
explain variation in worker mobilization under conditions of liberalization.
These three parts constitute the core of the framing mechanism I develop in
the chapters that follow. However, causal mechanisms are effective only in relation
to particular contextual conditions.111 Chapters 3 and 6 offer insights on how the
discursive and institutional context surrounding production shapes the
effectiveness of this framing mechanism. I summarize those conditions in the table
below, noting that institutions can provide organizers the opportunity to develop
discursive strategy and as well as structures for sanctioning management. At the
same time, however, each of these contextual elements is relevant to whether
workers mobilize only to the degree that organizers creatively interpret them.
Before describing the research methods used to develop this argument, the next
section turns to the issue of creativity and emphasizes its significance in explaining
the path of liberalization.
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Figure 2.2 Causal mechanism with contextual conditions

3. Creative action under liberalization
Against those views suggesting that the transition to the knowledge economy
necessarily threatens workers’ job security, I propose an alternative approach
emphasizing the contingencies that shape the path of liberalization. Focusing on the
discursive strategies that employers develop to control the workplace alongside the
strategies that workers develop to protect their rights contributes to ongoing
discussions about the role that actors’ creativity plays in political economic
transition.
The conditions of liberalization are still relatively new to the OECD’s wealthy
democracies, but it has been decades since countries in Latin America and Eastern
Europe began facing the challenges associated with market forces being
disembedded from institutions for social protection. While some argued that the
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broad changes that unfolded in each of these regions was due to structural factors,
many have emphasized the importance of actors’ creativity in shaping the path of
liberalization. In Latin America, for instance, changes to civil society undermined
unions’ power, but workers developed novel strategies to defend their rights.112
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, labor in Eastern Europe was weakened not just by
the liberalizing reforms imposed by international organizations, but also by their
history of collaboration with dictatorships. Nonetheless, some unions succeeded in
mobilizing workers to protect their rights, leading scholars to conclude that “the
behavior of actors is neither uniform, nor merely reproducing past habits and
practices; instead it reflects significant political creativity on the part of differently
situated actors seeking to survive in the midst of extreme uncertainty.”113 Research
on liberalization in each of these regions suggest a number of lessons for studying
liberalization in the OECD’s wealthy democracies, but the main one is that the path
of liberalization is driven by actors’ creativity rather than structural forces.
I build on these approaches to liberalization in other regions by focusing on
the discursive shifts that accompany political economic transition. As argued above,
the ascendance of a primarily financial discourse can significantly constrain labor’s
traditional power resources, but it can also provide new types of resources for
mobilizing in the workplace. In other words, the effects of this discursive shift
depend directly on actors’ interpretations.
Recent years have seen scholars pay increasing attention to the role of
creativity and interpretation in politics, particularly around institutional change.
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Streeck and Thelen point to the “gaps” in formal institutions in order to propose that
change occurs when actors creatively interpret these gaps to meet their purposes.114
While compelling on many levels, their account provides little guidance regarding
how this act of creativity unfolds, beyond specifying that “applying a general rule to
a specific situation is a creative act that must take into account, not just the rule
itself, but also the unique circumstances to which it is to be applied.”115 Consensus
has formed that creative interpretation has little to do with classical conceptions of
genius, which “itself creates models and rules,” but is instead constituted by
recomposing elements that already exist.116 Berk and Galvan call this “creative
syncretism,” whereby even the most untethered forms of imagining “new lines of
action” are shaped by “prior ways, hopes, and examples or combinations of these old
actions…. They come from a socially shared repertoire of relevant impulses and
actions,” which include “institutional rules and roles, cultural heritage and historical
memory.”117
I propose that this model for understanding creativity in terms of
institutional change can also be applied for understanding how the discursive shifts
associated with the knowledge economy affect worker power. While management’s
hegemonic discourse can constrain workers’ ability to protect their rights, workers
can also redeploy and recompose this discourse in order to fulfill the conditions
necessary for mobilizing in the workplace. As suggested above, the concept of
counterhegemonic strategy can help make sense of this process of creative
redeployment and explain why it is effective in some cases and not in others.
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By focusing on a single mechanism in different settings, the analysis that
follows sheds more light not just on the detailed mechanics of counterhegemonic
strategy, but also on how contextual factors, particularly the discursive context of
production and surrounding institutions, shape its effectiveness. The chapters that
follow offer further insights into the path of liberalization by comparing a single
mechanism for worker mobilization in four different contexts, while also developing
important upshots regarding the role of creativity in the politics of institutional
change.
4. Research design and methods
Existing accounts of worker mobilization, the structural dynamics of production,
and national institutions for industrial relations provide a solid basis for
approaching the industrial relations of the tech sector, but these accounts must be
updated in order to explain variation in tech workers’ job security. A number of
factors, outlined above and in the previous chapter, distinguish the power relations
underlying the tech sector from those of other sectors. The combination of the
paucity of unions, tech firms’ adoption of the orientation to shareholder value, and
tech workers’ occupational identity, all suggest that explaining variation in tech
workers’ job security requires a more complex approach to causation than engaged
by existing approaches to the industrial relations of the tech sector. In order to
capture this causal complexity, I relied on a research design that integrates multiple
levels of analysis, from national institutions to discursive contests in the workplace.
Causal complexity exists where outcomes cannot be attributed to a single
cause, but rather a combination of causes.118 Of course, every causal relationship is
inherently complex, but some outcomes are easier to explain in terms of individual
causes acting independently. As outlined above, variation in tech workers’ job
security is not one of them. I argue that tech workers’ vulnerability to dismissals is
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due to the interactions between their own occupational identity and employers’
adoption of the orientation to shareholder value. This combination disposes tech
workers to avoid unions and to decide against participating in collective action. At
the same time, I argue that tech workers will mobilize if organizers challenge
management’s justification for dismissals, as long as they do so in a discourse that
resonates with tech workers’ occupational identity. Therefore, complex causal
processes constitute both the threat of dismissal facing tech workers and its
potential solution. This complexity is more than a simple combination.119 Instead, as
I propose below, discursive processes of persuasion are central to both the threat of
dismissal and the possibility of workers’ resistance.
The causal processes underlying tech workers’ job security are constituted
by discursive contests between management and organizers. This discursive
perspective provides the “premises about the deep causal structures of the world
from which analysis begins and without which theories about the social world
would not make sense.”120 Extending research on social movements, the argument I
develop in the chapters that follow begins from the premise that discourse is central
to workers’ job security, due primarily to its role in motivating collective action.
While employers frame the employment relationship and dismissals in order to
encourage workers’ acquiescence, organizers frame dismissals in order to
encourage resistance. Therefore, I constructed a research design to investigate the
essentially discursive nature of the processes by which tech workers respond to
dismissals.121 My goal was to develop a clear causal account of how these processes
unfold by identifying the causal factors and conditions relevant to determining
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whether tech workers acquiesce to dismissals or resist by mobilizing to defend their
jobs.
While the case studies that follow were selected and analyzed comparatively,
the methods deployed depart in significant ways from standard uses in political
science of Mill’s methods of comparison. Mill’s methods are based on comparing
cases that vary in terms of outcome, but the quantitative turn in political science has
led scholars to select cases based on variation in the presence of potential causal
factors, which allows testing hypotheses deductively through large-N statistical
analyses.122 Rather than testing pre-existing explanations for job security based in
the presence of, or interaction between, discrete variables, my goal is to uncover the
causal mechanisms underlying workers’ job security and to develop a robust
explanation that can travel across different cases. Therefore, rather than selecting
cases based on variation among a discrete set of potential causes, I selected cases
based on the presence of the effect to be explained, with attention to the contextual
conditions considered by existing research to be relevant to industrial relations.123
As described below, I examine tech workers’ responses to downsizing in the
US and Germany because the differences between their national institutions for
industrial relations enable me to develop an account of the causal mechanisms
involved that is portable across very different institutional contexts. Furthermore, I
explore how these causal mechanisms function under different production regimes,
showing that workers can defend their jobs using discursive strategies under both
Fordism and post-Fordism. Establishing that workers’ discursive strategies are
effective in protecting their jobs in two highly different institutional contexts and
two highly different production regimes provides strong evidence for the causal
properties of these mechanisms and suggests that they should be effective in a
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variety of contexts much broader than those presented here. In outlining each step
of analysis, the following sections pay particularly close attention to the interpretive
methods I deployed to develop the argument proposed above. Interpretive
approaches entail their own standards of rigor, which I explicate by documenting
the systematic steps I took to select cases, gather data, and analyze this data.124 I
have included an appendix, which documents the protocol I used to code data using
the software MAXQDA.
4.1 Two pathway contexts: The United States and Germany
Analyzing tech workers’ responses to dismissals in the US and Germany provides a
cross-national comparative framework for distinguishing between institutional
factors and organizers’ creativity in explaining variation in tech workers’ job
security. As the previous chapter showed, workers in both countries must mobilize
in order to enforce legislation protecting them against dismissals, but the very
different institutional structures cast into relief the specific interpretive strategies
organizers deploy in each setting. In the section that follows, I describe the four
workplaces I selected and how I analyzed organizers’ discourses, but first it is
important to show why focusing on the US and Germany supports the goal of
explaining variation in tech workers’ job security.
Given the differences in their institutions for industrial relations, the US and
Germany present a framework for comparative analysis frequently engaged by
political economists in larger-N studies. Scholars include the US and Germany in
nominal comparisons to investigate how variation in national institutions for
economic governance leads to different outcomes.125 Many studies, however,
mention the US and Germany only in passing, referring to each as a nationally
Dvora Yanow, “Neither Rigorous nor Objective? Interrogating Criteria for Knowledge
Claims in Interpretive Science,” in Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and
the Interpretive Turn, 2nd ed. (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2014), 97–119.
125 See, for instance, Jonas Pontusson, David Rueda, and Christopher R. Way, “Comparative
Political Economy of Wage Distribution: The Role of Partisanship and Labour Market
Institutions,” British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 2 (2002): 281–308.
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distinct form capitalism.126 Comparative analyses that deploy a variable-based
approach to causation face significant challenges in directly comparing only the US
and Germany because establishing the unit homogeneity necessary for comparison
requires tightly restricting the range of inquiry while establishing the necessary
number of observations requires expanding it.127
As a result of these difficulties, scholars have taken an alternative approach
to comparing the political economies of the US and Germany, avoiding these
challenges by relying on a concept of causation not based on variables. Locke and
Thelen, for instance, advocate “contextualized comparison,” which is designed to
“capture the particular way that common challenges have been translated into
specific conflicts in the various national settings.”128 Contextualized comparisons
treat variation in national institutions not as a variable that distinguishes between
cases, but as a contextual feature in which cases are situated. Instead of comparing
the effects of similar causes, a contextualized comparison focuses on similarities
between actual political processes, which are always situated in particular contexts.
Contextualized comparisons are especially suited to studying industrial conflict in
different countries because while economic transformations may be global, such as
the adoption of shareholder value, the pressures they create “set in motion
fundamentally different struggles in different contexts.”129 The case studies that
follow are based in different national systems for industrial relations in order to
illustrate how different institutions shape the dynamics of industrial conflict in the
workplace.
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Rather than treating variation in national institutions as a factor that leads to
discrete variation in workers’ job security, I treat national institutions as contextual
factors that shape the effectiveness of particular causal mechanisms. I build on
Gerring’s concept of the pathway case in order to approach each set of national
institutions as a pathway context. According to Gerring, “the pathway case exists
only in circumstances in which cross-case covariational patterns are well studied
and in which the mechanism linking X1 and Y remains dim.”130 A well-established
research tradition links American institutions to a low degree of job security and
German institutions to a high degree of job security.131 However, while we know
quite a bit about these institutions and that they are associated with variation in job
security, we lack an in-depth explanation of why German institutions seemingly
protect workers more effectively than American institutions against employer
discretion. Relying on existing research on the institutions for industrial relations in
each country, I turn to the sub-national level to uncover how national institutions
are made effective in political practice.
While existing research provides a wealth of information about political
economic outcomes associated with the institutions for industrial relations in the US
and Germany, diversity in job security at the sub-national level suggests that these
explanations overlook critical aspects of the causal processes connecting national
institutions to workers’ rights.132 In order to develop a compelling account of the
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role that national institutions play in shaping workers’ job security, I trace the
causal processes by which workers engage institutional resources to respond to the
threat of downsizing.
4.2 Developing causal mechanisms
Although institutions play a prominent role in the explanation for variation in job
security that follows, the formal characteristics of these institutions take a backseat
to the interpretive processes by which workers realize them in political life. As
mentioned above, recent theorizing about institutions has convincingly
demonstrated that “there always is a gap between the ideal pattern of a rule and the
real pattern of life under it.”133 This gap is inhabited by the interpretive processes
that actors deploy in harnessing institutions to address whatever challenges they
face. I build on this interpretive account of institutions by developing a detailed
account of how workers interpret national institutions for industrial relations and
apply those interpretations in responding to the threat of downsizing. Each of the
case studies that follows is designed to elucidate the causal mechanisms that allow
workers to mobilize in the workplace.
Rather than simply tracing the chronological development of workers’
responses to downsizing, I engage a mechanismic approach to process tracing to
identify the pieces of specific causal mechanisms leading workers to either mobilize
or to acquiesce. By situating causal mechanisms in the broader context surrounding
workers’ responses to dismissals, this approach has the advantage of integrating
different levels of explanation, from institutional background to organizers’
creativity. This allows generating an explanation that more accurately reflects the
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complexity of the causal processes observed at each site. Additionally, by calling
attention to the interactions between structure and agency, this approach ensures
that each site-specific explanation can be generalized to other cases on the basis of
its fit with contextual conditions.
From the variety of approaches to mechanismic explanation,134 I engage
Beach and Pedersen’s “systems-understanding” of causal mechanisms. According to
this approach, causal mechanisms are defined as “entities that engage in activities
that transfer causal forces from X to Y.”135 Following earlier views, Beach and
Pedersen emphasize that context is of central importance to a mechanismic
understanding of causation because “the mechanism is merely the link [between
cause and effect], and therefore cannot be causally more important that the
condition that triggers it.”136 In contrast to attempts to present mechanismic
causation as consistent with the correlation-based approaches that have dominated
political science,137 Beach and Pedersen emphasize that the “link” represented by
causal mechanisms is complex, because every outcome is the result of several
factors interacting with one another. Some of these factors are constituted by pieces
of the mechanism itself, and some belong to the surrounding environment, so that a
mechanismic explanation captures the manner in which these interactions lead to a
particular outcome. A mechanismic explanation of an outcome is thus always a
systemic explanation because mechanisms are composed of “parts that transfer
causal forces,”138 so that an account of causal mechanisms must identify each of
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these parts and specify how it interacts with other parts as well as surrounding
contextual conditions.
Beach and Pedersen’s account of mechanismic causation is suited to studying
a process as complex as the role of discursive strategies in mobilizing workers
because their approach reflects the interactive nature of social processes. As
demonstrated in the following chapters, workers’ job security in both the US and
Germany is contingent on a combination of workers’ agency and background
institutions for industrial relations. Despite significant differences, enforcing these
institutions in both countries relies on workers mobilizing in the workplace.
Explaining workers’ job security thus requires flattening the analytical horizon that
otherwise separates institutional background from actors’ creative strategy.
Furthermore, as argued above, workers’ mobilization depends on organizers’ ability
to develop a counterhegemonic discourse to undermine management’s justification
for dismissals. Just as they develop certain elements of background institutions into
resources for collective action, organizers’ counterhegemonic strategy is constituted
by a creative interpretation of managers’ hegemonic discourse. Rather than treating
management’s discourse as a background feature and foregrounding organizers’
discourse, a mechanismic approach integrates these two levels in a comprehensive
explanation that accurately reflects how political struggles always reflect and
reshape their social contexts.139
Workers mobilize against their employers when organizers transform the
causal potential of surrounding conditions into patterns of collective action. In this
manner, organizers’ counterhegemonic discourse constitutes a causal mechanism
that “transfer[s] causal forces from X to Y.” Institutions for industrial relations, as
well as management’s hegemonic discourse, provide workers a number of resources
for collective action, but the effects of each of these causal forces depends on how
organizers interpret them. When organizers limit their engagement with
139
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institutions to formal channels of negotiation, and when they accept management’s
justification for dismissals, workers are likely to acquiesce to downsizing. However,
when organizers are creative, interpreting institutions for industrial relations to
support collective action and developing a counterhegemonic discourse to challenge
management’s justification for dismissals, they can transfer the causal forces of each
of these contextual factors to workers’ collective action.
The interpretive approach to institutions provides one framework for
developing causal mechanisms to explain what leads workers to mobilize against
downsizing, and I enrich this approach by engaging research on the use of framing
in social movements. Rather than viewing interpretation as causally secondary to
the presence of particular institutions, research on framing makes clear that actors’
interpretive strategies play a primary causal role in collective action. Nonetheless,
research on framing has rarely investigated in sufficient depth how organizers
develop discursive strategies that resonate with a particular group. In order to
address this gap, I leverage the specificity of the mechanismic approach to causation
in order to develop a detailed discursive account of organizers’ discursive strategies.
Researchers suggest that understanding how organizers develop effective
counterhegemonic strategies “calls for closer inspection than heretofore of not only
the nature of the interpretive work and resources of SMOs, but also of the degree of
fit between the resultant framings or products of that work and the life situation
and ideology of potential constituents.”140 Rather than “blackboxing” resonance, I
break apart the concept of resonance into the less metaphorical concept of
credibility,141 and focus on two elements of credibility in particular: the persuasive
discourse of managers and organizers, and the broader discursive context of the
workplace. In each case, I analyze actors’ persuasive discourse against the
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background of the discursive context of production to show how workers’ choice
whether to participate in mobilizing against dismissals depends on whether
organizers develop a counterhegemonic strategy.
The first step of this analysis involves examining the persuasive discourse
that managers and organizers deploy in their efforts to lead workers to view
dismissals a certain way. Persuasive discourse is a type of “practical discourse,”
which presents actors with “arguments for or against different ways of acting.”142
Persuasive discourse is fundamental to the power relations underlying politics
because, in many situations, power is constituted by the ability “to give people
reasons for actions that they would not otherwise have.’”143 Focusing on the
persuasive discourse that actors deploy in a particular situation affords a useful
perspective for political analysis because “politics is most fundamentally about
making choices about how to act in response to circumstances and events and in
light of certain goals and values, and such choices and the actions which follow from
them are based upon practical reasoning about what should be done.”144 As
Foucault points out, discourse is central to politics because power flows through
discourse, which presents actors particular structures of meaning that entail distinct
conditions of possibility.145 Discourses allow actors to fulfill their interests and
provide the structures of meaning for them to develop specific interests in the first
place. Explaining tech workers’ responses to mass dismissals thus requires
uncovering how managers and organizers used discursive strategies to persuade
workers that collective action was either useless or potentially effective.
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In each workplace, managers presented workers with persuasive discourse
to frame acquiescence as the only rational response to downsizing. In the two cases
where workers resisted, organizers formulated a persuasive discourse that framed
resistance as reasonable. Each strategy presented workers with a particular
framework for considering their plan of action: “the goal of practical reasoning is
arriving at a reasonable practical judgment that can ground reasonable decisionmaking and reasonable action.”146 In order to explain how organizers’ discursive
strategies were effective in some workplaces but not others, I focus on the “meansend” arguments that organizers offered for collective action. In discursive contests,
actors do not judge the relative merits of persuasive discourses according to an
objective notion of rationality, but rather the “manifest rationality” specific to that
particular discursive context.147 In order to be persuasive, actors must structure
their arguments in accord with that manifest rationality. Each case study is based on
a “rational reconstruction” of the surrounding discursive context, which illustrates
how the underlying structure of rationality in each workplace shaped the conditions
for how workers assessed managers’ and organizers’ credibility.148
The second step of analysis thus revolves around the workplace-specific
practices of credibility that actors relied on in order to formulate and assess
arguments concerning the proper response to the threat of dismissals. As described
above, the most notable feature of the discursive context of the workplace is
management’s continual effort to implement hegemonic control. Management’s
hegemonic discourse plays a central role in shaping how workers make sense of the
world, and I suggested that workers’ commonsense would be based in large part on
management’s hegemonic discourse. Each case study that follows, therefore,
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devotes significant space to presenting an account of management’s hegemonic
discourse, drawing on interviews, as well as primary documents in order to show
how management’s discourse structured the way in which workers articulated their
underlying worldviews. In assessing the relationship between management’s
hegemonic discourse and workers’ occupational identities, I sought to discover the
practices of credibility that workers considered valid. Did workers understand the
employment relationship in terms of a primarily economic or a normative
discourse? Extending this line of analysis, I also sought to identify the types of
evidence that workers found plausible. What evidence did workers refer to in order
to substantiate their framing of the employment relationship as either primarily
economic or normative?
Combining these two steps of analysis allows analyzing the discursive
contests between management and organizers against the background discursive
context that managers established as hegemonic in the workplace. Doing so
addresses Gahan and Pekarek’s concern “that any examination of framing needs to
be conducted in the broader context of frame contests involving other social actors,
as well as over more extended periods of time.”149 While each step is analytically
separate, there is of course overlap in presenting each of case studies that follow.
This is due in part to the fact that workers stand at the center of conflicts around
downsizing, with managers and organizers simultaneously attempting to persuade
workers of a particular plan of action. This can complicate efforts to keep the
discourse of each set of actors distinct. Rather than discrete focal points of analysis
anchored to particular actors or situations, the raw data underlying analysis
consists in the interactions between various actors,150 and the analysis that follows
focuses first and foremost on the utterances that inscribe these interactions.
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The case studies that follow extend this analysis to each of the workplaces
under study in order to argue that the central mechanism shaping tech workers’
responses to the threat of dismissals is organizers’ credibility vis-à-vis management.
Workers acquiesce to dismissals when they find management’s justification for
dismissals persuasive, but they can resist when they find organizers’ critiques
persuasive. Each set of actors frames dismissals in a specific discourse that govern
the conditions of possibility available to workers. Managers develop arguments and
present evidence to frame dismissals in a manner that makes collective action
appear useless. At the same time, organizers argue that collective action could be
potentially effective in protecting workers from dismissals, and they also present
evidence to support this view. Workers’ decision to participate in collective action
depends on which set of actors they find credible, which is contingent on which set
of arguments they find persuasive. When organizers develop counterhegemonic
strategies to undermine management’s justification for dismissals in management’s
own discourse they can persuade workers to mobilize against dismissals.
In order to develop mechanismic account, I explain variation in workers’ job
security within each country by deploying process tracing. The paired case design,
which I describe in the following action allows tracing mechanisms until they break
down in deviant cases where X is present (organizers’ discursive strategies) but Y is
not present (acquiescence). Information about when and why the mechanism
breaks down informs a comparative analysis with the most similar typical case to
detect potential omitted contextual or causal conditions.151
4.3 Two pairs of causal case studies: IBM Burlington and IBM San Jose, Infineon and
Siemens
For decades, workers chose to join IBM and Siemens for job security, accepting that
they would receive less pay in exchange for the guarantee of lifetime employment.
Both firms were founded around the turn of the century, each played a critical role
151
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in developing the technological infrastructure of modern states and the global
economy, and each has long been viewed as representing the national business
tradition of the US and Germany, respectively. In the 1990s, however, executives at
each firm abandoned their century-long dedication to technological innovation to
adopt the orientation to shareholder value.152 Soon afterward, each firm dismissed
thousands of workers who had been promised employment for life. I selected a pair
of sites at each firm where one site mobilized to resist dismissals, and the other
acquiesced. Against the backdrop of cross-national variation in institutions, this
within-country within-firm analysis allows tracing the creative processes by which
organizers in each workplace developed resources for worker power.
The paired case study design is useful for explaining variation in tech
workers’ job security because it leverages variation across different contexts and
levels of analysis, and it also establishes causal homogeneity within each pair of
cases. Causal homogeneity is necessary for identifying causal mechanisms that can
travel across cases because it allows identifying the systematic features of each
causal process by which workers either acquiesced to or resisted dismissals.153 I
selected each pair of cases according to the contextual conditions hypothesized by
existing research to affect workers’ job security: at each pair of worksites, unions
were similarly absent, firms faced similar business challenges, and workers faced
the same national institutions.
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Table 2.1 Workplace characteristics: IBM Burlington and IBM San Jose
IBM Burlington
IBM San Jose
Main product
Employees

Number
dismissed
(2001 – 2002)
Participants in
collective legal
case

Semiconductors

Storage and memory

8000 (approx.)

6000 (approx.)

(2001)

(2001)

2444

1013

[~31%]

[~17%]

155 [43.4%]

24 [6.7%]

Table 2.2 Workplace characteristics: Infineon and Siemens
Infineon: Balanstr.
Siemens ICN
Main product

Semiconductors

Telecommunications solutions

4918

6772

(2000)

(2002)

1296 [26%]

1945 [29%]

(2000)

(2002)

Employees
affected by
dismissals154

943 [19%]

2600 [38%]

Union
membership

<10%

6%

Employees

Employees
paid above
collective
bargain

It is conceivable that the higher percentage of workers initially affected at Siemens
Hofmannstr. could have encouraged resistance by lowering the cost of participating in
collective action. (See David Weil and Amanda Pyles, “Why Complain? Complaints,
Compliance and the Problem of Enforcement in the US Workplace,” Comparative Labor Law &
Policy Journal 27 [2005]: 59–92.) However, this could have had the opposite effect. (See Cowie,
Capital Moves). Either way, I found no evidence that variation in the proportion of workers
affected by dismissals shaped their decision to mobilize.
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(white-collar workers)

(white-collar workers)

29

39

(2001)

(2002)

IG Metall: 12 [41%]

IG Metall: 16 [41%]

(2001)

ver.di: 8 [21%]

Size of works
council
Union
representation
on works
council

Total: 24 [62%]
(2002)

Tracing how these contextual conditions shaped different responses allowed
me to pinpoint the systematic relations between each piece of the causal process
and elements of the surrounding context. As I elaborate below, causal mechanisms
must always be situated in a specific environment, so carefully establishing
homogeneity among each pair of cases is a critical step in explaining variation in
tech workers’ propensity to mobilize against dismissals.155 Moreover, by tracing the
presence of organizers’ discursive strategies in highly different contexts, these two
pairs of case studies establish that the causal mechanisms identified here can be
applied to a wider universe of cases.
I selected a pair of cases at IBM in which workers at one site resisted
dismissals while workers at another site acquiesced with the goal of explaining
these divergent paths. Between 1986 and 2015, IBM’s American workforce declined
from 237,000 to 70,000, due largely to a series of mass dismissals.156 In 2001 and
2002, management dismissed tens of thousands of workers at sites across the US.
While many acquiesced to the downsizing, hundreds of workers in Burlington,
Vermont, coordinated a collective legal action against the firm, which was eventually
Falleti and Lynch, “Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis”; Beach and
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settled out of court but forced IBM to compensate workers and to adjust their
dismissal policy. While workers at IBM’s site in San Jose, California, were dismissed
at roughly the same rate as workers in Burlington, they chose to acquiesce. Both
sites were composed of highly skilled workers who were deeply loyal to the firm,
faced the same national institutions, and had access to the same union resources.
Nonetheless, workers at San Jose chose not to participate in collective action.
I explain this divergence as the result of organizers at San Jose failing to
adapt their discursive strategies to the post-Fordist context of production in Silicon
Valley, instead simply recycling the discourse that had been effective in Vermont.
Organizers at Burlington framed dismissals in a discourse that undermined
management’s justification for downsizing in a manner that workers found credible,
and I show how this was largely due to organizers’ efforts to align their framing of
dismissals with the discourse that management established as hegemonic in the
workplace. I show that the Fordist context of production in Vermont informed
management’s hegemonic discourse, and thus played a large role in shaping
workers’ occupational identity. In Silicon Valley, however, a post-Fordist context of
production led management to establish an entirely different discourse as
hegemonic in the workplace, which subsequently shaped workers’ occupational
identity in a different direction. Organizers in San Jose could have followed the
method, rather than the substance, of organizers’ discursive strategy in Vermont in
order to adapt their framing to fit workers’ occupational identity and encourage
them to mobilize. Instead, organizers in San Jose recycled a discursive strategy that
did not resonate with workers, which led them to acquiesce to downsizing. To
illustrate that organizers can develop effective discursive strategies in a post-Fordist
context of production, I turn to a pair of cases in Germany.
In 1999, Siemens spun off their semiconductor division as a separate
company, Infineon. The original employees of Infineon had all previously worked at
Siemens, often at the same site as workers at Siemens’ telecommunications division
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(ICN). In the early 2000s, therefore, workers at each firm thus knew each other, had
received the same training, and were socialized in the same firm. Furthermore,
workers at each firm had access to the same union resources because organizers
from IG Metall’s Siemens Projekt remained with Infineon after the split.157 Despite
these similarities, when management announced downsizing at each firm in 2001
and 2002, respectively, workers at Infineon acquiesced while workers at ICN
mobilized and saved thousands from dismissal.
This paired comparison illustrates that Germany’s institutions for industrial
relations are not sufficient for protecting workers from dismissal, but also that
mobilization is possible in the context of post-Fordist production. Despite the
endurance of widespread normative commitments to the social market economy,158
many German firms, especially those in the tech sector, have adopted post-Fordist
employment practices, such as eliminating the guarantee of lifetime employment. As
firms have demonstrated new patterns of behavior, so have workers. German
institutions were once recognized as stabilizing industrial relations, but with the
emergence of a post-Fordist context of production, they have become sites of
conflict. I show how works councilors at Siemens mobilized workers against
dismissals by creatively interpreting the institutions for codetermination. Doing so
allowed them to reproduce many of the elements observed in workers’ mobilization
in the Fordist context of IBM Burlington. In both cases, workers chose to mobilize
against downsizing when organizers demonstrated the potential effectiveness of
collective action in a discourse that workers found persuasive. By illustrating that
this discursive strategy is effective in both Fordist and post-Fordist contexts, as well
as under the weak institutions of the US in addition to the robust institutions of
Germany, the two pairs of case studies present strong evidence of a portable set of
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causal mechanisms that can explain variation in workers’ job security across a wider
variety of production regimes and countries.
While selecting cases in terms of the dependent variable would be a problem
for a correlation-based approach to causation,159 this is a necessary step for the
mechanismic approach to causation. As I elaborate below, the variation between
mobilization and acquiescence is not symmetric.160 Instead, I approach each
outcome as the result of an independent causal process. In selecting these four
paired case studies, my goal was to explain large scale political economic
transformation, namely, the erosion of job security in the core sectors of the OECD’s
wealthy democracies, by focusing on the micro-level dynamics of struggles over
dismissals in the workplace. Large multi-national firms provide a setting for
identifying the contextual features necessary for generalizing this explanation to
other cases. In part, this is due to the sheer number of workers each of these firms
employs, which together amount to nearly one million. Furthermore, while startups
and entrepreneurs have received much attention in the tech industry, the tech
sector continuously undergoes rounds of consolidation, so identifying workplace
dynamics at large multinationals provides an explanation for workers’ job security
that should be durable, despite the pace of technological change.161
4.4 Data collection
From April 2014 to January 2016, I performed fieldwork at each of the four
workplaces of IBM Burlington, IBM San Jose, Infineon, and Siemens in order to
gather data on what led workers to either mobilize or to acquiesce to downsizing. I
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began fieldwork in Munich in May 2014 through participant-observation at a
number of trade shows and tech meetup groups, which led to a series of preliminary
interviews of tech workers at Siemens and union officials at IG Metall and ver.di.
This stage of fieldwork was largely exploratory, designed to build familiarity with
the tech sector in Germany and to select cases that were causally homogenous. I
selected interview participants on the basis of initial research on Siemens and on IG
Metall in Munich. After an initial round of interviews, I began to deploy a snowball
method as subjects suggested further contacts.162 During this period, I also
deepened my understanding of codetermination through participant-observation at
a weeklong intensive course for first-time works councilors.
Following the initial stage of fieldwork, I selected four specific workplaces as
field sites and conducted targeted interviews directly relevant to each case. I
designed a sample frame to collect first-hand accounts from each party involved in
dismissals, including workers, managers, labor organizers, as well as lawyers and
public officials. This series of interviews was characterized primarily by snowball
sampling because the initial period of fieldwork demonstrated that access was a
significant challenge.163 Many managers declined interviews, likely because they had
received bad publicity for dismissing thousands of workers.164 Furthermore,
managers at Infineon and Siemens were sensitive to the topic of industrial relations
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after investigative journalists had unearthed a series of scandals at Siemens over the
past decade, including a massive bribery network and management’s illegal funding
of works councilors in order to undermine IG Metall.165
In order to develop an account of each case that included perspectives from a
wide range of actors involved, I relied on a combination of research and networking.
At IBM San Jose, for instance, I found a retiree newsletter published online and
contacted former employees listed there. While interviewing these workers, I noted
which names they brought up, and which actors played a significant role in their
accounts of the events. In order to generate further interviews, I asked interview
subjects for the contacts of the people they mentioned, and solicited other
suggestions. This method certainly has its drawbacks. It may have led to an
overrepresentation of workers whose social networks were based in the firm,
because these are generally the workers who belong to retiree organizations, and
my initial entry point through this organization may have skewed the views I
captured. However, I compared these accounts to those provided by interview
subjects I selected by other means, such as suggestions from union officials, and
observed no significant patterns of bias. Nonetheless, each method of data collection
has its shortcomings, and this method also had the notable advantage of enabling
access to an otherwise reclusive but informative set of interview subjects.
Interviews were semi-structured and lasted between 45 minutes and 2
hours. I recorded each interview and took notes as we spoke. When I completed
fieldwork in January 2016, I had performed 142 interviews, of which 92 were
directly relevant to the selected case studies. As I describe below, I transcribed each
interview and entered it, along with fieldnotes, into the software MAXQDA.
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Interviews formed a significant focus of my fieldwork, but I also collected
primary documents in order to triangulate the data generated in interviews. For the
two cases at IBM, I assembled more than 4500 pages of legal documents related to
Syverson v. IBM, the case that workers brought against the firm. These documents
were immensely helpful, as they included verbatim testimony from workers and
managers, along with internal memos, handbooks, and training manuals. In
addition, I collected 87 documents from union organizers in Burlington, and 37
documents from organizers in San Jose.
At Siemens and Infineon, works councilors shared with me their personal
archives, which included notes from works council meetings, flyers, and emails.
These totaled 1007 documents at Infineon, and 81 documents at Siemens, as well as
photographs and video documentation. I was also provided access to the Siemens
works council’s archive from 1998 to 2008, which included more than 22,000 files.
From this immense collection, I selected documents from the period surrounding
dismissals in the early 2000s and focused on the works council’s strategy
documents, presentations, and emails. In addition, two workers involved with the
resistance at Siemens shared with me the documents related to their legal
proceedings against the firm, as well as internal emails and training manuals they
received while still employed. While interview subjects provided internal
documents from each firm, including presentations to workers and stockholders, I
also relied on publicly available documents, such as annual and quarterly reports
and press releases.
As each case occurred in the early 2000s, workers were initially discovering
how they could use the internet as an organizing tool, which left behind an
accessible archive. Workers at IBM began an “IBM union” yahoo chat group, while
workers at Siemens largely relied on the firm’s internal online forums before
designing an independent website after a few months of resistance. Workers at IBM
posted thousands of messages in their yahoo group, but I limited my analysis to the
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2060 messages posted between the announcement of dismissals in November 2001
and the filing of the legal case against IBM in October 2003. A former Siemens works
councilor provided extensive screenshots of workers’ discussions on the firm’s
internal forum. Although his selection criteria were unclear and not particularly
reliable, this data nonetheless provides further triangulation to generate a
comprehensive perspective of workers’ resistance to dismissals.
In addition to primary documents gathered during fieldwork, I also relied on
press accounts of each case. I performed Lexis-Nexis keyword searches for each firm
and “layoff,” [“Entlassung”, “Kündigung”] during the period surrounding dismissals. I
also accessed the online archive of Burlington’s local TV station from 1996 to 2005
to collect further contextual information, as well as quotes from workers, managers,
and labor organizers. Press coverage allowed corroborating and triangulating data
gathered from interviews and primary documents. This multi-site, multi-method
data collection provides a broad basis for tracing the causal processes by which
workers and organizers developed strategies to respond to the threat of mass
dismissals. In the next section, I describe the methods used to analyze this data.
4. Conclusion
This chapter outlined the argument I develop in the remainder of this dissertation.
After demonstrating the threat that firms’ adoption of the shareholder value
orientation poses to tech workers’ job security, I argued that tech workers may be
able to protect their jobs against downsizing when organizers develop
counterhegemonic discursive strategies in the workplace. I then presented the
research I performed to develop this argument. By carefully selecting pairs of cases
that allow for within-country, within-firm comparative analysis, as well as crossnational analysis, I illustrate the interplay between background environmental
factors, such as the structural characteristics of producing technology and national
institutions for industrial relations, and organizers’ creativity, which together can
enable tech workers to mobilize in the workplace.
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The remainder of the dissertation presents the results of this research in
order to develop and support an explanation for variation in tech workers’
responses to the threat of mass dismissals. Rather than seeking to test pre-existing
theories, my goal is to build on existing research in order “to generate a grounded,
yet theoretically informed, hypothesis to account for the observed differences in
outcomes – and which can be further tested in other settings.”166 The account I offer
for variation in tech workers’ job security is based on in-depth interpretive analysis
of specific cases. To enable this account to be extended beyond the workplaces
under study, I show how the discursive context surrounding production sets crucial
causal conditions that shape workers’ decision to participate in collective action.
Building on institutionalist theory and research on social movements, each case
study of workers’ response to dismissals contributes to an explanation for the
patterns of job insecurity emerging among tech workers in OECD countries. Taken
together, the case studies illustrate the role of tech workers’ collective action in
shaping the path of capitalist development in wealthy democracies.
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Chapter 3. The Discursive Context of Production: Liberalization
in the United States
This chapter introduces the concept of the discursive context of production in order
to explain why liberalization threatens worker power. I trace how production in
Silicon Valley evolved from being framed in a primarily technological discourse into
one that is primarily financial. This discursive shift lies at the center of
liberalization, and is one element of employers’ increasing orientation to producing
shareholder value above all else. Scholars have noted the spread of the orientation
to shareholder value, and have argued that it is responsible for the erosion of
workers’ rights under liberalization. I add greater detail to these accounts by
specifying that firms’ orientation to shareholder value is just one aspect of the
discursive context that surrounds the production of technology. This discourse
orients firms to shareholder value, and at the same time, it encourages management
to frame the employment relationship in primarily financial terms. The orientation
to shareholder value encourages managers to dismiss workers in order to improve
their firm’s financial performance at the same time that managers’ primarily
financial discourse discourages workers from mobilizing to protect their jobs. Taken
together, these two elements of liberalization threaten workers’ rights.
Building on the discursive approach to liberalization introduced in the
previous two chapters, this chapter offers a historical argument for why
liberalization should be understood as a discursive shift. I show how the state’s
support for technological innovation in Silicon Valley legitimized a discourse that
connected technology to economic growth. This early support for the tech sector
later morphed into a discursive framing in which particular market conditions were
viewed as necessary for producing technological innovation. As a result, the
discursive context of production in Silicon Valley disposed workers to believe that
conditions in the workplace were directly shaped by market forces external to the
firm. The primarily discursive context of production surrounding the tech sector
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embeds the workplace in global financial markets, which severs workers from
labor’s traditional power resources.
To further explain why the discursive shift associated with liberalization
threatens worker power, I introduce the institutions for economic governance in the
US and show that they regulate employer behavior on the basis of primarily
financial considerations. Employers are allowed dismiss workers as long as they can
demonstrate that downsizing is financially necessary. As the transition to the
knowledge economy disposes workers to find management’s primarily financial
framing of the employment relationship persuasive, the sparse institutional
resources that workers could otherwise rely on are thrust further out of reach.
Moreover, illustrating that institutions for economic governance in the US depend
on worker mobilization highlights why workers’ increasing propensity to be
persuaded by management’s justifications for downsizing increases their
vulnerability to dismissals. As long as workers believe that downsizing really is
required in order to ensure their firm’s survival, they are unable to enforce the
institutions that would otherwise protect them from dismissal.
Despite the challenges of liberalization, in terms of both discourse and
institutions, I conclude the chapter by suggesting that counterhegemonic strategy
nonetheless offers a possibility for protecting workers’ rights. I show that the
discursive context of production in Silicon Valley reflects the contradictory
conception of workers’ agency inherent to the primarily financial framing of the
employment relationship. Extending the hypothesis articulated in Chapter 2, I
propose that the discursive context of production surrounding the tech sector offers
workers the possibility of developing an effective counterhegemonic strategy.
Before exploring this hypothesis further in the following chapters, I introduce the
two case studies that follow and emphasize the analytical leverage allowed by
comparing workplaces at IBM located in different discursive contexts.
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1. The discursive context of production in Silicon Valley
Over the last two decades, Silicon Valley has become iconic as a symbol of progress
and economic growth. Numerous scholars have illustrated that the success of tech
firms in the Valley depended in large part on efforts by the state to support
technological innovation. However, while scholars have sufficiently illustrated the
role of the state in economic development, less attention has been paid to the
discursive legacy of the state’s involvement. This section reviews three key policy
areas where the state supported Silicon Valley in order to distinguish between two
distinct phases in the development of the discourse surrounding production. I show
that, while producing technology was originally framed in a primarily scientific
discourse, successful lobbying by tech executives and venture capitalists in the
1970s led to a discursive shift so that production came to be framed in a primarily
financial discourse. As I illustrate in the section that follows, this primarily financial
discourse directly undermines labor’s traditional power resources.
1.1 Phase one: Technological innovation as input for economic growth
Firms had been producing electronics in Silicon Valley since the 1930s,167 but the
Cold War set the region on an entirely different path of growth. Impressed by the
importance of technological innovation to winning World War II, Washington
invested heavily in Silicon Valley to aid efforts to beat communism. The state’s
strategy was largely guided by the vision of corporate liberalism laid out in
Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report, “Science: The Endless Frontier,” which “willfully blurs
boundaries between public and private sectors and turns decision making over to
small clubs of insider firms and institutions.”168 For decades, Bush’s strategy served
as a touchstone for the state’s involvement in Silicon Valley, leading the government
to play an important role in shaping the discursive context surrounding production.
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As science and technology policy became “economized” in the post-war
period, the notion of “the economy” took on a broader meaning. In the first phase of
this development, the state supported technological innovation in order to support
economic growth, as “both neoliberals and interventionists saw S&T [science and
technology] not just as ways to solve specific problems of defense or health, or even
as useful to particular industries, but as inputs into an abstraction called the
economy.”169 During this period, government worked closely with specific firms in
order to develop products that could improve the US’s position vis-à-vis its trading
partners.
Government officials viewed the Cold War as an economic fight as much as a
military one, and they saw Silicon Valley as crucial to supporting and sustaining
economic growth in the US. In the 1950s, the state supported technological
innovation as an input for economic growth, but in the 1970s and 1980s, state
involvement shifted to frame technological innovation as the output of certain
economic forces, namely the dynamics characterizing free markets. Tracing
legislative developments in the US’s science and technology policy in the section
below adds substantive detail to the discursive context surrounding production in
Silicon Valley. While much of this discourse has now been adopted on a national
level and beyond, pinpointing three specific legislative developments illustrates the
elements of this discourse that are particular to Silicon Valley.
1.2 Phase two: Technological innovation as output of market forces
The Bayh-Dole Act
One of the most significant pieces of legislation for the growth of Silicon Valley was
the Bayh-Dole Act, which enabled universities to patent ideas they had developed
with public funding. Although some downplay the importance of the act for Silicon
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Valley, it provided a clear structure of rewards for private actors to develop novel
technologies.170 Beyond the material incentives that Bayh-Dole provided, the act
also played an important role in forming the discourse of production in Silicon
Valley because it “further legitimized” universities’ patenting activities, extending a
primarily financial discourse to actors ordinarily considered external to it.171
Moreover, the act legitimized the belief that technological innovation depends on
market dynamics to incentivize inventors. A number of federal administrators
involved with passing Bayh-Dole “believed that patents were often a necessary
incentive to encourage the development of inventions,” and, with its passage, this
belief became much more widespread.172 Of course, academic science was never
isolated from the market economy,173 but Bayh-Dole nonetheless marked a
significant step in reinforcing a primarily financial discourse in Silicon Valley by
marginalizing an important alternative, namely the concept that inventors might
pursue technological innovation for reasons independent of financial reward.174
The Small Business Innovation Research Program
The state also legitimated a primarily financial framework in Silicon Valley by
explicitly encouraging financial markets to invest in technological innovation. The
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program encouraged scientists and
engineers to become entrepreneurs by facilitating their access to venture capital.
The program provided signaling and certification mechanisms that directed
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investors to risky technological innovations, which “provided more information and
more time for investors selecting promising technology ideas. This increased the
odds of investment success, and simultaneously strengthened the position of small
firm entrepreneurs by allowing deals to be negotiated at later stages of a
technology’s development.”175 The state’s support for market mechanisms in Silicon
Valley was firmly anchored in the concept that technological innovation requires
particular market dynamics. According to this concept, activities leading to
technological innovation in the workplace depend directly on market forces
external to the firm.
Lobbying to support venture capital
In addition to the direct support for technological innovation provided by the SBIR
program, the state also introduced more indirect mechanisms, which reinforced the
notion that technological innovation depends on market forces external to the firm.
In the late 1970s, the National Venture Capital Association teamed up with the
American Electronics Association, both based in Silicon Valley, to lobby Congress to
lower the capital gains tax on the grounds that doing so would spur the type of
technological innovation necessary for economic growth. They succeeded, and the
capital gains tax decreased from 40% in 1976 to 20% in the early 1980s.176 Their
lobbying efforts built on the first phase of the state’s involvement in Silicon Valley
by arguing that technological innovation leads to economic growth, but the content
of their proposal characterizes the second phase, for they argued that increasing the
financial rewards for innovation would lead to valuable technologies. On a material
level, only a handful of financial actors benefited from this legislation, which has
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contributed to the growing wealth inequalities in the US over the past decades.177
On a discursive level, however, these successful lobbying efforts led to a widespread
shift in discourse that further legitimized the view that technological innovation
depends on market forces external to the firm.
Linking technological innovation within firms to broader market forces has
become common sense across the US and beyond, which attests to the success of
lobbyists at the National Venture Capital Association and the American Electronics
Association, but also requires underlining that this discourse originated in Silicon
Valley. When Vice Chairman and cofounder of Intel, Robert Noyce, testified in favor
of tax incentives to support firms’ research and development, he defended the
measures by arguing that technological innovation is driven by specific market
forces, so that “tax measures are preferable to more direct government intervention,
(e.g., grants or loan guarantees) because the decision to conduct R&D can continue
to be made by individual firms, some of whom will prosper and some of whom will
fail based solely on market performance.”178 Noyce’s support for tax incentives over
direct government assistance is based on the belief that technological innovation
depends on the market, because “ultimately the market chooses which firm(s) have
succeeded in making the best decision as to technological direction.”179 When Noyce
testified, Intel was already posting annual sales of $850 million and had almost
16,000 employees worldwide, so his testimony was taken seriously. Furthermore,
Noyce’s views can be taken as indicative of those common in Silicon Valley, as he
represented five high technology trade association and addressed only those points
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“for which there is a broad consensus throughout the high technology electronics
sector.”180
Noyce’s support for framing technological innovation as dependent on
particular market dynamics is echoed in other hearings concerning the state’s role
in Silicon Valley during this period. While intending to support technological
innovation, state actors came to believe they could not support specific firms, but
instead needed to build a structure for the proper market forces to develop. In part,
this was due to the networked character of production in Silicon Valley, whereby
firms abandoned the model of vertical integration common to Fordism, and instead
engaged a variety of partners throughout a more fluid production process.181
Therefore, in order to promote a particular output, the state needed to support the
dynamics between firms rather than within them.
In trying to develop an alternative energy industry, for instance, senators
were frustrated by Silicon Valley, because they recognized the potential for
innovation, but they did not know how to design the appropriate form of state
support. During a hearing on adjusting the tax code to promote technological
innovation, Senator McIntyre complained to a representative from Silicon Valley
that, “We are just unable to interface with you. If you were IBM or you were Ratheon
[sic], maybe we could sit down and do business.”182 In confronting the novel
organization of production in Silicon Valley, where firms were networked rather
than vertically integrated, the state struggled to identify a new form of support for
the output they desired. With the help of lobbyists from the National Venture Capital
Association and the American Electronics Association, the state focused on
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constructing a set of market forces they believed would lead to technological
innovation. These efforts played a central role in legitimizing a primarily financial
framing of technological production.
2. The threat to workers’ power resources
The discursive context surrounding production in Silicon Valley has become
common sense, but its primarily financial orientation has entailed an occupational
identity for tech workers that marks a significant break with previous eras. By
framing the employment relationship in a primarily financial discourse, the context
surrounding production in the tech sector embeds workers in global financial
markets, rather than the specific locality where their workplace is located.
Historically, workers constructed power resources by engaging their locality. This
can take the form of developing networks of solidarity within civil society or by
leveraging local norms to critique and limit employer discretion.183 However, by
encouraging the view that producing technology requires individuals to compete
against one another for financial gain, the discourse surrounding production in
Silicon Valley disposes workers to view themselves as atomized individuals whose
interests can be assessed against the universal scale of financial returns. Economic
activity is always embedded in one or another context,184 and the discourse
surrounding production in Silicon Valley embeds employment in a global context
that severs workers from labor’s traditional power resources.
Tech workers’ occupational identities now appear commonsensical, but this
is due as much to the rise and ubiquity of rational choice theory, whose ascendance
is no less contingent than the development of the discursive context of production in
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Silicon Valley.185 It has become common to understand economics as constituted by
individuals competing against one another, but this has been the case only since the
rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s.186 With the wide acceptance of Becker’s “human
capital theory,” economics shifted its focus from the macro-level to individual
workers. Becker proposed that individuals’ skills constitute a particular type of
capital that is bought and sold on the marketplace, “so that the worker himself
appears as a sort of enterprise for himself.”187 Human capital theory has been
adopted into common business practices. Social scientists have extended, and
reified, these business practices by examining how individuals’ human capital
affects their policy preferences. According to asset theories of politics, the
composition of a worker’s skills, particularly how they are valued and what type of
competition he faces as an individual on the labor market, shapes his preferences
for social policy, particularly regarding unemployment insurance.188
In the case studies that follow, I show how workers at each of the firms, with
the exception of IBM Burlington, identified strongly with the financial value of their
skills. Each of the firms adopted the discursive context of production from Silicon
Valley, and management exhibited a commitment to delivering shareholder value
above all else. As a result, management established a discourse in the workplace
that led workers to assess themselves in terms of their contribution to their firm’s
financial success. This primarily financial occupational identity has since become
common sense, so before documenting its role in shaping workers’ responses to
downsizing, it is important to highlight what makes this occupational identity
distinctive and to illustrate how it developed. Both of these characteristics are
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critical for underlining why and how the occupational identity that evolved in the
tech sector constitutes an important part of liberalization by threatening workers’
power resources. Moreover, highlighting the distinctive history of this occupational
identity makes clear not just the manner in which liberalization threatens workers’
power resources but also the opportunities it presents for developing new ones.
The ubiquity of human capital theory poses the risk that tech workers’ strong
identification with the economic value of their skills may pass as unremarkable.
Streeck’s critique of asset theories of politics, however, suggests why tech workers’
occupational identity deserves a closer look. While an asset theory of politics may
purport to explain why tech workers do not participate in collective action or join
unions, such approaches are “rooted in an uncritical reception of human capital
theory, as well as in a rationalistic misconception of the relationship between
politics and the economy, or between social structures and economic pressures for
efficiency.”189 Against such views, Streeck insists that political economy should be
understood in terms of power relations, and that workers’ market power must be
compared with their associational power.190 Streeck’s critique is based on the view
that evaluating workers’ skills is impossible from an ahistorical standpoint that
purports to examine the content of workers’ jobs. Instead, the evaluation of skills
reflects ongoing negotiations between workers and management.191
Indeed, evaluating labor is fundamentally a historically specific act because
skills hold no value independent of their surrounding social context. As Postone
writes, “value is an objectification not of labor per se but of a historically specific
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function of labor.”192 In the context of capitalism, it is managers who assign value to
workers’ labor. Therefore, in a strong sense, tech workers’ compensation depends
less on their skills than on what managers choose to pay them. Structural factors
certainly play a role in shaping how managers value one type of skill over another,
but decisions regarding evaluation always ultimately rely on management’s
judgment.
This is significant because assigning value to a worker’s labor does more than
determine his compensation. In a capitalist society, working is “considered as a
predicate of a self, [so that] labor is never simply an activity of self-confirmation and
self-realization. It is always a process of self-externalization and self-expropriation,
to the point that the act of labor is no longer self-evidently the act of a self that
performs it.”193 By assigning value to a worker’s skills, management not only frames
those skills in a particular discourse, but also assigns that worker a particular
identity. Management’s language of evaluation and practices of compensation
provide a material structure that establishes an identity for workers that appears
objective. Tech workers identify as capable individuals in part because they can
easily summon evidence of their autonomy in the form of high wages.
The discursive context of production in Silicon Valley established a set of
practices around valuing technical skills in a primarily financial discourse. Rather
than viewing technological production as a scientifically valuable activity, or
evaluating workers’ skills in terms of their ability to collaborate in groups,
management in Silicon Valley maintains a hegemonic discourse in the workplace
where technological production is understood in financial terms, and workers are
evaluated as individuals against one another. As a result, tech workers adopted an
occupational identity that leads them to understand themselves as economically
Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical
Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 167.
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powerful individuals, to the extent that they are biased against participating in
collective action as well as joining unions, which reinforces their decision to
acquiesce to dismissals.
3. Liberalization and American institutions for economic governance
The primarily financial discourse that developed around production in Silicon Valley
is particularly threatening to workers’ power resources due to the US’s institutions
for economic governance. As the paradigmatic “liberal market economy,” national
institutions in the US are characterized by a consistent commitment to a principle of
economic rationality embodied by market competition. This orientation to market
dynamics has enabled employers to defend their discretion in the workplace by
arguing that any regulation of their decisions regarding the allocation of capital
would interfere with the efficient functioning of market mechanisms. This is
particularly evident in legislation surrounding dismissals, where employers are free
to dismiss workers as long as the measures are justified by economic conditions.
This section identifies the distinctly economic discourse underlying American
institutions for economic governance in order to suggest why the rise of the
knowledge economy has been associated with increased liberalization that, on the
one hand, threatens workers’ power resources, and, on the other, offers
opportunities to develop new power resources. As I illustrate in the case studies
that follow, the confluence of employers’ ability to justify downsizing for economic
reasons with workers’ identification as economic subjects disposes workers to
acquiesce to dismissals rather than mobilize to protect their rights.
Employment in the US is characterized by at-will contracts, which leave the
substantive terms of employment entirely up to negotiation between workers and
employers.194 Most significantly, the at-will framework precludes national
legislation regulating dismissals. Some argue that at-will employment benefits
Clyde W. Summers, “The Rights of Individual Workers: The Contract of Employment and
the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will,” Fordham
Law Review 52 (1984): 1084.
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workers, employers, and society at large, because its support for fluid labor markets
allows the independent dynamics of the economic sphere to unfold without politics
interfering with its autonomous rationality.195 Others argue that transaction costs
inherent to the labor market entail significant inefficiencies, which can be corrected
by dismissal protection legislation.196 Despite labor’s repeated attempts to regulate
dismissals, American employers have succeeded in defending a high degree of
discretion by shaping institutions for economic governance around the notion of an
economic sphere defined by an economic rationality autonomous from politics.
In 1935, during the historic high point of its strength in the twentieth century,
the American labor movement passed National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act.
Protecting workers’ rights to form unions and bargain with employers over working
conditions, the Wagner Act held considerable promise for limiting employer
discretion.197 American employers contested the Wagner Act, but were forced to
accept its provisions due to their fragile bargaining position. Some employers took a
belligerent stance, but the majority accepted that weak economic conditions and
strong union power required them to accept labor’s proposed legislation.198
American employers viewed the Wagner Act as a tradeoff: accepting formal
institutions for workers’ rights to organize unions would allow employers to
demand concessions from labor during collective bargaining over the actual
conditions of employment. Accepting the Wagner Act could thus allow employers to
defend managerial prerogative in the workplace.199 While some scholars view the
Wagner Act as the end of feudal employment relations in the United States, due to
Richard A. Epstein, “In Defense of the Contract at Will,” University of Chicago Law
Review 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1984): 947–82.
196 Paul Fenn and Christopher J. Whelan, “Job Security and the Role of Law: An Economic
Analysis of Employment-at-Will,” Stanford Journal of International Law 20 (1984): 353; Peter
A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of
Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
197 “National Labor Relations Act,” 49 Stat. 449 § (1935), §7.
198 Howell John Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in
the 1940s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 26.
199 Harris, 28.
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the extension of Congressional oversight to the workplace,200 many treat the
Wagner Act as more in line with employers’ interests than workers’.201
While the Wagner Act protects workers’ right to organize unions, it does little to
strengthen workers’ ability to limit employer discretion, and is particularly
ineffective regarding dismissals. The law itself is justified in terms of economic
performance rather than workers’ rights, and designed to avoid “strikes and other
forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce.”202 Furthermore, workers are prohibited from
bargaining over dismissals. The 1958 Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. BorgWarner distinguishes between those subjects that must be included in collective
agreements, “mandatory subjects,” and those that may be included, or “permissive
subjects.”203 According to the Court, the conditions surrounding partial or full plant
closings, including dismissals, do not constitute a mandatory subject, leaving
employers free to evade negotiating with unions over dismissal policies. Relying on
a framework of property rights, the Court supported employer discretion over
dismissals because they “feared that giving workers a voice in whether their jobs
were eliminated would impinge on the employer’s property interest.”204 Justice
Stewart pithily summarized this reasoning in his concurring opinion in Fibreboard v.
NLRB, where he described employer discretion over dismissals as falling within the
“core of entrepreneurial control.”205 Upholding property rights requires protecting
employer discretion within that core.
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The Wagner Act represents a significant legislative victory for labor, but its
provisions do not meaningfully limit employer discretion over dismissals. The
distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects for collective bargaining
affords employers a broad sphere where they can make unilateral decisions about
workplace conditions, including dismissals, without interference from workers or
the state. Since the Wagner Act was passed, however, the character of labor and the
labor movement has developed considerably, with workers increasingly focused on
protecting their rights in terms of individual identity, such as race, ethnicity, and
gender, rather than class.206
Just as employers deployed arguments about the autonomy of the economic
sphere in order to defend their discretion over dismissals in the face of the Wagner
Act, employers presented similar arguments to uphold their discretion against Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. Congress drafted Title VII in order to prohibit racial
discrimination in employment, namely employers’ hiring white workers first and
firing them last. Employers’ views of Title VII closely tracked their concern for
protecting managerial prerogative over personnel decisions. Many saw benefits in
Title VII, because ending discrimination would broaden the labor market: “When an
employer is limited in his choice of qualified employees to certain racial or religious
groups, he cannot always choose the skilled man for the job. Every time he must hire
the poorer man productivity suffers and costs of production are increased.”207 On
the other hand, employers feared that the bill would limit their discretion in the
economic sphere. The objections lodged by one local Chamber of Commerce
illustrate employers’ broader position. On their view, Title VII “would virtually put
the Federal Government in control of hiring, firing, and many other employment
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practices.”208 Concerns such as these can be understood as motivated by racial
animus, but employers’ opposition highlights that Title VII could limit their
discretion.
According to Title VII, an employer may not “refuse to hire or discharge any
individual” on the basis of protected categories, including race, color, and religion.209
While these provisions do formally limit employer discretion, Title VII contains
significant exceptions, namely that an employer may treat workers differently on
the basis of protected categories as long as the treatment corresponds to a “bona
fide occupational qualification.”210 The Court has further broadened this exception
by formulating the “business necessity defense,” whereby employer behavior may
have discriminatory effects as long as that behavior is necessary for the business to
function.211 Title VII’s standards are important for limiting employer discretion over
dismissals because they have been applied to a wide range of other categories,
including disability and age.212
National legislation like the Wagner Act and the Civil Rights Act could significantly
constrain employer discretion over dismissals, but employers carved out exceptions
by placing dismissals within the legal boundaries of an apparently autonomous
economic sphere. Despite these limitations, Title VII differs from the Wagner Act in
that it sets standards for assessing whether an employer’s reasoning is rational on
economic grounds. These standards provide resources for workers to limit
employer discretion over dismissals by enforcing Title VII to ensure that employer
behavior remains within a restricted economic sphere. Enforcement, however, is
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uneven, so that employer discretion over the employment relationship varies
considerably. At the high end of employer discretion, we observe cases where
managers are nearly unrestrained in how they shape the fundamental terms of the
employment relationship,213 and at the low end of employer discretion, we observe
cases where workers are able to stop or alter employer behavior by bringing a legal
case.214 By providing enforceable standards allowing workers to determine where
employer discretion can be limited, the relevant institutional background for
limiting employer discretion in the US associated is the Civil Rights Act, rather than
the Wagner Act.
American employers fought the passage of the Wagner Act more actively than
the Civil Rights Act, but it is the latter that provides the resources for workers to
limit employer discretion over dismissals. Legislation passed in connection with the
Civil Rights Act includes not just specific standards regulating dismissals, as I
showed above, but also an effective enforcement regime. Lawmakers designed the
enforcement regime of the Civil Rights Act in direct response to the Wagner Act, but
its effectiveness is an irony of history. Segregationists rejected proposals that civil
rights be enforced through a centralized agency like the Wagner Act’s National
Labor Relations Board because they feared that federal power would be too
effective in ending segregation.215 Instead, they suggested that civil rights be
enforced through private litigation. In an environment where civil rights lawyers
were too intimidated to take cases and local judges unsympathetic to racial equality,
private litigation should have helped uphold segregation. This proved, however, not
to be the case, due to subsequent reforms incentivizing attorneys to take civil rights
cases, in addition to the NAACP’s courtroom talent. I argue that the private litigation
framework designed for enforcing the Civil Rights Act is also effective for enforcing
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workers’ rights because it provides resources for workers to undermine employers’
economic justifications for dismissals.
The enforcement regime under Title VII solves a number of the collective action
problems that workers face in limiting employer discretion. Collective action against
employer discretion can potentially benefit an entire workforce, so mobilization
requires overcoming the problem of free-riders who prefer to keep their jobs but
would rather not pay the costs of participation, whether that be employer
retaliation or simply the time lost to mobilizing activities.216 Unlike the group rights
defined under the Wagner Act, however, civil rights are individual, so contesting
employer discretion under Title VII is aided by, but does not necessarily require,
broad collective action. Furthermore, due to the special importance of civil rights in
American constitutional law, Title VII is continuously reformed, and some recent
reforms have strengthened workers’ role in enforcement, in part by providing
education and outreach.217
The civil rights regime still, however, sets a high bar for workers to meet in
order to limit employer discretion. Title VII allows employers to execute otherwise
prohibited dismissals if they can show that business conditions require downsizing.
On a strict reading of the “business necessity defense,” “an employer must prove
that the goal it seeks to achieve through the practice is crucial to its continued
viability and, in turn, that the practice selected is crucial to the achievement of that
goal.”218 This formulation emphasizes a tight connection between employer
behavior and external economic conditions, but the standard applied is often more
David Weil, “Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions,” Industrial Relations: A Journal
of Economy and Society 30, no. 1 (January 1, 1991): 20–36; Louise Sadowsky Brock,
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lenient to employer interests. As discussed above, Title VII allows employers in
some cases to justify apparently discriminatory treatment of workers if they can
show that their behavior was motivated by a “bona fide occupational qualification.”
These standards have been adopted to apply beyond race, to gender and other
categories, but they pose a particularly difficult hurdle for age-based claims of
discrimination.
Not all workers are at equal risk for dismissal, with black workers and older
workers more likely to be affected by plant closings than others.219 While
employers’ propensity to dismiss black workers is motivated by racial animus,
dismissing older workers can, in many cases, meet the standard of economic
judgment formulated under Title VII. This standard is particularly difficult to
formulate in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which otherwise
extends the protections of Title VII to older workers.
Older workers are often more expensive than younger workers, due to seniority
wages and benefits, which makes it rational, from an economic perspective, for
employers to dismiss older workers first when faced with challenging economic
conditions. Scholars argue that the economic justification for dismissing older
workers is likely to hold up in court:
Outsourcing, restructuring, lean manufacturing, RIF [reduction in
force], and other business strategies resulting in the downsizing of
late-career employees can be justified on cost containment and
competitive market rationales. It is highly unlikely that courts would
interfere with the efforts of corporations seeking to reduce costs by
eliminating employees who earn premium wages as a result of their
length of service.220
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Indeed, while the ADEA does prohibit employers from basing personnel decisions
explicitly and solely on workers’ identities, the law specifies that these constraints
can be relaxed in the face of pressing economic conditions. Section 101 specifies that
the ADEA “prohibit[s] discrimination against older workers in all employee benefits
except when age-based reductions in employment benefit plans are justified by
significant cost considerations.” What these significant cost considerations are, and
how to balance them against the prohibition on age-based discrimination, depends
on workers’ ability to challenge management’s deployment of economic rationality.
Enforcing the ADEA presents a hard test for limiting employer discretion over
dismissals because it brings into relief the more general challenge of interpreting
and applying legal standards to economic phenomena. Recognizing that older
workers face a higher risk of dismissal than others, scholars have proposed
increasing the standards that employers must meet, suggesting that courts “inquire
under an objective standard, whether the employer’s cost-saving measure
‘significantly serves’ the employer’s legitimate need.”221 However, the fact that older
workers do win cases against employers’ threats of dismissal suggests that changing
the legal standard is not a necessary condition for workers to limit employer
discretion over dismissals. Statistics show that workers are likely to lose ADEA
complaints against employer behavior,222 but it is important to note that workers do
not lose every case, and, indeed, are significantly more likely to prevail in court if
they bring a group case, such as a class action.223 By offering a basic standard to
assess the legal limits of employer discretion, the ADEA provides workers a
resource for enforcement. Minda, for instance, describes a four-part test for
identifying where employer behavior constitutes discrimination.224 Winning a case
Steven J. Kaminshine, “The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age
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requires that workers show that an employer’s argument fails to meet the standards
of economic rationality by demonstrating that dismissals are not in fact justified by
economic conditions. Lacking an economic justification for dismissals locates the
employer’s decision outside the realm where discretion is protected.
1991 reforms to the ADEA bolstered the resources workers need to protect
against dismissals. The Older Workers Benefits Protection Act of 1991 (OWBPA)
amended the enforcement regime surrounding the ADEA in two ways. While one
section of the OWBPA allows employers to make severance benefits contingent on
workers’ forfeiture of some rights, another section requires employers to release
precisely the information that workers need in order to challenge dismissals on
grounds of age discrimination. Section 201.h.ii of the OWBPA requires that
employers provide workers “the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or
selected for the [dismissal] program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job
classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the
program.” When employers distribute information about the pattern of dismissals
across the entire firm they give workers the tools to overcome one the central
challenges in responding to a mass dismissal. Armed with a shared understanding of
their employer’s behavior, and the data to support that understanding, workers can
use this common informational basis to coordinate a collective response.225 The
OWBPA allows workers facing dismissal to view their situation from the collective
standpoint of the workforce rather than as isolated individuals. Indeed, statistics
showing a rise in cases contesting age-based dismissals suggests that the steady
decline of unions has not stopped workers from challenging their employers.226
While unions have historically supported workers in defending their rights at work,
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including defense against unjust dismissals, union involvement is less critical to the
challenges particular to economically justified dismissals of older workers. Instead,
the necessary conditions for mobilization have shifted to economic discourse in the
workplace because workers’ ability to limit employer discretion depends on
undermining employers’ economic justification for dismissals.
By specifying distinct limits to employer discretion, Title VII provides workers a
set of resources for limiting employer discretion over dismissals. Workers stand a
chance of challenging dismissals in court when they demonstrate that an employer’s
plans for dismissal are not justified on economic grounds, which suggests that
employer behavior fails to meet the standards of economic rationality. The ADEA
provides a hard test of workers’ ability to mobilize the civil rights enforcement
regime because employers can more easily argue that economic conditions justify
dismissals based on age than those based on other characteristics, such as race.
Despite these limitations, the private litigation mechanisms under the Civil Rights
Act, and particularly reforms to the ADEA that provide workers with firm-level
information about dismissals, offer workers meaningful resources for limiting
employer discretion.
Institutions for economic governance in the US make liberalization especially
threatening to workers’ power resources because they reinforce employers’
hegemonic discourse in the workplace. As the previous section illustrated, the
discursive context surrounding production in the tech sector leads both employers
and workers to frame the employment relationship in a primarily financial
discourse. This discourse disposes workers to acquiesce to dismissals because it
leads them to believe that collective action will not be effective in protecting their
jobs against dismissals. Instead, this discourse frames downsizing as the necessary
consequence of market forces external to the firm. In this section, I showed that the
institutions for economic governance in the US explicitly allow employers to dismiss
workers when they can justify dismissals with reference to market forces external
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to the firm. To the extent that employers in the tech sector are more likely to frame
downsizing in a primarily financial discourse, American institutions for economic
governance reinforce the persuasiveness of employers’ discourse in the workplace.
At the same time, as I illustrated above, these institutions do provide workers a set
of arguments to challenge downsizing.
Despite the challenges that liberalization poses to workers’ rights by
disposing them to acquiesce to dismissals, workers nonetheless stand a chance of
protecting against dismissals when they develop a counterhegemonic strategy.
Reviewing the structure of US institutions for economic governance reveals not just
how this legislative framework threatens workers’ rights under liberalization, but
also that workers can mobilize these institutions by challenging managers’
economic justifications for downsizing. The next section further articulates the
promise of counterhegemonic strategy under liberalization by identifying an
important set of contradictions underlying the discursive context of production in
the tech sector.
4. The unstable discourse surrounding production in Silicon Valley
While the state’s involvement in Silicon Valley led management and workers to
understand technological innovation in primarily financial terms, this framing, like
all hegemonic discourses, is not entirely stable. In order to establish the priority of
the financial aspects of technological innovation, the hegemonic discourse in Silicon
Valley must actively challenge alternative understandings, but such challenges are
never complete. As demonstrated in the first phase of state support for developing
new technology, technological innovation is both a scientific input to economic
growth as well as the scientific output of particular market forces. Although the
financial framing dominates, technology production in Silicon Valley is also framed
as scientific.
This unstable discourse around producing technology is at the root of the
contradictions underlying the primarily financial framing of the employment
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relationship, which was discussed in Chapter 2. On the one hand, tech workers may
contribute to scientific progress and economic growth, or at least their firm’s
performance. On the other hand, the discursive context of production in Silicon
Valley implies that causation may run the other direction, because conditions in the
workplace are shaped not just by scientific progress, but also market forces external
to the firm. While workers may contribute to market developments, they may also
be constrained by those very same market forces.
Many tech firms have adopted the discourse of academic science, just as
academic science has adopted the discourse of the private market. This has led to a
common discourse to describe the production of new technology, which oscillates
between presenting technological innovation as scientific and presenting it as
financial. Some insist that this discourse is characterized by “asymmetrical
convergence.” With tech workers involved in both science and business, there is a
melding of discourses due to the tendency of actors to “learn to use each other’s
rhetorical styles and arguments.”227 However, private firms and their focus on
market forces hold the upper hand over academic considerations regarding the
independent progress of knowledge. Furthermore, those who benefit from this
melding of discourses, whether venture capitalists or software engineers, are
coming to form a “technical intelligentsia, with its affinity for instrumental, marketbased values.”228 The financial aspects of this discourse are therefore privileged in
the sense that they correspond to the interests of a distinct set of actors.
While a financial framing of technological innovation has become hegemonic
in the tech sector, the instability of this discourse ensures that different
understandings of agency continue to play an important role in determining
workers’ power resources in the workplace. This instability can be observed in a
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number of running conflicts in Silicon Valley, such as those concerning open source
software. Weber describes open source as an “internet era Rorschach test,” because
it questions the dominant understanding of how to motivate and coordinate
technological innovation by proposing that software be distributed for free.229 As I
show in the two case studies that follow, this conflict between the scientific and
financial conceptions of technological innovation can also be observed in the
workplace when workers attempt to make sense of management’s justifications for
downsizing. Workers’ understanding of their agency in the workplace plays a
critical role in shaping how they respond to downsizing. When workers believe that
collective action could protect their jobs, they mobilize, and when they believe that
collective action will be ineffective, they acquiesce.
5. Two cases of downsizing
Existing research on downsizing cannot explain why workers at Burlington
mobilized against dismissals while those in San Jose did not, partly because most
approaches mainly rely on variation between firms. However, because both sites
belonged to IBM, each faced the same financial conditions, as well as the same
corporate governance structures.230 (See table 3.1) Furthermore, much of the
existing research on downsizing is limited to either firms’ announcement of
dismissals or to workers’ tenure, neither of which is a reliable measure of job
security. Research shows significant discrepancies between the number of
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dismissals firms announce and what they implement, and job tenure both overlooks
voluntary quits and is quickly mired in the complications of counter-cyclical
tendencies.231 Instead, the chapters that follow focus on explaining variation in
workers’ mobilization, which is, as I argued in Chapter 2, a necessary condition for
workers to protect their jobs from dismissals.

Table 3.1 IBM’s Financial Performance
1999
2000
2001
Earnings
per share

2002

2003

2004

3.93

4.32

4.59

3.07

4.34

4.94

Debt to
equity ratio

1.382

1.391

1.158

1.142

0.848

0.77

Net income

7712

8093

7723

3579

7583

8430

Revenue for
servers232

11024

11497

10947

10047

11148

12460

Revenue for
storage233

2381

2539

2755

2581

2849

2898

IBM Total
employees

307401 316303 319876

315889 319273 329001

($ in million)
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Sources: IBM Annual reports, 2001-2004

Chapter 4 traces how workers responded to dismissals at IBM Burlington,
where the Fordist context of production led management to establish a hegemonic
discourse in the workplace based on a norm of mutual obligation. Organizers
redeployed this discourse in order to frame dismissals as a violation of this norm.
Because their framing resonated with workers’ occupational identities, organizers
succeed in persuading workers that mobilizing against dismissals was necessary
and reasonable. Workers coordinated a collective legal case against IBM that forced
management to settle with workers for an undisclosed sum and to adapt their
dismissal policy.
As Chapter 5 shows, organizers at IBM San Jose simply recycled the
discursive strategy they received from their colleagues on the east coast, rather than
developing a strategy based on the discursive context surrounding production in
Silicon Valley. In contrast to the Fordist context of Burlington, production in Silicon
Valley is framed in an unstable mixture of financial and scientific discourses,
although the financial discourse dominates. As a result, management at IBM San Jose
framed the employment relationship in a primarily financial discourse, leading
workers to reject organizers’ normative framing of dismissals. Disposed to view
production in a primarily financial discourse, workers at San Jose found
management’s justification for dismissals more plausible than organizers’
normative critiques. Therefore, they chose to acquiesce, rather than participate in a
collective action they believed was neither necessary nor reasonable.
While focusing on how workers’ responses to dismissals depended on
organizers’ discursive strategies, each chapter makes clear that the effectiveness of
these strategies depended directly on the discursive context of production that
developed at each site. Chapter 4 traces how the state’s attempts to regulate IBM in
Vermont established a discourse around production based on the norm of
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reciprocity, while Chapter 5 shows how the primarily financial discourse
surrounding production in Silicon Valley made labor’s tradition strategies for
mobilization ineffective. While workers at IBM Burlington were involved with
producing technology, their occupational identities were distinct from their
colleagues’ in Silicon Valley. Comparing these two cases thus illustrates how tech
workers’ occupational identity, which developed in Silicon Valley, undermines the
effectiveness of organizers’ established strategies for mobilization.
Situating each workplace in the broader discursive context surrounding
production illustrates how firms’ adoption of an orientation to shareholder value
affects workers very differently depending on how managers and organizers make
sense of their specific settings. As IBM transitioned from a technology orientation to
focusing on shareholder value, executives implemented changes across the firm,
such as significantly decreasing investments in research and development,234 but
the orientation to shareholder value had different effects at different sites due to
variation in the discursive contexts of different localities. At IBM San Jose, workers
adopted the occupational identity particular to Silicon Valley, which led them to
reject organizers’ call for collective action.
As I show in the two chapters that follow, management at Burlington and San
Jose framed dismissals in the same discourse of shareholder value, and organizers
responded with the same normative critiques. Nonetheless, workers at Burlington
resisted dismissals in a collective legal action that included hundreds of
participants, while workers at San Jose largely acquiesced. This within-country,
within-firm comparison of workers’ responses to mass dismissals in different
geographic settings identifies the workplace dynamics that shape the effect of the
discursive context of production on workers’ power resources.
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Chapter 4. Economic transition in the workplace: Resistance at
Burlington
There's a local culture here, and a passion for Burlington, and a passion for the site
that really transcends way beyond IBM… there is a very strong local passion to be
successful and keep these jobs in Burlington.
Former Technical Manager, IBM Burlington.
Author Interview, Burlington, October 13, 2015.

In the late 1990s, life was uncertain at IBM’s production facility in Burlington,
Vermont. In November 2001, a worker told the local news that, “the last few weeks
have been like living on pins and needles.”235 On the one hand, the site was growing.
In 1999, Burlington hired 500 more workers, boosting employment to 7500, the
largest it had ever been. Production was exceeding benchmarks, contributing to
IBM’s growing revenues in 2001 with earnings 117 percent higher than the previous
year. Although IBM was outperforming its competitors, seemingly untouched by the
tech bubble bursting in late 2000, the Burlington facility was still in trouble. In early
2000, IBM executives decided to produce the next line of semiconductors in East
Fishkill, New York, rather than Burlington, and in February 2001, Burlington began
a series of cost-reduction programs.236 Workers saw their compensation reduced,
and in August 2001, they learned that their overtime would be limited. Site
executives defended the measures, warning workers to “keep in mind that others in
the industry have had to take much more severe actions.”237
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On November 28, 2001, IBM Burlington terminated 1247 workers, followed by a
second round on June 4, 2002, when 1210 were dismissed.238 In little more than six
months, one third of the site’s workers had been terminated, but to fully appreciate
the scale of the job cuts, it is important to note that the surrounding town of Essex
Junction had 8000 residents in 2002. In the months following dismissals, workers in
Burlington filed a collective legal case against IBM. 358 workers from IBM’s
locations across the US joined Syverson v. IBM, alleging that workers had been
selected for dismissal illegally, based on their age rather than a business reason.
Workers associated with the Alliance@IBM, a group of IBM workers who organized
in the late 1990s to represent their interests against management, initiated the case
and 155 from Burlington eventually joined the collective legal action, forming the
largest group of plaintiffs. IBM settled in 2009, paying workers an undisclosed sum
and amending their dismissal policy to avoid future challenges.
This chapter explains how workers at IBM Burlington mobilized to protect their
jobs against downsizing by developing counterhegemonic strategies that
undermined management’s justifications for dismissals. I show that while IBM as a
firm adopted a discourse of shareholder value, production at Burlington remained
embedded in Fordist discourse, which revolved around a norm of reciprocity
between management and workers. When they announced dismissals, however,
managers engaged the discourse of shareholder value, and workers found their
justifications for downsizing prima facie illegitimate. As a result, a group of workers
organized and redeployed management’s own hegemonic discourse in order to
persuade workers that mobilizing against dismissals was necessary and reasonable.
Viewed from a distance, workers at Burlington mobilized because organizers’
strategies were consistent with the site’s Fordist production practices. This chapter,
however, looks beyond the material organization of production, relying on
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thousands of primary documents gathered during fieldwork in Burlington and from
workers’ case against IBM, as well as interviews with former workers, managers,
and organizers. Doing so sheds light on organizers’ agency in formulating a
counterhegemonic discourse. Moreover, I demonstrate the importance of local
discursive context in shaping how, and whether, a firm’s orientation to shareholder
value affects power relations in the workplace.
Building on existing accounts of worker mobilization, I make three
interconnected claims to highlight the causal linkages between the discursive
context of production and the path of workers’ mobilization against downsizing.
First, I argue that workers mobilized to protect their jobs because organizers
framed dismissals in a discourse that resonated with workers’ occupational
identities, which made clear that mobilization could be effective. Second, I argue
that workers’ occupational identities were shaped by management’s framing of the
employment relationship. Lastly, connecting research on social movements to
broader theories in political economy, I argue that managers framed the
employment relationship in discourse that reflected the material organization of
production. This chapter argues that the Fordist organization of production at
Burlington generated a discourse surrounding production that provided workers
the resources to mobilize against dismissals. This chapter thus illustrates the threat
of liberalization to workers’ rights by tracing how the introduction of the primarily
financial discourse of shareholder value transforms employment relations.
Building on the concept of the discursive context of production introduced in
Chapter 3, this chapter engages and contributes to the Régulation School of political
economy. While this approach is limited in many ways, its analysis of Fordism as a
relatively coherent set of material and political practices provides a framework for
analyzing the consequences of the material organization of production at

110

Burlington.239 I build on the regulationist view that Fordist production practices
provide the basis for institutions, particularly unions and collective bargaining, that
protect workers’ rights.240 Instead of institutions, however, I shift the focus to
discourse, showing that when firms establish a production facility in a particular
region, local attempts at regulation embed the firm in a specific discursive context,
which can provide workers the resources necessary for mobilizing against employer
discretion. This chapter suggests how the introduction of the discursive context
surrounding the knowledge economy can sever the connection between workers
and their local context. The chapters that follow build on these observations to
develop a more in-depth analysis of how embedding the workplace in the global
context of financial capital restructures the balance of power between management
and workers.
The chapter begins by illustrating how IBM adopted the primarily financial
discourse of shareholder value in the mid-1990s. I then trace the path of workers’
resistance, from their first reactions to dismissals until the settlement of Syverson in
2009. In order to explain why workers mobilized despite being exposed to the
discourse of shareholder value, I show how organizers met the two conditions
necessary for mobilization outlined in Chapter 2. The remainder of the chapter
analyzes the discourse surrounding production at Burlington to show that
organizers succeeded in developing an effective counterhegemonic strategy
because, while executives at IBM introduced the discourse of shareholder value, the
workplace at Burlington remained embedded in the local discursive context.
Organizers were able to re-deploy management’s normative framing of the
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employment relationship in order to demonstrate to workers that collective action
could be effective in a discourse that they found persuasive.
The following case study is consistent with existing accounts of worker
mobilization but shows that these accounts need to be updated with the transition
to the knowledge economy. As more and more firms adopt the orientation to
shareholder value, workers confront a different set of challenges and the discourse
surrounding production provides a different set of resources for collective action.
By highlighting the historical contingency of organizers’ strategies, this chapter
suggests that we need to revise our understanding of worker mobilization as the
discursive context of production evolves. By showing that the effectiveness of
organizers’ strategies under Fordism depended on their resonance with the
discursive context of production, this chapter suggests why those strategies became
ineffective with the transition to the knowledge economy.

Table 4.1 Timeline of workers’ response to dismissals: IBM Burlington
November 28, 2001
Management announces 1248
dismissals
December 2001

Alliance@IBM begins gathering
workers’ accounts, advising affected
workers

June 4, 2002

Management announces 1210
dismissals

June 13, 2002

Workers meet at a hotel near
Burlington to discuss their options and
consult with a lawyer

July 3, 2002

James Leas faxes letter alleging age
discrimination to Burlington
management

August 5, 2002

Leas and others demonstrate in the
parking lot of an IBM outsourcing site,
present workers with graphs
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illustrating age discrimination, and
forms for filing cases
August 7, 2002

Workers file the first three age
discrimination claims with Vermont’s
Attorney General

February 2003

Vermont Attorney General transfers
workers’ cases to the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)

July 2003

EEOC rejects workers’ claims

September 2003

McTeague, Higbee, Case, Cohen,
Whitney & Toker agrees to represent
workers against IBM

October 7, 2003

126 workers join the case, Syverson v.
IBM, alleging that IBM illegally selected
workers for dismissal based on their
age

January 9, 2009

IBM settles Syverson v. IBM for an
undisclosed sum and agrees to amend
its dismissal policy; 155 workers from
Burlington are named plaintiffs

1. Management’s hegemonic discourse: shareholder value at IBM
When Lou Gerstner became CEO in 1993, he was explicit that IBM needed to better
serve shareholder interests. Gerstner described his first shareholder meeting as “a
massacre”: “Shareholder after shareholder stood up and blasted the company, and
frequently the Board of Directors, all of whom were sitting in front of me in the first
row of the auditorium.”241 As a result, Gerstner concluded that, “we needed to make
the marketplace the driving criterion for all of our actions and all of our behavior.”242
Gerstner introduced a new system of variable pay and he played a major role in
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establishing a hegemonic discourse that revolved around the conception that
market forces external to the firm set parameters on working conditions. In the
period surrounding dismissals, IBM executives explicitly told workers that market
developments were pushing them toward downsizing. Shortly after he became CEO
in March 2002, Sam Palmisano “told employees April 24 that IBM would have to
pare its workforce because of the decline in corporations' demand for technology,
according to an investor newsletter that published an edited transcript of the
broadcast.”243 Across IBM, workers received a consistent message that market
developments required downsizing.
Despite Gerstner’s efforts to push IBM toward the shareholder value
orientation, he faced significant opposition. Management had long framed the
employment relationship in a discourse derived from Watson’s “Three Basic
Beliefs,” which outlined management’s normative commitments, such as “Respect
for the Individual.”244 Gerstner complained that Watson’s normative framing of the
employment relationship damaged IBM’s business. This normative orientation
“helped spawn a culture of entitlement, where ‘the individual’ didn’t have to do
anything to earn respect – he or she expected rich benefits and lifetime employment
simply by virtue of having been hired.”245 Gerstner did what he could to push IBM
away from this normative discourse, but its legacy lived on at Burlington through
the early 2000s. As I show in the sections below, the endurance of normative
discourse at IBM Burlington is what enabled workers there to defend against
downsizing.
2. Downsizing at IBM Burlington
Although management had introduced cost-reduction measures at Burlington in the
late 1990s, workers were nonetheless stunned when dismissals were announced in
Caroline Humer, “Massive Layoffs Possible at IBM; Source: 9,540 Jobs May Be
Eliminated,” San Jose Mercury News, May 11, 2002, sec. BU.
244 “IBM100 - A Business and Its Beliefs,” March 7, 2012, http://www03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/bizbeliefs/.
245 Gerstner, Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance?, 186.
243
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November 2001. Many joined IBM with the expectation of lifetime employment, and,
after decades of weathering economic downturns without dismissals, workers
believed that IBM’s tradition of employment security applied to them as it had to
previous generations. After the first round of dismissals, workers mostly just vented
their frustrations in an online discussion forum established by the Alliance@IBM, a
group that organized to protect workers’ interests at IBM. After the second round in
June 2002, however, a handful of workers organized direct action against the firm.
Noticing that older workers were more likely to be dismissed than their younger
colleagues, William Syverson analyzed the workforce statistics he received along
with his termination notice. Syverson’s analysis showed clear evidence of age
discrimination, and he shared his findings with other workers, who took the first
steps in mobilizing workers against IBM in August 2002. This section traces the path
by which workers filed individual cases against IBM with Vermont’s Attorney
General before organizing a collective legal case at the federal level, which
eventually became Syverson v. IBM. In the following sections, I explain what allowed
organizers to mobilize 155 workers from Burlington against dismissals.
2.1 The First round: November 28, 2001
The announcement of 1248 dismissals on November 28, 2001, challenged much of
what workers at Burlington understood about the world. Many turned to the
Alliance’s Yahoo chat room to seek support from others.246 In early December 2001,
the Alliance began gathering workers’ accounts of the dismissals, but much of their
activity focused on providing advice to affected workers.247 Sensitized to the issue of
age-discrimination from their fight concerning pensions, and noticing that older
workers seemed more likely to be dismissed than younger workers, the Alliance
encouraged workers to file a case with the Equal Employment Opportunity
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Commission (EEOC) charging age discrimination.248 The Alliance also posted a
“survival guide” for dismissed workers and tried to rally support for a “hire-back
campaign.”249 As dismissals continued, workers continued to give one another
advice, such as what to do if they were called in for a discussion with their
manager,250 and workers repeatedly brought up the possibility of litigation. Having
long believed that management acted in their interests, workers at IBM were slowly
recognizing that some form of collective action was necessary to protect their rights.
2.2 The Second round: June 4, 2002
In addition to providing a platform to support workers following dismissals, the
Yahoo chat room was a useful forum for workers to learn when the next round of
dismissals was coming. On June 4, 2002, Lee Conrad posted that Burlington was
being hit by another round.251 By the end of that day, 1210 more workers had been
dismissed.252
While workers at Burlington responded to the first round of dismissals primarily
through online channels, the second round engendered a wave of direct action. On
June 13, workers held a meeting at a hotel near the site in order to discuss their
options, and they allotted two hours to local lawyer to discuss legal action against
the firm.253 One former worker, William Syverson, assembled statistics drawn from
information IBM released in compliance with the Older Workers Benefit Protection
IBM_WARRIOR, “Urge to File a EEOC Charge?,” IBM Union, December 14, 2001,
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249 IBM_WARRIOR, “If IBM Layoff/Fires You! Whats Going On?,” IBM Union, December 17,
2001, https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/ibmunion/conversations/messages/10109;
IBM_WARRIOR, “Call Back Campaign.Hire Back Laid-Off!,” IBM Union, December 19, 2001,
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/ibmunion/conversations/messages/10117.
250 unionjack1999_2001, “What to Do If You Are Fired!,” IBM Union, May 18, 2002,
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/ibmunion/conversations/messages/10691.
251 bboru11, “Microelectronics Cuts Happening,” IBM Union, June 4, 2002,
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/ibmunion/conversations/messages/10748.
252 Declaration of Robert H. Topel, “Exhibit C: Summary Statistics of MERA and All
Resource Actions Between 12/1/2001 and 5/4/2005.”
253 unionjack1999_2001, “ALLIANCE MEETING BURLINGTON,” IBM Union, June 9, 2002,
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/ibmunion/conversations/messages/10788.
248

116

Act (OWBPA), which requires firms to provide dismissed workers with the positions
and ages of workers who were dismissed as well as those who were retained.254
Breaking each group into different age categories, Syverson detected a pattern,
whereby older workers were more likely to be dismissed than younger workers.
Although Syverson gathered this data in order to file an appeal to save his own job,
he also shared his analysis with others.255
James Leas, an engineer at IBM, self-taught lawyer, and activist, was one worker
who received Syverson’s analysis. On July 3, 2002 , Leas faxed a two-page letter to
site executives at Burlington expressing his concern that IBM’s dismissals had
discriminated against workers on the basis of age.256 Receiving no satisfactory reply,
Leas organized other workers to help distribute Syverson’s findings. IBM had
scheduled dismissed workers to receive career counseling from the outsourcing
firm, Dean Beam and Morin, and on August 5, Leas and a handful of others set up in
the parking lot with a large banner, Syverson’s graphs, and forms for filing agediscrimination complaints.257
2.3 Syverson v. IBM: Workers’ collective legal case against IBM
On August 7, 2002, the first three workers filed age-discrimination claims with
Vermont’s Attorney General, and by the next day, twelve more workers had done
so.258 While the Attorney General pursued the case against IBM over the fall,
workers began collecting evidence for a possible federal case with the EEOC.259
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Recognizing a pattern of discrimination that extended beyond Vermont, the
Attorney General transferred workers’ cases to the EEOC in February 2003.260 In
July, however, workers received notice that the EEOC had rejected their claims,
leaving them 90 days to file private suits against IBM if they still wanted to pursue
the charges.261
In late September 2003, Leas directed workers to contact McTeague, Higbee,
Case, Cohen, Whitney & Toker, a Maine law firm where two attorneys agreed to take
on workers’ case against IBM.262 By October 2, 2003, 100 workers had joined the
case, and by the time the case was filed, on October 7, 126 workers had joined,
nearly half of which were based in Burlington.263 In the Yahoo chat room, workers
tried to recruit more participants from IBM’s other US locations.264 In November,
workers in Burlington organized a meeting with their attorneys. They advertised
the meeting in the local newspaper and used the Alliance’s online forum to tell
workers at other locations that they could participate in the meeting by dialing into
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a national conference call.265 The number of workers joining the case from outside
Burlington continued to rise, and Syverson v. IBM eventually counted 358 plaintiffs
alleging age-discrimination.266 After years of litigation, workers settled on January 9,
2009 in the Ninth Circuit, with IBM agreeing to pay an undisclosed sum to affected
workers and to amend their dismissal policies.267
2.4 Why did workers mobilize?
While workers ultimately settled out of court, their collective legal action
nonetheless represents a significant victory. Rather than acquiescing to downsizing,
workers mobilized for collective action that limited management’s discretion over
the employment relationship. Their collective action raised the costs of dismissals
by activating national institutions to protect workers from age discrimination. IBM
was forced not only to compensate affected workers, but also to update their
dismissal policies by limiting the discretion that managers have over dismissals. Of
course, even a victory in court would hardly count as a definitive win, because, as
long as capitalism survives, workers still remain subject to employer discretion.
Nonetheless, workers in Burlington fulfilled a necessary condition for protecting
their jobs against the threat of dismissals by mobilizing to activate national
institutions. For this reason, it is the fact that workers at IBM Burlington mobilized
that must be counted as a success, rather than the results of their action.
The remainder of the chapter explains why workers mobilized. I argue that
they decided to participate in collective action to defend against downsizing because
organizers framed dismissals in a counterhegemonic discourse that resonated with
John Mellon, “CHANGE IN LAWYER MEETING(S) CALL IN TEL. NUMBER
PROCEDURE,” IBM Union, November 18, 2003,
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workers’ occupational identities. By presenting mobilization as a necessary response
to the injustice of dismissals, organizers persuaded workers that open conflict with
management was justified. Furthermore, organizers’ framing of dismissals
highlighted workers’ agency over their working conditions, which persuaded them
that collective action could be effective in protecting their jobs. Mobilization thus
appeared as a reasonable response to downsizing. Each element of organizers’
discursive strategy was made possible by the hegemonic discourse that
management established in the workplace. While the primarily financial discourse
of shareholder value spread across IBM as a firm, I show below how managers at
Burlington continued to invoke the discourse surrounding the site’s Fordist
production practices through the mid-2000s. However, when they announced
downsizing, managers relied on instructions from IBM corporate human resources
(HR), which framed dismissals in the discourse of shareholder value.
As I argue in the sections that follow, managers’ discourse provided
organizers two distinct resources in developing a counterhegemonic strategy to
contest dismissals. First, managers’ framing of dismissals in the primarily financial
discourse of shareholder value was inconsistent with the hegemonic discourse they
had maintained over decades of directing the Burlington site. As a result, workers
viewed managers’ justifications for downsizing as prima facie illegitimate, which
strengthened workers’ sense that mobilization was necessary for correcting an
injustice. Second, in contrast to the primarily financial discourse of shareholder
value, the hegemonic discourse that management established at Burlington
accorded workers agency over their working conditions. In order to convince
workers that mobilizing was potentially effective, and therefore a reasonable plan
for protecting their jobs, organizers were able to reinforce a concept of agency that
workers already found persuasive. In the following sections, I show that
management’s hegemonic discourse in the workplace was based on the discursive
context that took shape around production in Burlington. Illustrating the
connections between the material organization of production at the site and the
120

discursive effects of local attempts at regulating IBM, I show how local political
economic context shapes the hegemonic discourse that managers establish in the
workplace. Precisely because workers can rely on the local discursive context to
develop power resources against management discretion, the primarily financial
discourse of shareholder value threatens their rights by embedding the workplace
in the global context of financial capital.
3. Organizers meet the two conditions necessary for mobilization
Workers at IBM Burlington participated in collective action because labor
organizers succeeded in fulfilling the two conditions necessary for mobilization.
First, organizers explicitly argued that workers had agency over their working
conditions, which demonstrated the potential effectiveness of collective action.
Second, and equally important, organizers framed downsizing in a discourse that
workers found persuasive. As a result, workers came to believe that participating in
collective action could save their jobs, which thus made mobilization a reasonable
response to downsizing. Before showing that organizers fulfilled these two
conditions, I demonstrate that workers at Burlington understood employment as a
relationship governed by a norm of reciprocity. This normative orientation allowed
organizers to activate workers’ sense of injustice, and, as I show in the following
section, also played a key role in allowing organizers to demonstrate the potential
effectiveness of collective action.
Workers at Burlington believed that the employment relationship was
constituted by mutual obligations between workers and their employer. Workers
dedicated their lives to serving the firm’s interests, and, in return, managers were
supposed to protect workers’ interests through high wages, regular promotions, and
employment security. Dismissals did not fit the IBM that workers identified with: “I
think the first layoff was 2002. And that was not IBM. You know, IBM was, you
joined them and you are there for life.”268 This worker went on to emphasize that
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the IBM he knew was one governed not according to business logic and competition,
but by norms: “[When] I started with them, it was really like a family affair. Truly.
You know, everybody cared about everybody.”269 Workers were expected to give
their maximal effort, and in return they expected that management would take care
of them. Dismissals shattered this sense of reciprocity.
Viewing the employment relationship as constituted by mutual obligation,
workers at IBM were accustomed to management respecting their interests. When
management seemed to act against their interests, workers expected to be able to
speak up so that managers could adjust their behavior. During the conflict over
reductions to workers’ pensions, one worker told a local report that, “we are
different breed of employee…. We are very well educated and involved and we know
what’s going on…With all the changes coming forth, we feel ignored with our
grievances.”270 Framing dismissals as a case of age discrimination allowed workers
to connect their grievances about being dismissed with a clear path of collective
action, namely a legal case against management. Furthermore, organizers’ framing
of age discrimination resonated with workers’ expectations of lifetime employment.
Because workers believed that management was obligated to provide employment
until they were ready to retire, age discrimination directly violated a norm central
to the employment relationship at Burlington.
Workers who joined Syverson used the streamlined form that organizers
prepared for them, and they also added their own language to strengthen the
normative claims against management.271 One worker wrote that, “It is wrong that
older workers who have devoted a substantial amount of their lives should be
discarded at significantly higher rates than younger workers.”272 Other workers
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added details to their complaints indicating that dismissals had violated the trust
they had in their managers. Allan Abrams described a conversation where his
manager asked about his retirement plans: “I made it clear right up front that I was
extremely intimidated by his question, since this coincided with the recent layoff we
had just had…With the November layoffs so recent, I as well as other employees did
not dare bring up retirement at all. That discussion at a time of layoffs was taboo.”273
Abrams was certainly upset that he was dismissed, but he was also upset that his
manager even suggested that he might not receive lifetime employment. In his eyes,
it was unjust for a manager to discuss retirement plans with him because doing so
constituted intimidation by signaling that his job was not secure. For workers at
IBM, age discrimination was unjust not only because it was illegal, but because it
violated the norm of reciprocity between managers and workers.
Upset as they were at management for dismissals, many workers did not see
collective action, particularly in the form of a union, as the most appropriate
solution. A CWA organizer described how workers wanted others to solve their
problems with management, rather than directly confronting managers themselves:
So even people, a lot of people who got involved with the union, got
involved in the union as like a negative thing, like ‘we're going to
strike back at them.’ It was like those old Westerns where the poor
farmers are sick of the bandits raiding them, so they hire their own
group of bandits. That was kind of the attitude. ‘You guys go and do
this, you guys go and fight the company.’ It was like, ‘no, see, you gotta
like organizing.’ That was the hard message, ‘you gotta actually
organize?’274
Even workers who supported the idea of a union would “never come out in public,
they'd never be seen with you. It was like, they didn't want to do anything, they
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wanted you to do it for them.”275 While anti-union bias prevented some workers
from joining in direct action against IBM, many dismissed workers had no choice
because as soon as workers were dismissed, they were no longer eligible to join the
union.276
Whether their reasons were ideological or practical, participating in the legal
case was more consistent with workers’ preferences than either unionizing or doing
nothing. Lawyers could act as workers’ “bandits,” exerting pressure on managers
without workers needing to contribute much effort, and the legal path was open to
workers who had been dismissed. But perhaps most importantly, for IBM workers
who identified strongly with their firm, the more technical discourse of the legal
complaint appealed to workers who otherwise found organizers’ framing too
“caustic.”277 By framing dismissals in the legal discourse of age discrimination,
organizers engaged workers’ occupational identities to show that dismissals
violated the shared norm of reciprocity. After devoting decades of their lives to IBM,
dismissed workers participated in Syverson in order to remedy the injustice of their
termination.
However, as argued in Chapter 2, workers need more than a sense of
injustice to motivate them to participate in collective action. Workers at Burlington
decided to participate in collective action not just because they felt that
management has violated the norms surrounding employment, but also because
they believed that mobilization could be effective in protecting their jobs. The
remainder of this section illustrates how organizers fulfilled the two conditions
necessary for mobilization by demonstrating to workers that collective action could
be potentially effective in a discourse that they found persuasive.
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The overall structure of workers’ age discrimination complaint implicitly
targeted IBM management, but organizers’ discourse made management’s
responsibility explicit, thereby fulfilling the first conditions necessary for
mobilization. In addition to simplifying the form that workers used to file charges of
age discrimination, organizers also provided specific language that workers could
insert in the form. In the part of the form where workers were asked to explain why
they believed they were discriminated against, organizers provided a pre-written
paragraph citing Syverson’s analysis of dismissal patterns: “When IBM selected me
for layoff… A chart made from data in IBM’s document shows that employees who
were over 45 years old had a much higher chance of being selected for layoff than
younger employees, and the chance of being selected increased sharply with age
above 45.”278 By specifying, “when IBM selected me,” this language makes explicit
the assumption underlying the charge of age discrimination: Workers were not
dismissed by accident, nor were they terminated due to broader forces outside of
their control, such as an economic downturn. Instead, organizers used a discourse
that explicitly attributed dismissals to managers’ decisions. With this attribution
established, workers could go on to directly demand that management remedy their
situation through reinstatement, backpay, damages, front pay, and loss of future
wages.279
As a result of organizers’ framing of dismissals, workers at Burlington
doubted management’s argument that external market forces required downsizing.
According to a former engineer, “oh, they [managers] had to say what they were
doing: ‘Yeah, we are doing it [downsizing] because we are losing business and we
are... Everybody will lose if some don't lose.’ You know, unfortunately, I don't
understand that logic. Because IBM did not do layoffs until that first one.”280 As I
“Employment Discrimination Questionnaire [Streamlined],” n.d.,
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illustrate below, management’s own discourse at Burlington contradicted the
primarily financial discourse of shareholder value articulated by executives, at least
until they announced dismissals. Workers doubted the attribution of downsizing to
market forces because the discourse that management established as hegemonic at
Burlington was based on the assumption that managers had the ability to shape
working conditions. Management’s normative framing, in contrast to executives’
financial framing, provided organizers discursive resources to articulate workers’
agency over working conditions.
By deemphasizing the causal power of market forces on the employment
relationship, organizers amplified workers’ beliefs in their ability to protect their
job security. Following management’s announcement of dismissals, organizers
polled workers at Burlington, asking them if they believed that downsizing was
necessary. After sharing information about IBM’s financial performance, the poll
asked, “Do you think IBM needs to Cut Jobs [sic] based on these results?” Two
workers answered, “yes,” and 120, “no.”281
While attributing dismissals to management rather than market forces was a
critical aspect of organizers’ strategy, this framing was effective only because it
resonated with workers’ occupational identities, fulfilling the second condition
necessary for mobilization. As I illustrate below, organizers’ articulation of
management’s responsibility for dismissals was based on assumptions underlying
workers’ normative understanding of the employment relationship. Moreover,
organizers also occasionally framed downsizing in explicitly normative discourse,
rather than leaving that framing implicit. Organizers’ framing was effective because
it was consistent with the norms underlying workers’ occupational identity.
Many workers used the streamlined form that organizers provided for filing
claims with the EEOC, and some added their own language to emphasize not just
Alliance@IBM, “(Anonymous Poll) Employees Poll on Job Cuts, Pay Cuts, and
Organizing.,” n.d.
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management’s responsibility for dismissals but also their view that downsizing
violated the norms of employment. One worker offered an explanation for
management’s behavior: “Because of my age and proximity to retirement,
Respondent [IBM] wanted to avoid the logarithmic growth of my pension account,
and avoid the cost of future retirement benefits.”282 Another worker wrote that she
and her colleagues were terminated because “We were nearing retirement and cost
IBM $$.”283 Workers understood downsizing not just as the result of managers’ free
decision to dismiss them, but also as a decision motivated by greed, which violated
the norm of reciprocity they understood to govern the employment relationship.
Workers’ belief in managers’ agency over working conditions undergirded their
decision to participate in collective action against downsizing. As I illustrate in the
section that follows, this belief was grounded in the discourse that management
established as hegemonic in the workplace, as well as the local context surrounding
production.
4. Management’s hegemonic discourse: normative vs. financial
Rather than establishing a hegemonic discourse derived from an orientation to
shareholder value, management at IBM Burlington established a discourse in the
workplace based on the conception that the employment relationship is
independent of firm performance. In contrast to the general trend in the knowledge
economy, where managers insist that workers must adapt themselves to market
forces, managers at Burlington emphasized their responsibility for workers’ welfare.
During a period of decreased demand preceding dismissals, management reduced
workers’ hours and pay, but made a point to remind workers that managers could
find solutions to any problems this might cause for workers or their families. In an
email to all workers, the site executive announced that, “Should such problems exist,
we would encourage you to discuss this with your manager to help look for
Lee A. Deshler, “Charge of Employment Discrimination, State of Vermont, Office of the
Attorney General, Public Protection Division,” December 2, 2002.
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individual solutions.”284 Management implied that, regardless of IBM’s performance,
they had a responsibility to uphold the working conditions that workers expected.
In contrast to the primarily financial discourse of shareholder value, in which
managers establish a hegemonic discourse based on the conception that external
market forces set parameters on working conditions, management at IBM
Burlington insisted that, while external market conditions may set some constraints,
managers still control the fundamental elements of the employment relationship.
Managers did acknowledge that external market forces might require some
adjustments to working conditions, announcing in an email to workers that, “In light
of the continuing extraordinary economic conditions we face, and the outlook for
the remainder of the year, it is now clear that we need to take additional action.”285
Nonetheless, at Burlington, managers emphasized their overriding commitment to
employees’ wellbeing. In announcing reductions to workers’ hours and pay during a
downturn, the site executive underlined that he chose not to dismiss workers: “I
also looked at large-scale, permanent layoffs, which several of our competitors have
implemented. My goal was to select an action that will have a genuine impact on our
cost, but won’t put us at a competitive disadvantage longer term and that will have
the smallest impact on our employees.”286 Managers’ orientation at Burlington to a
normative framing of employment led them to present workers with a conception of
workers’ agency that was coherent and emphasized workers’ power over working
conditions.
Management at Burlington presented a coherent framing of workers’ agency
over working conditions because they did not refer to a conception of external
market forces that set parameters on the employment relationship. According to
management’s hegemonic discourse, workers’ agency over working conditions was
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hardly limited by external market forces. Management acknowledged that market
forces shaped IBM’s performance, but Burlington primarily answered to internal
customers, for instance, IBM’s own server division.287 As a result, although firm
performance contributed to shaping working conditions, the effects of external
market forces were directly mediated by managers, because they decided how firm
performance shaped the employment relationship.
Furthermore, managers at Burlington explicitly accorded workers’ agency
over working conditions. Managers acknowledged that their relationship to workers
was bound by norms of reciprocity and they affirmed workers’ expectations that
managers should respond to workers’ concerns. According to management’s
hegemonic discourse, managers were the primary agent responsible for
determining working conditions rather than market forces external to the firm.
Therefore, workers at Burlington were led to believe that they had significant
agency to shape working conditions because they could directly ask managers to
alter their circumstances. As shown above, management affirmed this relationship
between managers and workers, along with workers’ agency, by explicitly calling on
workers to contact managers if they felt that their working conditions were
deteriorating too far. This conception of workers’ agency underlying management’s
hegemonic discourse provided workers important resources for defending their job
security. Even here, however, where management affirmed workers’ agency over
working conditions, mobilizing workers to protect their jobs required that
organizers develop a counterhegemonic strategy.
Due to managers’ normative framing of the employment relationship,
workers believed they had a right to demand that management protect their
interests: “You work and you do your work and you are there for life.”288 Longstanding norms at IBM led workers to believe they could influence managers’
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discretion over working conditions. When executives changed workers’ pension and
retirement plans in 1999, workers were incensed. Workers were no doubt upset
about the substantive changes, but they formulated their demands to management
primarily as a request to be included in the process of determining their working
conditions. Workers began attending shareholder meetings to voice their grievances
in 1999, and they submitted a resolution to the stockholders in 2000 and 2001.289
The resolution “calls on the board of directors to give all employees, regardless of
age, the same retirement medical insurance and pension choice as employees who
are within five years of retirement.”290 This resolution explicitly engaged
management’s hegemonic discourse because, while it acknowledged that there may
be some limits to employee benefits set by external market forces, workers
emphasized that they should nonetheless have a say in determining their working
conditions.
4.1 Management’s framing of dismissals: contradicting the discursive context of
production
This section traces how management’s discourse at IBM Burlington provided
resources for workers to mobilize. I show how management’s framing of dismissals
contradicted the primarily normative discourse that managers themselves
established as hegemonic at Burlington. Relying on directions from IBM
headquarters, management framed dismissals in the primarily financial discourse of
shareholder value, which workers found prima facie illegitimate. After presenting
management’s framing of dismissals, the following sections show how organizers
redeployed management’s own discourse to develop a counterhegemonic strategy
to support workers’ collective action.
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While managers spent decades maintaining a hegemonic discourse at
Burlington based on a norm of reciprocity between management and workers, their
framing of dismissals in the early 2000s engaged the primarily financial discourse of
shareholder value. Rather than justifying dismissals as a decision that managers had
made with workers’ interests in mind, they repeatedly told workers that dismissals
were necessary because of market conditions external to the firm. The memo
announcing downsizing on November 28, 2001, for instance, frames dismissals as
the necessary consequence of pressing business conditions: “The IBM
Microelectronics Division is refining its product portfolio in order to maintain its
long-term posture. This action is necessary to reduce expenses in light of the severe
semiconductor industry downturn. This requires some skills rebalancing and the
elimination of a number of positions across the organization.”291 In contrast to the
normative discourse that they had established at the site, managers framed
dismissals as though the measures were caused by market conditions external to
the firm and beyond their control.
The second announcement of dismissals the following June was subtler, but
still departed from the normative discourse that management had maintained at
Burlington. The 1210 workers who were dismissed on June 4, 2002, received
memos framing dismissals as the result of economic conditions external to the firm:
The IBM Microelectronics Division is announcing a restructuring of its
business to strengthen its competitive position by focusing resources
on three main areas of opportunity: high-end foundry, ASICs, and a
more targeted set of PowerPC-based standard products. This will
require some skills rebalancing and the elimination of a number of
positions.292
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Management’s framing of dismissals in each of these announcements demonstrates
their distance from the normative discourse that had been hegemonic in the
workplace. On the one hand, workers were led to believe that downsizing was the
result of a business decision “to strengthen its competitive position.” On the other
hand, managers’ discretion was limited because this business strategy “will require”
downsizing. By emphasizing that managers had limited control over how market
conditions shaped IBM’s strategy, managers thus framed dismissals in a register
that contradicted the normative discourse they had established as hegemonic in the
workplace.
Further marking a break from the normative discourse traditional to
Burlington, managers insisted they were not downsizing but “rightsizing.”
According to one former manager, “The facility's not downsized….We have less
people [sic], but we have less people because we moved from a wonderfully
lucrative, captive business, to a highly competitive global competition. So we had to
become more productive. The factory's not outputting less now than it was in
2000.”293 While readily acknowledged that dismissals led to lower levels of
employment, this manager insists that downsizing should be assessed in terms of
output, rather than employment. This framing marks a shift from perceiving the
workplace from the perspective of workers to perceiving it from the perspective of
the market. Indeed, another manager insisted, “I wouldn't call it ‘downsizing,’ I
would call it ‘right-sizing.’ Are you the right size based on your output, based on the
markets that you're in?”294 With the announcement of dismissals, managers at
Burlington departed from the normative discourse they had heretofore deployed to
frame the employment relationship. Rather than defending their decision in terms
of responsibility to workers, management justified dismissals in terms of their
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responsibility to shareholders: “you have an ongoing responsibility [as
management]. And I say, ‘responsibility,’ to maintain your efficiency, to basically
generate return on the investment.”295 After decades of emphasizing a norm of
reciprocity between management and workers, managers’ framing of downsizing
implied that IBM’s financial performance now took priority of workers’ interests.
Managers abandoned the discourse they had maintained as hegemonic
because their execution of dismissals was tightly directed by corporate HR, where
the orientation to shareholder value was already dominant. Managers did indeed
feel a normative commitment to their employees, according to a former manager,
“but when IBM decides to cut people and they tell you how many you're cutting,
you're cutting.”296 At Burlington, IBM hired McKinsey to assist with downsizing, and
managers who resisted were quickly pulled into line. The former manager went on
to mention that a senior executive at the site “had to pull me into his office and said,
‘Do what McKinsey says or I'll have to fire you.’ It was like, ‘Oh, OK, I got it.’”297 While
managers at IBM may have had significant discretion over working conditions at the
site for many decades, downsizing was a decision that came directly from IBM
headquarters, which communicated not just the order but also a specific set of
strategies for managers to implement the order.
Training materials that corporate HR provided managers to execute dismissals
reflect headquarters’ orientation to shareholder value. While the discursive context
at Burlington had remained oriented to the normative relationship between
management and workers through the mid-2000s, IBM headquarters fully adopted
primarily financial discourse of shareholder value. Gerstner told workers during a
company-wide telecast in 2001 that, “we’re not going to blame our problems on the
economy,” but during the same telecast, he reminded them that, “when we lose in
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the marketplace we’ve got to re-trench.”298 Retrenchment meant downsizing. By
indicating a direct linkage between IBM’s market performance and personnel
decisions, Gerstner framed dismissals as though managers had little control over
working conditions. Instead, deploying the discourse of shareholder value, Gerstner
suggested that market conditions external to IBM required downsizing. Managers’
training materials encouraged them to deploy this financial discourse of
shareholder value. One training manual instructs managers to “reinforce that this is
a necessary business action and not the ‘fault’ of selected employees.”299 In other
words, managers were to tell workers that their termination was the result of larger
market forces external to the firm and therefore outside of their control.
Managers’ training included coaching on how to deliver the news to selected
employees so that workers would hold external market conditions responsible for
their termination rather than managers. They were instructed to follow a tight
script:
____ Please sit down. _____ (State business unit) has specific resource
reduction requirements which must be met to improve the
competitiveness of our business. After thorough review, jobs, including
yours, have been restructured. This means there are significant
changes in those jobs and their required skills. Employees were
selected through a total skills assessment which considered the skills
of all employee’s [sic] in their skill group and the skills required for the
restructured jobs. Seniority was used to break any ties. If you are not
placed in another regular position in IBM, you will be permanently laid
off from IBM and your job is expected to end on ______ (insert departure
date).300
By justifying dismissals as a response to “requirements which must be met,”
managers encouraged workers to view downsizing as a necessary response to
market conditions over which neither managers nor workers had control.

“Lou Gerstner Hosts Live Employee Broadcast,” January 22, 2001.
IBM, “Production Procurement Manager Notification Day Training,” February 5, 2002, 29.
300 IBM, “Production Procurement Manager Notification Day Training.”
298
299

134

Managers’ departure from their own hegemonic discourse led workers to view
these justifications for dismissals as prima facie illegitimate. Workers were not
oblivious to the firm’s business position, and they understood management’s
position as well. Nonetheless, as noted above, they simply did not believe managers’
explanation that market conditions required downsizing. Many workers at
Burlington had been with the firm for decades, and witnessed how IBM had
survived previous economic challenges without resorting to dismissals. In previous
times, if business slowed, management had workers come in and paint the walls.301
Management had always emphasized that they valued workers’ interests, and until
the mid-2000s, they had delivered on this commitment, so workers had no reason to
believe that conditions had changed so radically to make downsizing necessary in
the current juncture.
As the next section shows, while management framed dismissals in a register
that departed from the discourse they had established as hegemonic in the
workplace, organizers redeployed this hegemonic discourse when they challenged
the decision to downsize. Even if managers recognized that organizers were simply
redeploying their own discourse, they rejected organizers’ framing of downsizing as
unrealistic. When managers announced cuts to workers’ pay in the period preceding
dismissals, a local television channel aired a clip in which an organizer described the
measures as designed to redistribute profits from workers to executives. The site
executive’s response to this comment illustrates how managers responded to
organizers redeploying management’s own discourse: “This statement [by the
organizer] simply disregards what is obvious to anyone following our industry… the
organizer completely ignores reality.”302 The challenge facing management was that,
after decades of framing the employment relationship as governed by norms of
reciprocity, workers perceived reality through this normative discourse. As
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illustrated above, workers believed managers’ account that working conditions at
Burlington depended primarily on management discretion rather than market
conditions external to the firm. When management suddenly abandoned their own
hegemonic discourse, they created an opportunity for organizers to develop a
counterhegemonic strategy to oppose dismissals.
5. Organizers’ counterhegemonic strategy
Workers who organized the collective legal case against IBM consistently framed
dismissals in the normative discourse that management had established as
hegemonic in the workplace. One organizer struggled to reconcile the evidence that
executives had acted illegally with his belief that all workers at IBM were bound by a
common set of norms: “I don't know why the site executives didn't blow the whistle
on this [age discrimination]. Because if they weren't responsible for it, and they
were directed to [do] this, they should have brought it to the ...There's ethics there,
and if the company is doing something illegal, it's your responsibility [to stop
them].”303 In his July 2002 letter, Leas addressed site executives by their first names,
implying that, as IBM employees, they shared a common identity. While accusing the
firm of acting illegally, Leas framed his concern by referring to this common
identity: “I am writing this letter as an IBM employee who cares about the company
and is concerned about a serious problem.”304 Despite the collegial tone, Leas
nonetheless demanded “immediate action,” suggesting that, “One approach would
be to not layoff a disparate proportion of older employees by hiring back a number
of older employees who were improperly laid off.”
The charge of age-discrimination provided organizers a framework that linked
norms shared among IBM workers to easily recognizable pieces of evidence, namely
the graphs that Syverson generated from his analyses. Clearly demonstrating a
statistical trend of age discrimination, these graphs were easy to display visually,
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deploy in conversation, and distribute to others. Furthermore, the charge of agediscrimination echoed earlier organizing attempts at IBM, particularly the
successful attempts to stop management from reducing workers’ pensions.305
Workers had already agreed that age discrimination violated the norms of
employment, and were accustomed to checking management’s behavior for
violations, thus making it easier to persuade workers that mobilizing against
dismissals was necessary for correcting an injustice.
In addition to engaging a pre-existing norm among IBM workers, the charge of
age discrimination was easily strengthened by presenting Syverson’s graphs that
showed the pattern of dismissals. When Leas and others set up a table to distribute
information to dismissed IBM workers, they presented Syverson’s analyses to
persuade workers that IBM had acted illegally and unjustly.306 Organizers
recognized that workers were more likely to mobilize if they had reliable evidence
against IBM, so they distributed Syverson’s analyses as widely as possible: “Well, I
was there sharing this information with folks. And trying to help these folks out that
were going to bring the lawsuit, and they were gathering the data, and we were
bringing it public, putting it out there so the media got the same information that
everybody else was getting. We were pushing this stuff to try to get it out in the
media.”307 In addition to covering workers’ public protests at IBM’s outsourcing
facility, local media in Burlington also reported on the content of workers’
complaints, given its accessibility and clarity. One local paper told readers that,
“According to the chart [prepared by workers], 67 percent of those in the 61 to 65
age category were laid off versus 20 percent for those workers in the 31 to 35 age
category.”308 By presenting age-discrimination in an easily accessible format,
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organizers at Burlington provided workers with clear evidence that IBM had
violated shared norms.
Organizers’ framing of dismissals played a critical role in recruiting workers to
participate in Syverson. However, as the previous sections argued, the effectiveness
of organizers’ strategies depended as much on the discursive context of the
workplace as on organizers’ creativity.
6. The discursive context of production in Burlington
This section argues that the material organization of production at IBM Burlington
provided the conditions for managers to frame the employment relationship in a
primarily normative discourse. As I argued above, this normative discourse
inadvertently provided workers resources for collective action. After demonstrating
that production at Burlington was thoroughly Fordist, I show how attempts to
regulate IBM led managers and local officials to develop a discourse around
production based on mutual obligations between the firm and the state. I show that
managers extended this framing from their interactions with the local community to
their interactions with workers, which led them to frame the employment
relationship in a primarily normative discourse. This section thus proposes a
discursive explanation for why workers generally had greater power resources
under Fordism, and provides a framework for explaining why the transition to the
knowledge economy poses such a threat, which is taken up in the chapters that
follow.
6.1 Discourse in Vermont
Management at Burlington framed the employment relationship in primarily
normative terms due to the discursive context that developed around the site’s
Fordist production practices. Fordism can be associated with a broad range of
economic and political practices, but its core is a particular production strategy.309
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Aglietta defines Fordism as “the system of mass production by large, vertically
integrated companies using a Taylorist division of labor – extreme task
fragmentation in a strict authority hierarchy with no worker input – based on
assembly line production of standardized goods.”310 In this section, I show that the
material organization of production at Burlington reflects the fundamental elements
of Fordism and that this led managers and local officials to develop a particular
discursive field that embedded production in a norm of reciprocity. Rather than
adopting IBM’s new discourse of shareholder value, managers at Burlington
remained committed to the normative discourse of Fordism until the announcement
of dismissals
Production at IBM Burlington was designed to supply massive quantities of
semiconductors to meet the demands of IBM’s other business units, especially the
server division. According to a former site executive, “we never really did much ‘R
and D.”’311 The major focus of the site was production by assembly line, and
although the site also employed some engineers, they were largely kept separate
from production: “the different engineers, you really didn't get to know them a
whole lot because they didn't come on line very often.”312 Workers were tasked with
catching mistakes on the assembly line, but their performance was not evaluated for
creativity. Indeed, when workers made a creative contribution, engineers had to go
out of their way to make sure they were recognized for their contribution.313
Production workers might receive a day off for a creative contribution, but they
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would not receive more pay.314 At Burlington, design was kept rigidly separate from
execution, fulfilling one of the primary characteristics of Fordist production.315
The assembly line at Burlington centered on the incredibly expensive
machines necessary for producing semiconductors. As a result, Burlington faced the
challenge of keeping their machines running all the time in order to recoup their
investment. According to a former site executive, “Number one, you have massive
capital investment. The number one thing you gotta do is keep that stuff running, all
the time. I don't know what an average piece of equipment would have cost back
then. Now, a cheap one is a million bucks, and we have equipment here that's $40
million for one piece…So even when you make nothing, we would spend 60% of our
budget.”316 Workers’ schedules at Burlington were distinctive because they were
designed in order to keep these machines running at all times. One worker told me
that he worked 12 hour shifts for twenty years: “And the reason for going twelve
hours was they were paying a tremendous amount of overtime, to keep their million
dollar machines running 24 hours days, 7 days a week, 362 days a year. The only
time that those machines were down was the night shift Christmas Eve through the
night shift Christmas night.”317 The imperative to keep the machines running
without stopping put a certain degree of strain on Burlington’s workers, but it also
required a particular type of business strategy for the site, because while they could
not afford to stop production, IBM also could not afford to leave their chips unsold.
This was a challenge because constant production left Burlington with a massive
amount of product, for which they needed to find demand. According to Sabel, “To
ensure that expensive machinery and workers with narrowly defined skills are
always sufficiently employed, production capacity must therefore keep step with the
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changes in the stable component of demand.”318 While they eventually came to
adopt the dual labor market solution that Sabel suggests, before the mid-2000s,
managers at Burlington relied on the traditional Fordist strategy of vertical
integration.
In addition to embodying the Fordist characteristics of separating execution
from design and using expensive machinery for mass production, Burlington was
also a key piece of IBM’s vertically integrated business model. According to a former
manager, “The company of IBM needs the processors first and foremost, and less
important is the OEM [original equipment manufacturer] business, which is like
selling semiconductors on the open market for profit. Just for semiconductors. So
it's largely you gotta take care of job one first, which is making sure that the
processors for IBM are there.”319 Although Burlington began supplying external
customers in the early 2000s, it was still focused on internal demand at the time of
downsizing, because, in the words of a former site executive, “when push came to
shove, yeah, we did IBM first.”320 Burlington was thus able to offload its mass
production on customers internal to IBM, representing a paradigmatic Fordist
business model, in which production is driven by supply, rather than market
demand.321
From Burlington’s perspective, there was no market demand because the site
functioned within IBM’s vertically integrated production. Burlington’s mission was
to fulfill the orders they received from IBM headquarters in Armonk, New York. At
the same time, Burlington relied on IBM for the parts they needed for production
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because “throughout IBM's supply chain, there was an interlock. All the way from
Poughkeepsie down to silicon sand.”322
IBM’s vertical integration accorded managers at Burlington a very specific type
of responsibility. In contrast to a business model where production is driven by
market customers, managers at Burlington could negotiate with IBM over the
amount of demand they needed in order to meet their capacity for supply. According
to a former manager, “if anyone believes that you're taking the resources below
critical mass and it'll end up being detrimental to the business, then you'll have the
opportunity to push back. And that happens all the time, and you just need to prove
your case.”323 In a vertically integrated production model like IBM’s, site executives
were directly responsible for conditions at the site, because they were not forced to
accept customer demands at arms-length. Instead, site executives negotiated with
their counterparts at other sites and with headquarters in order to make the case
that production should take a certain path. While IBM’s production sites were
certainly affected by external market conditions, they were first and foremost
subject to managers’ business decisions.
One former manager illustrated managers’ responsibility by bringing up the fate
of the former IBM site at Fishkill, New York, where “there was a fight to see what the
server division is going to pick, and they pick CMOS [complementary metal oxide
semiconductors]. That causes massive massive downsizing of the Fishkill site.
Massive layoffs, you know, thousands of people.”324 Executives at Fishkill may have
made the case that IBM should continue purchasing their product, or they may have
proposed that the site be upgraded to produce CMOS. Either way, the dismissals at
Fishkill were directly the result of negotiations internal to IBM, rather than the
result of changes external to IBM, such as a customer going out of business or
Former Engineering Manager, IBM Burlington, Author Interview, Burlington, October 14,
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dropping a particular product line. IBM’s vertical integration made managers
directly responsible for keeping their sites in business.
This material structure of production shaped the discursive field that
managers and local officials developed as they negotiated over IBM’s role in the
region. With local officials aware that IBM had the capacity to independently
determine production activity at Burlington, and given the site’s impact on the
region, officials held management responsible for maintaining the local economy,
while they also provided IBM the infrastructure the firm needed for production.
These attempts to regulate IBM led management to establish a hegemonic discourse
in the workplace primarily based on the norm of reciprocity
Local officials engaged the distinctly normative discourse of reciprocity when
describing IBM’s relationship to Vermont. Commenting on the fiftieth anniversary of
the Burlington site, Governor Douglas drew attention to how Vermonters were
responsible for the site’s success: “It is the power of this human contribution of the
Vermont community that has helped Essex Junction stay a leader and innovator in
chip, computer, and electronics design and manufacturing.”325 At the same time, the
governor acknowledged IBM’s sizable contribution to Vermont. In addition to
investing directly in the state’s K-12 education system and contributing
approximately $2 million to charity each year, IBM’s business connections across
the state made it integral to Vermont’s economic fabric. IBM held systemic
importance to the state’s economy not just because it provided 7000 high-paying
jobs but because “literally thousands of other workers in the Vermont economy
depend on IBM’s Essex Junction facility, and to that end Vermont’s political and
business leadership have been extremely responsive to the company’s needs.”326
For Governor Douglas, IBM’s economic importance to Vermont justified the
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attention it received from local officials, but also accorded the firm a degree of
responsibility. IBM’s continued success depended on support from the state of
Vermont, just as the state’s economic health depended in large part on IBM. By
framing the relationship with IBM in a discourse of reciprocity, Governor Douglas
strengthened the normative framework ensuring that IBM acted in Vermonters’
interests.
Managers echoed local officials in presenting IBM Burlington as embedded in a
system of local norms. In interviews, managers emphasized that business decisions
were made with the community’s interests in mind. One manager emphasized that,
even during market slowdowns, IBM had chosen not to close the site due in part to
their concerns for the community:
There's the sunk costs. And there's the employee factor. There's a
human factor, a community factor. So with a fairly small incremental
investment at the right time to stop that from happening is a very
reasonable thing to do. And even if it's not necessarily going to prove
to make a lot of money for IBM, but to keep the facility running, keep
the people employed. And it has a huge impact on the community, the
impact of IBM on the community. [sic] All those things matter a lot to
the senior executives at IBM.327
A former site executive further elaborated the firm’s concern for the community,
emphasizing that the site had “huge economic impact, which I think the leadership
team has known for a long time. And that matters to us. Because we know what the
impact of this place not being here would be on the whole state.”328 Of course,
managers were first and foremost concerned with running IBM as a profitable
business, but the fact that they were compelled to present themselves as caring for
the community demonstrates the degree to which production was embedded in
normative discourse.329
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The discursive field that local officials and managers developed around
production in Burlington resulted directly from IBM’s material organization of
production. Until about 2010, IBM was Vermont’s largest private employer, and its
economic impact on the state was immense.330 If IBM left Vermont, the state would
face a catastrophe, and the idea was entertained only as an analogy in order to put
other economic setbacks in perspective. When the furniture company, Ethan Allen,
closed one of its production facilities in Island Pond, a small town near Burlington,
local news commented that, for Island Pond, Ethan Allen’s complete closing “would
be like IBM leaving Chittenden County” in other words, unimaginable.331 For
Vermont, it was irrelevant what IBM produced, what it sold, or who the CEO was.
The single characteristic that mattered was that it was “the largest single private
employer in the state,” paying more wages and taxes than any other firm.332 As
Governor Douglas implied, IBM’s economic impact extended far beyond simple
revenue figures because the firm also generated business for other firms in the
region, and, because it employed more PhDs than the University of Vermont, it drew
a highly educated population to the state, which carried its own multiplier effect.
While Vermont’s economy depended in large part on IBM, IBM depended equally
on Vermont because the state provided the infrastructure necessary to do business.
Employing thousands of workers made IBM dependent on the region’s housing
market, because rising prices could make it difficult to recruit workers.333 IBM was
the largest water user in the Burlington area, drawing 4.5 million gallons a day, and
the state’s largest electricity user, racking up a bill of $35 million annually.334 In the
early 2000s, site executives negotiated with the state legislature to reduce the rate
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they paid for electricity, which passed on an annual rate hike of 2.8% to private
consumers.335 IBM’s business model depended directly on the state to provide the
infrastructure necessary for their Fordist production practices at Burlington.
The norms that actors developed to regulate IBM Burlington were a product
of IBM’s history of leveraging their economic weight during negotiations with the
state. Given the scale of production, local officials had little doubt about the systemic
importance of IBM to Vermont’s economy, but negotiating with executives was
reasonable only to the extent that they were able to shape local economic
conditions. Indeed, IBM was forthright about their ability to determine the fate of
Burlington. During negotiations with state legislators over electricity rates, IBM
announced that, “by controlling costs in areas like electricity, they can hopefully
avoid future layoffs.”336 This thinly veiled threat relies on the shared assumption
that executives could directly determine the headcount at Burlington. Similarly,
when local officials were considering building a new highway, IBM let it be known
that they might build a new facility if the highway were built, bringing five hundred
new jobs to the area. However, if the highway were not built, IBM would locate the
facility elsewhere.337
When downsizing became an issue in the mid-2000s, both Vermont’s Governor
Douglas and Senator Leahy went to Armonk, New York, to meet with IBM
executives, crossing party lines to ensure that IBM stayed in Burlington. According
to Senator Leahy, “This was not a Republican or Democratic issue. This is a Vermont
issue and we want to work with them.”338 Governor Douglas and Senator Leahy
negotiated with IBM over dismissals because they believed that executives were
able to directly determine conditions at the Burlington site. Otherwise, negotiations
would have been senseless. The fact that local officials pursued negotiations
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illustrates the pervasiveness of attributing the site’s conditions to decision makers
at IBM and demonstrates the ubiquity of the norms constituting the discursive
context surrounding production. Mass dismissals devastate workers and their
families and cause ripple effects across regional economies, but not all local officials
attempt to persuade firm executives to retain jobs.339 In Burlington, however, IBM
was expected to act according to the norm of reciprocity in which it was embedded.
After receiving decades of state support, IBM’s announcement of dismissals was
viewed as a violation, and local officials took it upon themselves to enforce that
norm by meeting with executives.
The discursive context of negotiations between IBM and the state was shaped
directly by the firm’s Fordist production practices. The scale of mass production at
Burlington gave IBM systemic importance to Vermont’s economy and made the firm
dependent on the state’s infrastructure, and IBM’s vertical integration accorded
executives the power to directly determine conditions at the site. These two
characteristics of production shaped a discursive context in which local officials
regulated IBM’s impacts on the region by developing a norm of reciprocity.
6.2 Discourse in the workplace
The development of a discursive context around IBM’s Fordist production practices
had broader consequences beyond local officials’ attempts to regulate the firm’s
impact on Vermont. In addition to providing a norm of reciprocity that governed
negotiations between IBM and the state, this discursive context also shaped
managers’ interactions with workers by providing a normative discourse for the
employment relationship. Managers extended the normative discourse that
developed through their negotiations with the state, leading them to establish a
hegemonic discourse in the workplace that framed employment primarily in terms
of the norm of reciprocity.
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When John DiToro, a site executive, announced reductions to workers’ pay, he
assured workers that IBM still looked after their interests. In an email to
Burlington’s workers, DiToro underlined that the firm still cared for them and
would tailor the plant-wide reductions in pay to meet individual needs through
“temporary schedule accommodations, financial referrals, or an advance on future
earnings if a severe financial hardship rose to the level of losing one’s home.”340 Just
as management professed to making business decisions that took into account the
concerns of the Burlington community, managers made clear that they took
workers’ interests into account. Managers framed the employment relationship as
normative because they extended into the workplace the discourse that took shape
around IBM’s Fordist production practices.
One indicator that management’s normative discourse became hegemonic at
Burlington is that workers adopted this normative framework to make sense of
their experiences in the workplace. Workers at Burlington were not oblivious to the
broader changes taking place in IBM’s product markets, and they believed that IBM
maintained the site at Burlington for normative reasons rather than economic
benefits. According to one former worker, “IBM obviously did not want to be in the
business that we do here. And that's been very true for many years. Maintenance on
the buildings, maintenance anywhere – anything to do with money at all basically
was truncated. And everybody could see it.”341 Workers saw that IBM no longer
invested in the site, although, until the dismissals in the early 2000s, management
did attempt to keep Burlington’s workers employed. Workers made sense of IBM’s
otherwise puzzling behavior by applying the norm of reciprocity: they had
contributed decades of their lives to making IBM successful, and now IBM was
taking care of them by preserving their jobs.

340
341

DiToro, “Manufacturing Update.”
Former Production Engineer, IBM Burlington, Author Interview, Burlington.

148

DiToro’s normative discourse further strengthened workers’ belief that
managers were directly responsible for conditions at the site. Management could
assume moral responsibility for workers’ well-being only to the extent that they
were capable of determining working conditions. Indeed, DiToro explicitly stated
that management had the ability to determine the effects of economic forces
external to the firm, and to adjust firm-wide plans to fit the needs of individual
workers at the site. Workers’ mobilization against dismissals therefore followed
management’s own logic. However, rather than voicing their concerns through
IBM’s internal channels, workers demanded better protection from management
through the external channel of a legal case.
Framing the employment relationship in normative discourse justified the
demands that managers placed on workers. The norm of reciprocity allowed
managers to demand overtime or that workers increase efficiency without a raise in
pay, but workers could also use this norm to hold managers accountable. Composed
of mutual obligations, the norm of reciprocity provided workers a set of standards
by which to judge managers’ behavior. Moreover, this norm was based on the
assumption managers had the power to shape working conditions. In motivating
workers to resist downsizing, organizers redeployed both of these elements in order
to meet the two conditions necessary for mobilization.
This section has suggested that management’s hegemonic discourse in the
workplace was shaped by local attempts to regulate production at Burlington. By
providing a consistent set of norms broadly anchored in civil society, these local
attempts at regulation shaped management’s efforts to establish a hegemonic
discourse in the workplace. Workers learned to view the employment relationship
as normative through management’s hegemonic discourse as well as what they
encountered in everyday life, including their exposure to accounts in the local
media. As illustrated above, however, when management departed from their own
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hegemonic discourse, they created an opening for organizers to mobilize workers
against dismissals.
7. Conclusion
This chapter presented workers’ mobilization against downsizing at IBM Burlington
in order to show how a Fordist organization of production provided workers
resources for protecting their rights through collective action. Burlington’s position
in IBM’s interlocked system of vertically integrated production meant that the site
was insulated from external market forces, leaving IBM managers directly
responsible for workers’ conditions, including whether the site survived or not.
Furthermore, the massive scale of production at Burlington bound IBM and the state
in a mutually dependent relationship, with IBM requiring public support for
infrastructure while the state relied on IBM for jobs and tax revenue. The discourse
that developed around production in Burlington reflected this mutual dependence,
as well as IBM’s agency in determining conditions at the site. Primarily normative in
its recognition of mutual obligation, managers and workers came to apply this
discourse to the employment relationship. While workers exhibited a high degree of
loyalty to IBM, they also expected managers to protect their interests. The discursive
context of production thus provided workers with two resources that supported
collective action. First, workers approached the employment relationship through a
discursive framework that assigned responsibility for working conditions to
management. Second, workers shared a common identity and standards for judging
management’s behavior.
Organizers developed a counterhegemonic strategy to redeploy
management’s normative discourse and fulfill the two conditions necessary for
mobilizing workers. First, they demonstrated to workers that if management were
capable of shaping working conditions, then workers’ mobilization could be effective
in pressuring them to back down from dismissals. Second, organizers engaged
workers’ shared norms in order to present the case for collective action in a
discourse that workers already found persuasive.
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Despite facing a number of significant hurdles, including anti-union bias, lack of
union representation, and uneven support, workers at Burlington mobilized
effectively to bring a collective legal case against IBM. While they did not win in
court, workers did receive some financial remuneration and IBM was forced to
update its dismissal policy. This mobilization should be seen as a success, moreover,
because workers fulfilled the first steps necessary for limiting manager discretion
over the employment relationship. The path of mobilization demonstrates that
organizers’ discursive strategies are at least as important in mobilizing workers as
their access to union resources. By engaging the discursive context of production,
organizers demonstrated to workers that collective action could be effective in a
discourse they found persuasive, and thus succeeded in recruiting hundreds of
workers to protect their rights by resisting employer discretion.
In addition to highlighting the importance of discursive strategies to worker
mobilization, this chapter also demonstrated the degree to which mobilization
strategies are linked to particular production regimes. A firm’s organization of
production will be situated in, and actively shape, a surrounding discursive context.
IBM’s negotiations with the state led to a discursive field at Burlington that
embedded production in a norm of reciprocity. This norm helped the state regulate
IBM’s behavior, much in the way that traditional Fordist institutions like collective
bargaining have done in other settings. As I demonstrated above, this normative
discursive context was what provided organizers at Burlington power resources for
mobilizing workers against dismissals.
While the discursive context surrounding Fordist production provides workers
resources for mobilizing against dismissals, the tight connection between IBM’s
organization of production and organizers’ strategies suggests that these resources
should be harder to come by in the knowledge economy. The next chapter builds on
the framework for mobilization developed here in order to illustrate why exactly the
transition the knowledge economy has fueled a process of liberalization whereby
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workers are exposed to economic dislocation rather than protected by institutions
for social protection. The remainder of the dissertation then develops a theory of
worker power in order to explain why workers can, despite these challenges, still
mobilize to protect their rights in the knowledge economy.
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Chapter 5. The threat of liberalization: Acquiescence in Silicon
Valley
One time we were involved with an organizing drive among white collar workers
and another union was involved and they put out a leaflet that said, ‘the strength of
the wolf is in the pack.’ You know, for a group of white collar women, it was like,
“what are they talking about?!’
Because to the guys they represented every day, it made perfect sense.
Former national organizing director, CWA.
Author interview, telephone, March 24, 2015.
On May 22, 2002, IBM terminated 646 workers from its global software group based
in San Jose. The next day, 202 more workers were terminated from the storage
group, and in June, another 143 from research. The site had housed more than 6000
workers in 1999, but, by 2008, when IBM sold the site to Hitachi, there were so few
workers left that the transaction was treated as a real estate deal rather than a
business acquisition.342
Similar to Burlington, a handful of workers at IBM San Jose had organized
themselves with the Alliance@IBM, and since 1999, the Communication Workers of
America (CWA) contributed significant resources to their efforts. The Alliance met
at the union hall of CWA Local 9423, where Louis Rocha, Jr., was president. Rocha
was known as an unusually active Local President, and he was central in
implementing CWA’s organizing drive in Silicon Valley in the early 2000s. Drawing
on the union’s international organizing infrastructure, Rocha hired a full-time
organizer, Josh Sperry, to focus on tech workers, and he helped coordinate local
efforts with those at IBM facilities nationwide, as well as with other tech worker
organizing drives, such as those at Microsoft.343 Following the Alliance model
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developed on the east coast, CWA’s immediate goal was not to form a bargaining
unit at IBM, but instead to build associational power among workers to protect their
rights against specific instances of managerial discretion.344 Dismissals were a
central topic,345 and, when downsizing was announced in 2002, Sperry led efforts to
coordinate collective legal action charging IBM with age-discrimination.
Local 9423 held meetings with IBM workers affected by downsizing at the union
hall in August and October of 2002 in order to distribute information necessary for
building a legal case.346 In addition, Sperry and Rocha met with the South Bay Labor
Council for assistance, spearheaded a letter-writing drive to local Senators and
Members of Congress to pressure the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
to investigate the case against IBM, distributed fliers at IBM, and encouraged
workers to bring their colleagues to meetings.347 Once organizers in Burlington had
secured legal assistance, two lawyers came to San Jose to meet with workers at the
union hall.348
However, very few workers at IBM San Jose chose to participate in the
organizing efforts. Despite being affected by downsizing at a proportion similar to
IBM Burlington, where 155 joined Syverson v. IBM, only 24 workers from San Jose
joined the case, constituting less than 7% of the total plaintiffs.349 Why did workers
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from IBM San Jose join the collective action at such a lower rate than IBM workers in
Burlington?
In this chapter I argue that, unlike their counterparts in Burlington, workers at
IBM San Jose did not mobilize against dismissals because they did not believe that
collective action would protect their jobs. Management framed dismissals in the
same primarily financial discourse used by managers at Burlington, and organizers
relied on the same normative discourse from Burlington to persuade workers to
mobilize. However, the discursive context surrounding production in Silicon Valley
disposed workers at IBM San Jose to find managers’ account more plausible than
organizers’. Managers’ primarily financial discourse persuaded workers that market
forces external to the firm made dismissals unavoidable. In contrast to Burlington,
where managers’ framing of dismissals was inconsistent with the hegemonic
discourse they had established in the workplace, managers’ framing of dismissals at
San Jose resonated with the primarily financial discourse that developed alongside
production in Silicon Valley. At the same time, organizers at San Jose failed to adapt
their discursive strategies to the specific context of production in Silicon Valley. As a
result, workers were persuaded that collective action would be ineffective in
protecting their jobs. They decided to take the most reasonable path according to
this belief: acquiescence.
In order to illustrate how management’s adoption of the orientation to
shareholder value led workers to acquiesce to downsizing at IBM San Jose but not
Burlington, I begin by presenting management’s announcement of dismissals. Just as
at Burlington, management justified downsizing in a primarily financial discourse,
but at San Jose, workers were persuaded by this framing, in part because organizers
failed to adapt their discursive strategies to the specific context of Silicon Valley. I
briefly review the material organization of production at IBM San Jose, noting the
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site’s exposure to external product markets and the labor market that workers faced
in order to show that these structural factors are not sufficient to explain workers’
acquiescence to dismissals. The remainder of the chapter traces how management
constructed a hegemonic discourse in the workplace that was consistent with the
context of production in Silicon Valley. Workers developed an occupational identity
that disposed them to understand the employment relationship in a primarily
financial discourse. Thus, workers found organizers’ normative appeals
unpersuasive, and were instead persuaded by management’s framing of downsizing,
which led them to acquiesce.
Table 5.1 Timeline of workers’ response to dismissals: IBM San Jose
May 22, 2002
Management announces 646 dismissals
May 23, 2002

Management announces 202 dismissals

July 24, 2003

Organizer with Communication
Workers of America (CWA) writes to
members of Congress on workers’
behalf

August 29, 2002

Alliance@IBM and CWA hold meeting
for affected workers

October 8, 2002

Alliance@IBM and Communication
Workers of America (CWA) hold
meeting for affected workers

January 28, 2003

Organizer with CWA writes to members
of Congress on workers’ behalf

January 9, 2009

IBM settles Syverson v. IBM for an
undisclosed sum and agrees to amend
its dismissal policy; 24 workers from
San Jose are named plaintiffs

1. Dismissals at IBM San Jose
In this section, I show that managers at IBM San Jose framed downsizing in the same
primarily financial discourse as their colleagues in Burlington. However, at San Jose,
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managers succeeded in persuading workers to acquiesce to dismissals. After briefly
reviewing management’s announcement and justification of dismissals, I show that
workers acquiesced because they found this account more persuasive than
organizers’. While both managers and organizers deployed the same discourses in
each location, management was more effective in persuading workers at San Jose
because their primarily financial discourse resonated with the discursive context
surrounding production in Silicon Valley. Just as workers’ occupational identities in
Burlington were shaped by the normative discourse that formed alongside attempts
to regulate Fordist production, workers in San Jose identified with the primarily
financial discourse surrounding the post-Fordist production of technology in Silicon
Valley.
1.1 Managers’ framing of dismissals
Management at IBM San Jose received the same training and materials as their
colleagues in Burlington, which led them to frame dismissals in a primarily financial
discourse. As managers testified during the Syverson case, IBM corporate human
resources ensured that managers across the firm received uniform training in
selecting workers for dismissal.350 Workers at San Jose were informed of dismissals
in the same primarily financial discourse as workers in Burlington. The 646 workers
who were dismissed on May 22, 2002, received a packet telling them that, “As the
needs of our customers and the industry continue to change, Storage Systems Group
must respond and adapt to those changes to remain competitive in the
marketplace,” before informing them that, “as a result you have been selected for
permanent layoff.”351 Thus, in a manner similar to Burlington, workers were told
that dismissals were the result of market forces external to IBM.
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While managers at Burlington may have expressed regret about dismissals
and articulated that they felt responsible for workers’ well-being, managers at San
Jose were more likely to support the decision to downsize. One former manager
defended downsizing by referring to changes in IBM’s product markets:
So disk drives became commodities, and that's where the market was.
But IBM's never been big in the light bulb business. They want to
make product that's differentiated in some way, always did. And when
that clearly wasn't the case anymore, that's when they got rid of it. So I
mean it was a good Gerstner decision, although it was too bad he gave
the business away. But that's the way it happened, and it was a good
decision.352
Echoing executives’ framing of dismissals, this former manager defended
downsizing as a necessary response to changes in market conditions external to
IBM. According to this view, once IBM’s products became commodities, thus
shrinking their profits, the logical course of action was to exit that business.
Downsizing was due to developments beyond workers’ and managers’ control.
Managers at San Jose thus echoed executives’ orientation to shareholder value
by justifying downsizing in a primarily financial register. Moreover, rather than
considering the long-term opportunities afforded by the firm’s accumulated
resources, they justified downsizing only in terms of immediate benefits. As I show
in the next section, workers at San Jose generally found this account persuasive.
1.2 Workers persuaded by management’s account
Although workers at San Jose stood to lose no less than their colleagues in
Burlington, they were persuaded by management’s primarily financial justification
for dismissals. Workers did not ignore managers’ discretion over conditions in the
workplace, but they believed that this discretion stood little chance against market
forces external to the firm. One worker acknowledged that, “there was a series of ill-
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fated business-strategy decisions,” but he explained that dismissals were ultimately
the result of developments that unfolded external to IBM:
Disk drives, along with telephones, televisions, and personal
computers, simply became a commodity. And they ceased to be
anything, I'll use the word "special," as though they ever were
special…You know, IBM has always relied on its name as a big selling
point. And they would use that to justify huge profit margins. And
when a product just becomes a commodity, and your competitors
start undercutting your profit margin by so much, you can't afford to
be in that business anymore.353
Illustrating the effectiveness of management’s hegemonic discourse in the
workplace, this worker deployed the same concept of commoditization as managers
in order to make sense of dismissals. According to this line of thinking, mobilizing to
resist dismissals would be unreasonable because workers’ collective action can do
little against the global market forces affecting their firm.
Viewing the employment relationship through management’s primarily
financial discourse, workers at San Jose saw mobilization against dismissals as
unreasonable because they saw little chance of collective action being effective.
Many workers had been with IBM for decades, and they identified closely with the
firm. Nonetheless, their employment was an economic relationship, which subjected
them to the unavoidable realities of global markets:
Under the circumstances, they've got to make a change in the system.
Costs us too much. Costs to produce too much. Overhead is too much.
All these factors they evaluate. Say, well, they've got to do something
now. Selling it to Hitachi is that. Why would we do that? …Because
that was a business deal. It's not an emotional deal. It's a business
deal. Just the bottom line.354
Workers at San Jose were certainly upset about being dismissed, but unlike their
colleagues in Burlington, they did not hold management responsible. Instead, they
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were persuaded by management’s primarily financial discourse and thereby
believed that downsizing was the result of market forces outside managers’ control,
as well as their own. Against this primarily financial discursive context, organizers’
normative discourse stood little chance of persuading workers to mobilize. After
illustrating that alternative explanations fail to account for workers’ acquiescence, I
argue that workers chose not to participate in collective action because organizers
failed to satisfy the two necessary conditions for mobilization.
2. Explaining acquiescence: discourse, not structure
This section reviews the material organization of production at IBM San Jose in
order to underline that workers acquiesced to the threat of dismissals due to the
surrounding discursive context, rather than the structure of production. In contrast
to the Fordist organization of production at Burlington, San Jose developed products
for external customers, which brought workers closer to market forces. However, I
show that neither IBM’s product markets nor the labor market in Silicon Valley can
explain why workers at San Jose acquiesced. After addressing these alternative
explanations, the sections that follow demonstrate that workers chose to avoid
participating in collective action against management because organizers failed to
adjust their strategies to the discursive context of Silicon Valley.
2.1. IBM’s product markets and workers’ acquiescence
One may find a number of firms still producing according to the Fordist model of
vertical integration, mass production, and separating design and execution, but
firms in Silicon Valley are largely organized according to a Post-Fordist model of
networked production.355 Few products are produced by a single firm. Instead, firms
AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route
128 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); Post-Fordism is a contested concept and I
invoke only its most limited connotations here, namely, firms’ reliance on networked
production, vertical disintegraton, and labor market flexibility. Indeed, this chapter, and
those that follow, contribute to the literature critiquing post-Fordism as a viable regime of
accumulation. For background on and compelling critiques of post-Fordism, see Steven P.
Vallas, “Rethinking Post-Fordism: The Meaning of Workplace Flexibility,” Sociological Theory
17, no. 1 (March 1999): 68–101, https://doi.org/10.1111/0735-2751.00065; Matt Vidal,
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collaborate by each producing a component for a product, which leads to a fluid
exchange of ideas and personnel between firms as each takes on a new project.356
This networked, project-based organization of production is made possible by
“flatter” organizations, where the workplace is characterized by “high-trust”
relationships between management and workers, which merge design and
execution.357 The combination of design and execution can become part of a firm’s
identity, as illustrated by a number of highly successful firms where workers
themselves are also owners and managers, such as Apple and Microsoft.
The history of Silicon Valley is littered with examples of eliding the
distinction between business strategy and technology strategy, which had
heretofore characterized Fordist production. For instance, a group of computer
enthusiasts who called themselves the Homebrew Computer Club met regularly
from the 1970s up through the 1990s and became “a respected critic of
microcomputer products. The Homebrewers were sharp, and could spot shoddy
merchandise and items that were difficult to maintain. They blew the whistle on
faulty equipment and meted out praise for solid engineering and convivial
technologies.”358 While their perspective was based in technological assessments,
they developed “the power to make or break new companies,”359 because, in Silicon
Valley, technological performance cannot be separated from market performance.
Producing technology was immediately an economic endeavor, so technicians who
developed specific products worked closely with the managers who designed
business strategy. In contrast to the Fordist organization of production at
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Burlington, these two aspects of production can hardly be pulled apart in Silicon
Valley.
IBM founded its San Jose site in 1956, but the firm never truly belonged to
the organization of production in Silicon Valley. While careers in the Valley are
characterized by frequent changes between firms, workers at IBM continued to
remain in long careers through the 1980s, according to IBM’s lasting commitment to
lifetime employment.360 Therefore, the firm remained relatively isolated from the
flow of ideas and personnel that otherwise characterize the networked organization
of production in Silicon Valley.
However, similar to many of its neighboring firms, and in contrast to the
Burlington site, IBM San Jose developed products primarily for external customers.
One worker who was based at Burlington but spent years on projects at San Jose
characterized Burlington as “sort of buffered from the outside world,” whereas San
Jose was “much closer to the external, outside market.”361 According to the effects of
Fordism observed at Burlington, one could expect that exposure to external market
forces in the post-Fordist context at San Jose might lead workers to acquiesce to
management’s threat of dismissals. While workers at Burlington could see that
management was responsible for downsizing, rather than forces outside of their
control, workers at San Jose could reasonably believe that management may have
actually faced external market pressures to downsize.
Existing explanations for variation in how workers respond to management’s
threats suggest that firms’ product markets play a role in worker power. Silver, for
instance, argues that vertical disintegration in the semiconductor industry weakens
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workers’ bargaining capabilities vis-à-vis management.362 Workers were once able
to resist management discretion by executing a “localized work stoppage in a key
node [that] can cause disruptions on a much wider scale than the stoppage itself.”363
In the semiconductor industry, however, firms compete globally to supply a
multitude of components, so if one firm faces a work stoppage, their customers can
choose from a handful of competitors offering the same product. Therefore, workers
cannot exert systemic pressure in the semiconductor industry in the manner they
were once able in, for instance, steel. When firms compete in fragmented, global
markets, we would expect workers to exercise less power, which would make them
more likely to acquiesce to management’s threats.
Some scholars go further than Silver to suggest that a firm’s exposure to
external market forces weakens worker power to the point that downsizing
becomes unavoidable. According to Golden, for instance, “if production costs
increase due to an exogenous shock, and if wage costs cannot be adequately
adjusted, the firm will necessarily seek to reduce the size of its labor force.”364
Thompson extends Golden’s view to propose that the post-Fordist production model
undermines workers’ rights not due to “mendacious exploiters and obstructive
middle management, but the structural characteristics of shareholder-driven, deregulated and globalizing markets on the one hand, and the extended hierarchies
that constitute forms of coordination within and between firms on the other.”365
These structural characteristics expose firms to market forces that demand
curtailing the rights that workers had previously enjoyed. Under the Fordist model
of production, as at IBM Burlington, exogenous shocks were unlikely, because most
components of production remained within IBM. However, at San Jose, the site
Beverly Silver, Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization Since 1870 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 123.
363 Silver, 13.
364 Miriam A. Golden, Heroic Defeats: The Politics of Job Loss (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 11.
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could be exposed to exogenous shocks, such as a drop in prices for storage products.
Because such a condition is exogenous – external to the firm and beyond the control
of both workers and managers – IBM San Jose’s position in global product markets
could have led workers to acquiesce to dismissals rather than resist.
While structural conditions no doubt played a role in dismissals at San Jose,
they cannot fully explain why workers there chose to acquiesce. Even if IBM did face
significant market pressures in this period, there was still enough cash on hand to
repurchase $7.8 billion of the firm’s own shares.366 Compensation and benefits for
more than 300,000 workers cost the firm $3.8 billion in 2001, so retaining even the
peak employment of six thousand at San Jose pales in comparison to the firm’s stock
repurchase strategy.367 It is doubtful that structural conditions were so urgent that
managers had no choice but to dismiss workers.
Furthermore, even if the storage division faced significant pressures on price,
IBM could have followed the strategy of German automobile manufacturers in the
1980s. When facing falling prices due to competition from Asia, firms like BMW and
Mercedes were unable to downsize due to the combination of strong unions and
formal legislation against dismissals. In order to remain profitable, these firms
moved up market, creating and capturing a new segment of the automobile market.
The firms remained profitable and workers retained their jobs.368 This option was
likely available to IBM San Jose, given the rise during this period of the internet,
which drastically increased the demand for precisely the type of storage solutions
that IBM developed at the site. With their expertise in storage, IBM San Jose was
well positioned to develop distinctive products that would preserve their
competitive advantage from other firms in the emerging market for components of
Alliance@IBM, Communications Workers of America, “For Immediate Release:
November 30, 2001,” November 30, 2001,
http://www.endicottalliance.org/news/release1130.htm.
367 IBM Corp., “Annual Report,” 2001, 71.
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cloud computing.369 Growing competition undoubtedly played a role in downsizing
at IBM San Jose, but focusing too intently on these structural factors overlooks the
capacity for organizational agency among both managers and workers.
2.2 The labor market in Silicon Valley and workers’ acquiescence
Another potential explanation for workers’ acquiescence at San Jose has to do with
the unique labor market that workers faced. Silicon Valley’s networked economy is
characterized by a high degree of labor mobility between firms, which has led some
to describe the industry as a “high-velocity” labor market.370 Indeed, tech workers in
California face fewer barriers to employment than their counterparts in other states,
in part because state courts have outlawed non-compete clauses. Just as IBM San
Jose’s product markets could have shaped workers’ response to downsizing, facing a
tight labor market could have encouraged workers to simply look for another job
rather than mobilize.
Two elements of Silicon Valley’s labor market, however, undermine its
explanatory potential in accounting for why workers at IBM San Jose acquiesced
while their colleagues at Burlington resisted. First, the period of dismissals at IBM
coincided with the bursting of the “dot-com bubble,” which led to high
unemployment in Silicon Valley. From 2000 to 2002, unemployment in Santa Clara
County jumped from 2% to 7%. During the same period, unemployment in the
county surrounding IBM Burlington rose from 2% to 3%.371 Even if there were more
tech firms in Silicon Valley than in Burlington, they were unlikely to be hiring.
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Workers at San Jose were no more likely to expect to find another job following
their dismissal than their colleagues in Burlington.
Second, in the unlikely event that a firm in Silicon Valley hired during the
dot-com bust, they probably would not have taken on a former IBM employee. As
noted in Chapter 1, age discrimination in the tech industry is well documented. 12%
of the US workforce is older than 55, but they comprise only 5% of the tech
sector.372 When older workers lose their jobs, they are likely to remain unemployed
significantly longer than younger workers. Xia and Kleiner find, for instance that, “a
45-year-old is likely to stay unemployed 40 weeks longer than a job seeker who is
25.”373 Tech firms in other parts of the country hire older workers, but in 2014, the
median age for tech workers in San Jose was 32. Facebook and Google illustrate how
young firms hire young people, but the converse is not true: older firms do not hire
older people. Nvidia was founded in 1993; in 2014, only 7% of its new hires were
older than 51.374 When an older worker is terminated in Silicon Valley, he is not
likely to find another job there.
For these reasons, collective action to defend against downsizing is just as
rational in Silicon Valley as in Burlington, Vermont. However, as I demonstrate in
the sections that follow, organizers’ failure to update their discursive strategies in
light of the context of production in Silicon Valley meant that workers were
unpersuaded that collective action could be effective. As a result, they chose to
acquiesce.
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3. Organizers’ discourse fails to meet the two conditions necessary for
mobilization
Workers at IBM San Jose acquiesced to downsizing because organizers failed to
meet one of the two conditions necessary for mobilization. While organizers did
argue that collective action could be effective in protecting workers’ jobs, they failed
to do so in a discourse that workers found persuasive. Instead of adapting their
discursive strategy to the context of production in Silicon Valley, organizers
defended collective action in the normative discourse from IBM Burlington. As a
result, workers at IBM San Jose found management’s justification for downsizing
more persuasive than organizers’ arguments that such measures could be avoided.
Organizers at IBM San Jose did satisfy the first necessary condition for
mobilizing workers in that they emphasized that collective action could be effective
in protecting their jobs. Organizers encouraged workers to sign a petition to IBM
management protesting dismissals based on the assumption that workers’ protests
could protect their jobs: "If you don't make your voice heard today, we may all be
out of work tomorrow!"375 But while organizers provided legal arguments that
workers could succeed in court against management, they offered no plausible
evidence that market conditions actually afforded workers meaningful agency over
firm performance or their working conditions.376 Instead of framing workers’
agency over working conditions in management’s discourse, which workers would
have found persuasive, organizers repeated the normative discourse from
Burlington. Thus, the content of organizers’ appeals at IBM San Jose was correct, but
not the form of their argument.
Workers at IBM San Jose accepted management’s primarily financial framing
of the employment relationship, and thus failed to recognize that they had more
agency over working conditions than management explicitly acknowledged.
Alliance@IBM, “IBM Employees: Worried about Layoffs? Protect Your Job!,” n.d.;
emphasis in original.
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Workers’ disposition to understand the employment relationship through
management’s primarily financial discourse led them to reject organizers’ appeals
as wishful thinking. According to one former worker, "I think that people generally
had the view that management tried hard to be fair about what they had to do. And
it had to be done. The business couldn't support the population that it had. People
had to go.”377 Without plausible evidence that collective action could be effective in
saving their jobs, workers at IBM San Jose viewed acquiescence as the most
reasonable direction forward.
As I argue in the following sections, workers at IBM San Jose found
organizers’ discourse unpersuasive because they were disposed by management’s
hegemonic discourse to view external market forces as setting tight parameters on
working conditions. Thus, workers believed that collective action would be
ineffective in protecting their jobs against dismissals because they believed that
downsizing was necessary for ensuring the firm’s survival given the market
conditions it faced. As long as organizers framed their arguments for the potential
effectiveness of collective action in the normative discourse they appropriated from
Burlington, workers at San Jose would remain unpersuaded. Thus, while organizers
did fulfill one of the necessary conditions for mobilization by arguing that collective
action could be effective in protecting workers’ jobs, they failed to fulfill the second
necessary condition, which is that organizers must do so in a discourse that workers
find persuasive. Organizers failed to convince workers that collective action could
be effective in defending their job security because they failed to frame downsizing
in a discourse that resonated with workers, namely, management’s hegemonic
discourse.
The contradictions underlying management’s hegemonic discourse noted in
Chapter 2 can provide workers resources for mobilization, but workers’
acquiescence at IBM San Jose further underlines that these resources must be
377

Former Engineering Manager, IBM San Jose, Author Interview, Mountain View, CA.

168

activated by creative organizers. As noted in the previous chapter, CEO Lou Gerstner
explicitly supported the adoption of the orientation to shareholder value, and he
made significant changes at the firm, such as introducing a system of variable pay
that linked workers’ compensation to the firm’s performance in financial markets.
By the year 2000, Gerstner had increased the variable pay budget to $1.8 billion in
order to reward workers for a successful year.378 Thus, the fundamental terms of
workers’ employment relationship led them to believe that firm performance played
a primary role in determining working conditions. Furthermore, managers at IBM
insisted that market forces external to the firm set tight parameters on the
employment relationship. While management structured compensation so that
workers’ pay depended on some local metrics, including evaluations of workers’
contributions at the division level, salaries were primarily “driven by overall
business performance.”379 While management’s primarily financial discourse of
shareholder value emphasized that workers had only limited agency over working
conditions, a closer look reveals that this discourse was based on an unstable set of
relations between external market conditions, firm performance, working
conditions, and workers’ agency.
According to management’s hegemonic discourse, workers’ agency over
working conditions was tightly limited by external market conditions. Managers
insisted that market conditions shaped IBM’s performance, and that the firm’s
performance dictated the parameters for working conditions. While IBM continued
to acknowledge its historical commitment to workers’ job security, orientation
manuals now insisted that, “True employment security, however, can only be
achieved through a successful, profitable business and the individual's continuing
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contribution to that success.”380 Therefore, workers were led to believe that external
market conditions dictated working conditions.
However, management at IBM simultaneously implied that workers had
some agency over working conditions. The assumption underlying variable pay is
that workers’ performance drives firm performance, as reflected in the orientation
materials above. Managers reinforced this assumption by acknowledging that
workers’ individual performance plays a role in whether they are selected for
termination during mass dismissals. According to Donna Riley, a former HR
executive:
In the case of a reduction… I’m trying to do this total assessment,
which takes into account their [workers’] current performance, their
past performance over the last three years, any change in that
performance, as evidenced by the trend, the skills that they have; and
I’m, I’m, as the manager, I’m trying to make a total assessment of who
has the most value for IBM, as evidenced by their contributions and
anything I may know about where our business is going.381
Because managers acknowledged that workers contributed to IBM’s performance
and that firm performance dictates the parameters for working conditions,
management implied that workers have some agency to shape their job security.
Management’s hegemonic discourse thus relied on a contradictory conception of
workers’ agency because they explicitly denied workers’ agency over their working
conditions while implicitly affirming it. This contradiction underlying management’s
hegemonic discourse provided workers important resources for defending their job
security, although it required organizers’ counterhegemonic strategy in order to
engage it.
In contrast to the organizers at Burlington, organizers at IBM San Jose failed
to develop a counterhegemonic strategy to amplify workers’ agency over working
“About Your Job: Document Number USHR101.”
Exhibit D, MOTION in Limine to Exclude the Report and Testimony of Dr. Richard
Drogin, “Deposition of Donna Riley” (Syverson v. IBM Corp., May 15, 2008).
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conditions. Instead, organizers at IBM San Jose inadvertently encouraged
acquiescence by failing to challenge management’s justification for dismissals on
their own terms. As I show below, workers at IBM San Jose already found managers’
justification of dismissals persuasive and they believed managers’ arguments that,
compared to external market forces, workers had only minimal agency over
working conditions. Workers acquiesced to downsizing because organizers failed to
provide persuasive evidence that mobilizing could be effective in protecting their
jobs.
3.1 Organizers fail to adapt to the discursive context of production in Silicon Valley
Rather than adapting their strategies to the primarily financial discursive context of
Silicon Valley, organizers at IBM San Jose simply recycled the materials and advice
they received from organizing activities at east coast sites like Burlington. According
to one organizer, the Alliance@IBM and CWA produced a newsletter that was “a
professionally-printed, like glossy kind of thing. So they were nice pieces.”382 While
glossy, these newsletters “were like national news, but they didn't say anything
about San Jose or the Local. So we would stuff a little thing in there, especially if we
were going to try and have a meeting.”383 The effort to insert a site-specific
announcement in advance of a meeting was no doubt necessary for generating
attendance, but it was hardly sufficient to build support for mobilization. Workers
receiving a newsletter were more likely to pay attention to the glossy pages than to
a single black and white insert, and the majority of those glossy pages reflected a
normative discourse that clashed with discursive context of production in Silicon
Valley.
In late November 2001, workers at multiple sites, including San Jose,
received a press release from the Alliance@IBM that deployed a normative
discourse admonishing management’s downsizing plans. The President of the
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Alliance, Linda Guyer, drew attention to the firm’s stock repurchase of that year, in
which IBM had spent $7.8 billion to buy its own shares. With such actions, IBM could
not justify dismissals for business reasons because, “money isn't the issue.” Instead,
“respect and loyalty to long-term employees is in short supply."384 Guyer concluded
the press release with another explicitly normative statement regarding the
dismissals: "The workers who built IBM deserve much better treatment than they've
received this week.” While workers at San Jose may have also criticized executives’
strategy to buy back the firm’s own shares, they were unlikely to be persuaded by
Guyer’s framing of dismissals in this normative discourse. Workers at San Jose were
meanwhile focused on broader business issues facing IBM, such as increasing
competition and declining prices among their core products.385 Guyer does not
mention these.
Organizers at San Jose failed to adapt their strategies to the discursive
context of Silicon Valley because they did not learn enough about the workers there.
While CWA had organized skilled workers in the technology sector, the majority of
their efforts had been focused on telecommunications, at firms like AT&T, for
instance. Organizers believed they did not need to update their strategies when
approaching different types of workers: “I don't think that [different types of
workers] makes a big difference [to organizing]... Especially at an early stage of a
campaign, when you're out there just like trying to get people involved. You pretty
much just pass out leaflets and then try to follow up with folks who have an
interest.”386 While this may have been true in previous organizing campaigns,
organizers never learned enough about the workers at IBM San Jose to ensure that it
applied here as well:
I knew very little about the company [IBM]. I did not have a lot of
information. I didn't, like, know what the hell they were really doing
Alliance@IBM, Communications Workers of America, “For Immediate Release:
November 30, 2001.”
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in there, in Cottle Road. Making hard disks. Okay. But what types of
workers there were; I did not have a good understanding of that. I
mean, were these people like hands-on assembling stuff? Clean
rooms? Or were they mostly engineers, software people designing
stuff? I didn't even know that, really.387
This distance prevented organizers from appreciating, or even perceiving, the
discourse that management had established as hegemonic in the workplace.
Organizers thus had little sense of what discourses workers found plausible, and
were unaware of how workers made sense of dismissals or their employment
relationship in general. Lacking familiarity with workplace dynamics at San Jose,
organizers stood little chance of demonstrating that mobilization could be
potentially effective in a discourse that workers found persuasive.
In order to develop a counterhegemonic strategy at IBM San Jose, organizers
would have had to adapt their discourse to the context of production in Silicon
Valley, which differs significantly from Burlington.
4. The discursive context of production at IBM San Jose
Rather than sharing their Burlington colleagues’ primarily normative understanding
of the employment relationship, workers in San Jose understood the employment
relationship in primarily financial terms. Just as at Burlington, workers formed their
occupational identities on the basis of management’s hegemonic discourse, which
was shaped directly by the discursive context surrounding production. I argue that
this context led managers to establish a hegemonic discourse in the workplace that
disposed workers to reject participation in collective action along with membership
in a union. Management’s hegemonic discourse supported workers’ belief that they
were powerful individuals, capable of securing their rights without the help of
others. Furthermore, management’s primarily financial framing of the employment
relationship led workers to believe that dismissals were caused by market
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conditions beyond their control, but that they were otherwise in control of their
employment status and working conditions.
This section shows how the workplace constitutes a central interpretive
node in the causal path connecting the discursive field of production to workers’
acquiescence to dismissals. The discursive field of production in Silicon Valley
disposed workers to acquiesce, but that decision was contingent on management’s
hegemonic discourse in the workplace and whether workers accepted that
discourse as persuasive.
4.1 The discourse of acquiescence
Just as at Burlington, managers at San Jose established a hegemonic discourse in the
workplace that was consistent with the discursive context surrounding production.
In contrast to Burlington, however, management at San Jose supported a hegemonic
discourse that was primarily financial. When it came time to announce dismissals,
this hegemonic discourse enabled managers to frame downsizing so that workers
were discouraged from resisting. The primarily financial discursive context of
production in Silicon Valley disposed workers to believe that resisting dismissals
would be unreasonable, because their working conditions were determined by
market forces beyond their power. Furthermore, this discursive context disposed
workers to believe that collective action stood no chance of protecting their rights.
As a result, the most reasonable response to downsizing was acquiescence.
Tech workers’ orientation to a primarily financial understanding of their
skills disposes them to acquiesce to dismissals by leading them to overlook the
effectiveness of collective action. Workers with technical skills, such as engineers,
have long avoided joining unions because they failed to see how a union could help
them.388 As illustrated in the previous chapters, tech workers are prone to
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understand dismissals as caused by market forces external to their firms, but, at
least in Silicon Valley, they nonetheless hold themselves responsible for finding
another job.389 On this view, unions are ineffective in protecting against downsizing
because there is nothing they can do against global market forces. At the same time
that unions cannot help prevent unemployment, they also cannot end
unemployment once a tech worker has lost his job. Tech workers understand unions
through a discourse that is primarily financial and thoroughly individualistic, which
leads them to believe that they are individually responsible for, and capable of,
protecting their rights in the workplace.
Workers at IBM San Jose engaged the discursive context surrounding
production in Silicon Valley to explain their opposition to participating in collective
action or joining a union. According to one worker, “Engineers can take care of
themselves, so I never felt like I needed a union to take care of me. In fact I was
kinda negative on unions, because if they decided to do something I didn't want to
do, I didn't have a choice.”390 Another worker emphasized that the employment
relationship was strictly individual and, as a tech worker, he had the market power
to negotiate directly with management:
You know, I'm responsible for my situation, I don't want... I'm not
saying necessarily that unions are a bad thing, but really, I can make
those kinds of decisions for myself. My employment is an agreement
between me and my employer, and if I don't like it, I can ask him for a
raise, and if I don't get it, I can go someplace else. And I can test the
job market, instead of trying to basically legislate myself an increase
in lifestyle.391
The strength with which tech workers identify as autonomous individuals is visible
in their emotional reaction to the issue of joining a union. Workers took the
suggestion that they might benefit from a union as a direct threat to their
Ofer Sharone, “Why Do Unemployed Americans Blame Themselves While Israelis Blame
the System?,” Social Forces 91, no. 4 (2013): 1429–50.
390 Former manager, IBM San Jose, Author interview, San Jose, March 27, 2015.
391 Former software engineer, IBM San Jose, Author interview, San Jose.
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competence: “I ought to be able to negotiate my wages, hours, and working
conditions with whoever I'm reporting to. I don't need some outside firm
representing me. I can speak for myself, thank you very much.”392
While workers at IBM appreciated collaboration in the workplace, they
nonetheless viewed themselves through the strictly individualistic and primarily
financial discursive context that developed in Silicon Valley. Understanding
themselves as possessing a set of technical skills that endowed them with market
power vis-à-vis their employer, workers at IBM San Jose categorically rejected the
possibility that participating in collective action would benefit them, and saw joining
a union as a threat to their occupational identity. Tech workers’ occupational
identity is based in large part on the primarily financial framing of technological
innovation that developed around production in Silicon Valley. Through their
framing of the employment relationship, management established this discourse as
hegemonic in the workplace, disposing workers to acquiesce to dismissals rather
than resisting through collective action.
The discursive field surrounding production in Silicon Valley is in large part
responsible for workers’ acquiescence because it disposed workers to find
management’s primarily financial discourse persuasive. Already accustomed to
understanding the employment relationship through this primarily financial
discourse, it was hardly a stretch for workers to believe that external market forces
required downsizing. While the Fordist discourse of production in Burlington
provided workers a set of resources to undermine management’s justification for
dismissals, workers failed to develop equivalent resources from the discourse
surrounding the post-Fordist organization of production in Silicon Valley.
The discursive field surrounding production played a large role in workers’
acquiescence, but by no means did it predetermine workers’ vulnerability to

392

Former Engineering Manager, IBM San Jose, Author Interview, Mountain View, CA.

176

dismissals. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the discourse surrounding production was
primarily financial, but it was unstable. As a result, workers believed that external
market forces shaped conditions within the workplace, but they also recognized that
they were capable of producing technologies that, in turn, shaped these market
forces. Workers were thus disposed to find management’s economic justification for
dismissals persuasive, but they did not overlook the contingency involved.
According to one former worker, dismissals “became necessary,” explaining that
they “probably would not have become necessary if the situation that made it
necessary had been avoided to begin with. Which was possible.”393 As much as their
occupational identities reflected Silicon Valley’s discursive context, workers
nonetheless recognized that management bore some responsibility for dismissals.
Had organizers developed a strategy based on the primarily financial
discourse of Silicon Valley, they could have exploited the contradictions inherent to
this discourse in order to reinforce workers’ inclination to attribute at least some
responsibility for dismissals to managers’ poor business decisions. Doing so would
have strengthened the reasonableness of collective action, because if managers
were responsible for dismissals then workers stood a chance to avoid downsizing if
they could pressure management to reconsider. Organizers, however, did not make
such arguments, and instead left workers with no plausible alternative
management’s hegemonic discourse in the workplace.
4.2 Workers’ understanding of production at IBM San Jose
Former workers’ accounts of IBM San Jose’s history demonstrate how they were
disposed to view technological innovation as primarily financial but also show that
their understandings were characterized by the contradictions inherent to this
discourse. On the one hand, workers understood themselves as gifted technicians.
On the other hand, workers saw themselves as the productive force driving IBM’s
market performance. One worker described how the site had played an important
393
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role in saving IBM during a previous downturn in the late 1980s. On first sight, his
account is strictly technical:
Somebody said, ‘Hey, why don't we run Unix in the mainframe?’ Now
that's not Unix in the whole mainframe. That's the current operating
system. [It]creates address spaces, thousands of them, if you have a
big enough machine, running in parallel. They're mostly in VS, the
original, the ‘native,’ operating system. But you can make an address
space in Unix…..so a large bank, like Chase, would be running Unix
apps in some of their mainframes. And each address space is a server.
So, and they're running all together. But they have the atomicity, the
atomic nature of Unix in small machines. But they're running in a
machine that's maintainable. You just change the libraries and pop
‘em all. That was it. That was a brilliant competitive ploy. It wiped out
Sun, because all of a sudden, the top tier of their customers slinked
away.394
While this worker’s account of technological innovation certainly engages a
technical discourse, mentioning the various programming languages involved, for
instance, the register he engages is ultimately financial. He includes technical details
in order to make an argument about how IBM triumphed in a particular product
market. This innovation of applying Unix to a new situation may have been
compelling on technical grounds, but it was significant in the first place because it
contributed to IBM’s bottom line. Furthermore, according to this worker, developing
this innovation was contingent on the market pressures facing IBM. Consistent with
the discourse that management established as hegemonic at San Jose, workers took
credit for this technological innovation not just in scientific terms, but also in
financial terms that recognized how they shaped IBM’s response to market forces.
dismissals, which led them to conclude that acquiescence was the most reasonable
choice.
Although proud of their technical achievements, workers were quick to
mention the site’s economic performance, indicating the important role of financial
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discourses in framing the employment relationship. Rather than describing their
scientific capabilities, workers were proud that, “At the bottom line, we made more
money, OK, than any other division. Sometimes we made more than all the rest of
the company. OK. We were the darlins' of the company.”395 Workers at San Jose
could have taken pride at being the firm’s designated inventors and problem-solvers
but instead, they were proud of having produced the most financial value.
While workers could connect their technical expertise to IBM’s financial
performance, they also perceived strong limits to their agency over working
conditions. Even first-line managers at IBM San Jose believed they could do nothing
to protect themselves against dismissals:
Guess what, I have a pharmacy license... Because I have a Plan B. If
they lay me off… They [other firms] don't want me, [because] I'm too
old, you know. I'm not young and innovative, but I'm too young for
social security, so here I've got my pharmacy license and I'll go down
and start applying to any local drugstore, Safeway, you name it.396
This sense of powerlessness toward dismissals is a direct result of management’s
hegemonic discourse, which disposed workers to frame their technical expertise in
the broader context of market forces beyond the firm. As skilled as workers might
be, their ability to shape working conditions paled in comparison to global flows of
capital. Workers acquiesced to downsizing because they relied on management’s
discourse to assess the potential effectiveness of collective action, illustrating that
management’s hegemonic discourse succeeded in guaranteeing acquiescence
because they were able to shape workers’ occupational identities. To do so,
managers relied in large part on the discursive context that developed around
production in Silicon Valley.
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4.3 Management’s hegemonic discourse at IBM San Jose
Solidly established on the east coast, the Watsons began looking west in the 1950s
in order to develop new ideas, and in 1956, they bought a building at 99 Notre Dame
in San Jose. Former workers at IBM San Jose explained the site’s history through a
framework oriented to technological innovation: “One of the reasons for moving
here in the first place is they wanted to get a small team together to do something
new and unusual. And the Watsons were big on ‘wild ducks,’” wild ducks being a
term to describe creative inventors.397 The team they assembled invented what
became known as RAMAC (Random Access Method of Accounting and Control),
which was a major milestone in the history of computing because it was “the first
[storage system] to support real time online transaction processing, a capability
which revolutionized the computer industry.”398 However, while management
certainly valued the scientific aspects of technological innovation, the financial
aspects were arguably more important, and they took priority in the discourse that
management established as hegemonic.
Management at San Jose consistently emphasized to workers that the
conditions for technological innovation within the firm were shaped by external
market forces beyond managers’ and workers’ control. The scientific, physical
aspects of technology played a role in IBM’s performance, but market forces
external to the firm were what made these aspects of technology relevant to the
employment relationship. One manager explained how dismissals were the result of
technological developments in IBM’s products:
When you have a disk drive that is 65 pounds of hardware,
maybe 300 and some parts, and then one day I come in and
Former manager, IBM San Jose, Author interview, San Jose, March 22, 2015; IBM still
seeks to support “wild ducks.” See IBM, WildDucks, Innovative Technology Podcasts about
World-Changing People and Ideas, accessed May 9, 2017, https://www.ibm.com/thoughtleadership/wild-ducks-podcast/index.html?lnk=wdm.
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show you that the new design has only 90 some parts and it
only weighs maybe 10 pounds or 5 pounds, you don't have to be
rocket scientist to figure out I don't need as many people to
make this.399
These technological, in this case, physical, specifications were relevant to workers’
job security because they mediated the relationship between the production process
and IBM’s product markets. As technological developments reduced the number of
workers necessary for manufacturing a given product, there was no leeway for
keeping those workers employed unless the market provided a new opportunity.
Managers led workers to believe that fundamental workplace conditions, such as
the decision whether to hire or fire, were beyond managers’ agency, and therefore
certainly beyond workers’ agency.
While a product’s technical aspects might illustrate the degree to which
external forces made dismissals unavoidable, according to the discourse
management established as hegemonic, a product’s technical aspects could hardly
be distinguished from its performance in a given market. When concerned workers
asked managers whether they would be dismissed, managers answered by directing
workers to their products’ market performance: “They'd say, ‘Jim, do you think
we're going to have another layoff?’ I'd say, ‘yeah.’ ‘Do you think our area will be
affected?’ ‘Yeah.’ And then I would say, ‘now let's look at the performance of our
products.’”400 Workers at IBM Burlington would not have found such financial
discourse persuasive because they believed that, even if their products performed
poorly, management was still responsible for looking after their well-being.
However, the discursive field of production in Silicon Valley led management to
establish a hegemonic discourse at San Jose that disposed workers to understand
technological innovation primarily in terms of its financial characteristics.
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4.4 How the discursive context of production shapes occupational identities
Tech workers’ identities may be as fragmented as any other profession, due to the
diversity of jobs they take on,401 but the case of downsizing at IBM San Jose shows
that the discursive context of production in Silicon Valley has led to at least two
common and fundamental characteristics. First, tech workers are disposed to view
the employment relationship in primarily financial terms. Second, they are highly
individualistic, understanding themselves to possess not just technical prowess, but
also the type of negotiating ability that makes collective action unnecessary. These
two features of the discursive context of production in Silicon Valley lead tech
workers to avoid collective action in general and unions in particular. As illustrated
at IBM San Jose, management’s hegemonic discourse in the workplace ensures that
these identities endure over time.
Technological innovation has always been framed as both a scientific and
financial phenomenon, although, as described in previous chapters, the financial
framing has prevailed in Silicon Valley since the rise of finance in the 1970s.
Founders of early tech companies set out to introduce novel technologies, but
“Today we’re creating jobs, benefiting customers. I talk in terms of customer
benefits, adding value. Back then, it was like pioneering.”402 It was no different at
IBM. In the early days, laboratories were generally left to their own devices, free to
develop “bucky balls” if they wanted, but at least since the 1990s, labs were
assessed according to the financial returns of their inventions: “I can tell you what
drove the development laboratory. So this year's budget was based on last year's
profit, and I can't tell you what the algorithm was. But if you developed a bad
machine and it didn't earn money, it was terrible trying to recover, because you
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were squeezed.”403 Although IBM was isolated from some aspects of Silicon Valley,
such as networked production methods, managers nonetheless framed technology
in a primarily financial discourse.
The second constitutive aspect of the occupational identity of tech workers is
that they are individualistic. From the early days of Silicon Valley, technology
production was motivated by a deeply individualistic ethos. Tech workers sought to
create an alternative form of society, a
sphere that would not be ruled through the work of agonistic politics,
but rather by turning away from it, toward the technologically
mediated empowerment of the individual and the establishment of
peer-to-peer agoras. For the prophets of the Internet, as for those who
had headed back to the land some thirty years earlier, it was
government, imagined as a looming, bureaucratic behemoth, that
threatened to destroy the individual; in information, technology, and
the marketplace lay salvation.404
It is no mistake that much of the technology developed in Silicon Valley is based on
the model of an individual user who exercises near complete control over his own
personal computer. This individualism is described alternately as utopic or dystopic,
but it is widely recognized that “That libertarian model of selfhood – its allures and
its limitations – played a key role in the trajectory of the internet and its reception in
the early 1990s.”405 This insistence on individualism persists in the form of
contracting, which is a very common employment practice in the tech sector, even at
the high-end of the wage scale.406 Tech workers’ individualism inspires their
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confidence that they exercise enough market power to negotiate their own salaries.
For many, this may be true.
Compensation practices in the tech sector reinforce workers’ beliefs that
they are powerful individuals who do not need to rely on collective action in order
to satisfy their interests. In 2000, wages in Silicon Valley were 88.4% higher than
the national average, although they dropped by nearly 16% following the bursting
of the tech bubble.407 While workers in other sectors may be paid according to
seniority or formal qualifications, workers in tech are more frequently paid
according to performance.408 Until 2016, managers at IBM evaluated workers’
performance according to a system called Personal Business Commitments (PBC).
Each worker was assessed and rewarded according to their individual performance.
Even before the PBC system was implemented, evaluations were always performed
individually. One manager explained:
You'd sit with the employees and say, ‘this is what I expect you to do:
1 2 3 4 5,’ and then appraise them, you'd go through the things, 1 2 3 4
5, and you'd give a score. Well, then the personal commitment thing
came on later, and the only difference was that the employees would
set their own objectives, and you'd meet with a manager and you'd
decide whether the objectives were reasonable, that the employee
objectives matched the manager's objectives, and then from then, the
thing worked the same way.409
It is normal for evaluation systems to consider workers as individuals, but IBM’s
system reinforced workers’ individualism by comparing workers against one
another and compensating them accordingly.410 Discussing variable pay, another
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manager emphasized that, “everybody got something, but if you're a great
performer, you might get 10%. If you're a lousy performer, you might get 0%.”411
Competition between workers may have led them to worker harder, but,
importantly, it also reinforced each worker’s sense that he had to look after his own
interests ahead of everyone else’s.
Management at IBM San Jose structured the workplace in a manner that
disposed workers to apply a primarily financial approach to understanding the
source, content, and limits of their agency. Each individual was responsible for his
output and compensation. Workers could increase or decrease their output and
compensation by changing the way they addressed the technical problems they
were assigned. However, beyond the jurisdiction of their specific technical area,
workers’ agency was tightly constricted. Just as a region’s job-search practices shape
how workers attribute blame for remaining unemployed,412 management’s
treatment of compensation is one factor that shapes how workers attribute blame
for dismissals.
Committed to an ideal of meritocracy, workers at IBM San Jose had little
sympathy for those who were cut in the first rounds of dismissals. One worker
described his response to when “Gerstner came along and full employment went
away, and they started to lay people off. And actually, we all thought that was great.
Because we were like, ‘finally.’ If IBM had what we refer to as ‘deadwood,’ there's a
lot of deadwood we can get rid of.”413 Workers believed that their wages and job
security were tied to their individual abilities, so they were disposed to believe that
somebody fired by management probably deserved it: “I know that there were
plenty of people, working, being carried along, who didn't know shit from Shinola,
doing a job, getting paid, for.... I have no idea. How can this person be
Former manager, IBM San Jose, Author interview, San Jose, March 27, 2015.
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productive?”414 At least during the first rounds of dismissals, workers believed that
only low performers were dismissed, and that these dismissals were therefore
justified.
The belief in meritocracy may be widespread in the US, but tech workers’
dispositions are not simply the result of political culture. Instead, the characteristics
fundamental to tech workers’ occupational identities are the consequence of how
the discourse surrounding production in Silicon Valley developed over a period of
decades. Beyond a general form of meritocracy, tech workers look to their
individual skills in order to differentiate themselves from others. They believe that,
by virtue of the same skills that got them their jobs and their pay they do not need to
participate in collective action.
Tech workers constitute a certain type of professional. Their workdays are
devoted to non-routine assignments and they are committed to the value of
autonomy.415 Indeed, workers at IBM San Jose identified as professionals,
distinguishing themselves from workers who performed repetitive tasks.416
Furthermore, for many tech workers, identifying as a professional means that their
work is the core of their identity. Tech workers work because they enjoy what they
do, because, according to one former worker, “a professional ought to enjoy what
he's doing or he shouldn't be doing it, and it's difficult for him to be professional,
because if he's always trying to escape or march out the door when the whistle
blows, it's going to be tough.”417 This view of professionalism reflects the
individualism presented above, in that professionals hold the type of jobs for which
their performance is related in large part to their own satisfaction. While money
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certainly plays a role, tech workers choose a particular career path based on what
they enjoy doing. Moreover, this sense of identity with a particular set of skills is
reinforced by the wages they receive, which confirms their expertise and affirms
that they are fulfilling a core aspect of their identity.
Tech workers are similar to other types of professionals in that they identify
with the specific skills they rely on in the workplace. Sabel writes that professionals
find a common identity in a “culture of skill,” which binds workers together through
shared standards for judging each other.418 As a result, “professional identity among
software workers is built securely on academic attainment and technical
proficiency.”419 This identity provides tech workers a common point of orientation,
and, importantly “stamps control on defined areas of work.”420 As illustrated above,
the discursive context of production in Silicon Valley ensures that, while tech
workers engage “a body of knowledge that is effectively a type of hard engineering,”
they perceive and evaluate their skills according to financial standards.421 Tech
workers know they are valuable because they are well paid for exercising their
skills. While all professionals are paid for their skills, tech workers stand out for the
degree to which they view their skills as personal property, perhaps best conceived
as individual intellectual property.
At IBM San Jose, workers echoed the discursive context of production in
Silicon Valley by identifying strongly with the financial value of their technical skills.
As indicated above, what originally made the site so notable was not simply that
engineers had developed a new type of computing in RAMAC, but that this product
opened one of IBM’s most significant revenue streams. Similarly, while workers
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valued one another for their intelligence, being highly skilled was never an end in
itself. Instead, a worker’s skills were important because they positioned that worker
to contribute to the firm’s bottom line. According to the discursive context of
production that developed in Silicon Valley, the division between technical skill and
business sense was a thin one, so that managers were selected on the basis of their
expertise in technical areas.422 Workers at IBM San Jose constructed occupational
identities that were largely consistent with the discursive context of production in
Silicon Valley. Doing so disposed them to reject participating in collective action but
also provided the possibility of mobilization due to the contradictions inherent to
framing the employment relationship in a primarily financial discourse.
This section has argued that management at IBM San Jose persuaded
workers to acquiesce to dismissals by framing downsizing in a manner consistent
with the discursive context of production in Silicon Valley. This discursive context,
which revolved around a primarily financial understanding of technological
innovation, ensured that managers’ justification of dismissals was consistent with
the hegemonic discourse they had established in the workplace. By disposing
workers to view the employment relationship in primarily financial terms, this
discourse led workers to believe that working conditions were shaped by market
forces external to the firm rather than norms of reciprocity between management
and workers. Therefore, in contrast to Burlington, where workers redeployed
management’s own normative discourse to critique managers’ presentation of
dismissals in the discourse of shareholder value, workers at San Jose acquiesced to
dismissals because managers’ justification resonated with the occupational identity
they formed in the workplace.
5. Conclusion
Disposed to understand the employment relationship as shaped by broader market
forces, workers at San Jose found organizers’ framing of dismissals unpersuasive. In
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contrast to their colleagues in Burlington, workers at San Jose believed that
dismissals resulted primarily from developments in IBM’s product markets, rather
than managers’ decisions. Even when acknowledging that managers played a role in
downsizing by formulating an ineffective business strategy, workers at San Jose
believed that market forces external to the firm made dismissals necessary to IBM’s
survival. Workers’ disposition to view the employment relationship in a primarily
financial discourse led them to find management’s framing of dismissals in the
discourse of shareholder value more persuasive than organizers’. On workers’
primarily financial understanding of downsizing, participating in collective action
would be unreasonable because mobilizing would be ineffective against global
market forces.
Workers at IBM San Jose acquiesced to downsizing because organizers failed
to adapt their framing of dismissals to the discursive context of production. Instead
of characterizing managers’ decision to downsize and the potential for workers to
mobilize against the measures in the discourse that developed around production in
Silicon Valley, organizers simply repeated the discursive strategy they received from
colleagues on the east coast. As a result, organizers failed to meet the two conditions
necessary for mobilizing workers. While they argued that mobilization could be
potentially effective in protecting workers’ jobs, they did not frame their argument
in the primarily financial discourse that workers found persuasive. Instead,
organizers framed dismissals as a normative issue, arguing that workers needed to
mobilize in order to correct an injustice.
As demonstrated above, the discourse surrounding production at San Jose
disposed workers to view the employment relationship in primarily financial terms,
which led them to find management’s framing of dismissals more persuasive than
organizers’. Convinced that dismissals were the unavoidable result of market forces
external to IBM, workers believed that collective action would be ineffective, and
thus unreasonable.
189

Viewed against workers’ resistance to dismissals in Burlington, the case of
workers’ acquiescence in San Jose proposes a handful of broader lessons. First, this
within-country, within-firm comparison demonstrates how local discursive context
can lead workers to respond very differently to management’s and organizers’
strategies. Due to IBM’s centralized management structure, and to the linkages
between organizers at each site, workers at Burlington and San Jose faced exactly
the same strategies from both management and organizers. However, variation in
the discursive contexts of each site led management to establish their hegemony in a
different manner in the two workplaces. This variation in surrounding context
highlights how organizers must adapt their discursive strategies in order to frame
collective action in a manner that workers find persuasive. While the discursive
context surrounding a particular workplace constitutes a critical causal condition
for workers to mobilize against management discretion, organizers must develop
creative strategies in order to transform that context from a constraint into a power
resource.
Second, building on this observation, this pair of case studies reinforces
organizers’ own observations about the necessity of tailoring their discursive
strategies to a particular workplace. At San Jose, workers were disposed to
understand the employment relationship in a primarily financial discourse, which
made them susceptible to overlooking their ability to shape conditions in the
workplace. The discursive context of Silicon Valley led workers to view downsizing
against the broader backdrop of globalization, and to understand their plight as one
detail in a process much larger than themselves. According to a former organizer,
this discourse is “overwhelming. Because it's not just my problem, or my plant at
IBM. There's no such thing as manufacturing in the United States. How do you stand
up and fight that?”423 Organizers recognized that workers were unlikely to mobilize
as long as they understood dismissals to be the inevitable result of a larger global
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process. Despite this recognition, organizers failed to develop a strategy that
illustrated to workers the potential effectiveness of collective action in a discourse
they found persasive. As a result, workers saw mobilization as unreasonable, so they
chose their most reasonable option: acquiescence. This outcome was by no means
determined by the discursive context of post-Fordist production in Silicon Valley. As
I show in Chapter 8, even under these circumstances, organizers with enough
creativity can develop a discursive strategy to mobilize tech workers.
These two upshots, concerning the interaction between the discursive
context of a workplace and organizers’ ability to adapt their discursive strategies,
illustrate why and how the transition to the knowledge economy does not always
and everywhere have the same effects on workers’ conditions. Even though
executives at IBM adopted the primarily financial discourse of shareholder value,
organizers at Burlington creatively redeployed management’s hegemonic discourse
in order to demonstrate to workers the potential effectiveness of collective action in
a manner that contradicted management’s insistence that market forces demanded
dismissals. By transforming the discursive context of production into a power
resource, organizers at Burlington succeeded in mobilizing workers to protect their
rights. At San Jose, on the other hand, organizers failed to develop the discursive
context surrounding production to challenge management’s economic justifications
for dismissals. Disposed to understand the employment relationship in primarily
financial terms, workers were persuaded by management’s framing of dismissals
because the discourse of shareholder value resonated with the discourse
surrounding production in Silicon Valley.
In addition to proposing a handful of broader upshots, the pair of case
studies presented in this section also raise a number of questions. First, can
organizers actually develop successful counterhegemonic strategies in the
discursive context of post-Fordist production? The comparison offered above shows
that organizers can develop counterhegemonic strategies under the discursive
191

conditions accompanying Fordist production, but it may be that organizers in San
Jose had no choice but to repeat the normative discourse developed on the east
coast. What would counterhegemonic discourse look like under conditions of postFordist production? Can a primarily financial discourse be creatively interpreted
and applied to encourage workers to cast doubt on the discourse of shareholder
value?
Second, this pair of case studies has examined how workplace dynamics lead
management’s adoption of the shareholder value orientation to affect workers
differently, but the apparent importance of workplace dynamics may be an artifact
of the US’s lax institutions for industrial relations. Indeed, the US is the paradigmatic
liberal market economy, where employment is at-will, and the state provides
workers only the most minimal legal protection against employer discretion. Are
workplace dynamics so critical in shaping how the shareholder value orientation
affects workers in other national settings where workers may be protected by more
robust institutions? Furthermore, workers were able to protect their rights at
Burlington in part because they creatively interpreted and effectively applied
elements of national legislation, namely the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
How do other institutional regimes shape the conditions for workers to defend
themselves against the effects of management adopting the orientation to
shareholder value? The section that follows addresses these questions by comparing
how tech workers responded to the threat of mass dismissals at two firms in
Germany.
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Chapter 6. Institutions and liberalization in Germany

The following three chapters shift the focus from the United States to Germany in
order to explore how institutions for industrial relations shape the prospects for
tech workers to defend their jobs against downsizing. I argue that while Germany’s
institutions for dismissal protection and codetermination remain formally robust,
German tech firms’ adoption of the primarily financial discourse associated with the
shareholder value orientation exposes their workers to the same risk of dismissals
as in the US.
While the previous chapters developed an account of tech workers’
occupational identity derived from the discursive context of production specific to
Silicon Valley, this discursive context has since spread far beyond California. As
firms have increasingly sought to emulate the economic success of Silicon Valley,
often aided by their respective states, managers have adopted its primarily financial
discourse, thereby leading to widespread adoption of the occupational identity
observed among tech workers in Silicon Valley. In the UK, researchers have found
that tech workers assumed an entrepreneurial identity that reflects the
observations above about Silicon Valley, whereby workers identify with their
expertise, believing that it gives them significant market power vis-à-vis their
employers.424
Even in Germany, where the commitment to a social market economy
constrains policy making, the past decades have seen employers adopt practices
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developed in Silicon Valley, including “patterns of work organization, remuneration,
and financing that resemble the Silicon Valley model commonly used in the USA.”425
Despite widespread social norms of lifetime employment, the adoption of the Silicon
Valley model for economic growth has entailed “the acceptance, on the part of
skilled employees, of low employment security,”426 which indicates that tech
workers in Germany have also adopted their American counterparts’ belief in their
individual power on the labor market. Believing that their skills endow them with
the ability to negotiate directly with management, tech workers in Germany have
distanced themselves from labor’s traditional power resources, particularly unions.
This chapter begins by introducing the institutions for industrial relations in
Germany and noting how they have evolved over the past decades of liberalization.
Building on the analysis of the discursive context of production in Silicon Valley
from the previous chapters, I propose that the institutional change observed in
Germany is the result of German firms adopting the primarily financial discourse
associated with the transition to the knowledge economy. Noting how firms’
adoption of the discourse of shareholder value weakens workers’ power resources, I
show that Germany’s institutions for industrial relations nevertheless offer workers
significant support for mobilizing under liberalization. The chapter concludes by
introducing the two case studies that follow in the next two chapters.
1. Liberalizing Germany’s institutions for industrial relations
This section briefly reviews Germany’s institutions for industrial relations to
propose that, in addition to promoting cooperation between capital and labor, these
institutions are also designed to promote conflict. I show how the mechanisms for
enforcing national legislation depend on workers’ ability to disrupt production by
mobilizing against their employer. In the chapters that follow, I suggest that
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liberalization has made these mechanisms for conflict more prominent, thereby
pushing German industrial relations to be more adversarial not just in design, but in
practice as well.
Unlike workers in the US, workers in Germany are formally protected against
dismissals by national legislation. The Dismissal Protection Act
(Kündigungsschutzgesetz) was first passed in 1951, after years of negotiations
between employers, unions, and political parties. The law prohibits dismissals,
except in three circumstances: employers may dismiss a worker when he is no
longer able to fulfill the functions of his position, when he has broken the employer’s
trust, and in the event of “urgent operational conditions.”427 If an employer is found
guilty of wrongful dismissal, they may be required to provide workers backpay, in
addition to damages and significant legal fees, which means that workers can exert
considerable pressure on their employer by simply filing a case.428 However,
protection against wrongful dismissal under the Dismissal Protection Act is an
individual right, rather than a group right, so resisting dismissal requires affected
workers to file a case individually.429
A series of reforms in the 1970s augmented the enforcement mechanisms of
the Dismissal Protection Act by empowering works councils to oversee dismissals.
According to the newly drafted §102.2, “the works council must be consulted before
every dismissal… Any dismissal performed without consulting the works council is
invalid.” Works councils can negotiate with an employer over a “social
compensation plan” (Sozialplan) for affected employees.430 With a social
“Kündigungsschutzgesetz (Protection Against Dismissal Act)” (1951), §1.2.
Christian Grund, “Severance Payments for Dismissed Employees in Germany,” European
Journal of Law and Economics 22, no. 1 (July 2006): 49–71; Elke J. Jahn, “Do Firms Obey the
Law When They Fire Workers? Social Criteria and Severance Payments in Germany,”
International Journal of Manpower 30, no. 7 (November 13, 2009): 672–91.
429 Eva Kocher, “Effektive Mobiliseriung von Beschäftigtenrechten: Das Arbeitsrecht in der
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2009).
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compensation plan, the works council attempts to reduce the financial burden on
employees of being fired, and frequently involves different levels of severance pay
for workers depending on their family obligations and their position on the labor
market.
Although works councils may not demand severance payments that threaten
the firm’s interests,431 their ability to demand certain levels of severance pay
enables them to negotiate with management over whether alternative business
strategies might in fact be more cost-effective in achieving the firm’s goals. As a
result, works councils have historically been able to protect workers against
dismissals by adjusting employers’ economic calculus around downsizing.432
Germany’s institutions for industrial relations have long attracted scholarly
attention for their ability to simultaneously protect workers against employer
discretion while also supporting firms’ performance. For decades, scholars
maintained that Germany’s institutions encouraged a system of industrial relations
that balanced conflict among labor and capital with mechanisms to encourage
partnership as well.433 While unions are responsible for bargaining at the sectorlevel with employers about wages and other benefits, workers negotiate with their
employers over more specific aspects of working conditions via their works council.
The works council, composed of workers elected by other employees at their firm,
constitutes the core of conflict-partnership because they represent workers’
interests in firm-level negotiations with management. The latest phase of
globalization, however, which has been driven not just by interlocking supply chains
Ibid., sec. 112.5.
Christian Grund, Johannes Martin, and Andreas Schmitt, “Works Councils, Quits and
Dismissals in Germany,” German Journal of Human Resource Management 30, no. 1 (February 1,
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across national borders, but by the circulation of management consultants and their
ideas, has raised questions about the future of “conflict-partnership.” As noted
above, the transition to the knowledge economy has seen German firms adopting
management practices more familiar to the American context, where conflict is the
norm and partnership is rare.
Some scholars maintain that conflict-partnership remains resilient. When
German firms adopt the orientation to shareholder value, they simply include
shareholders in existing structures of negotiation, leading to a German variant of
“negotiated shareholder value.”434 Others, however, point to the rising incidence of
conflict within firms and sectors, and argue that conflict-partnership has
disintegrated into “partnership without conflict” or “conflict without
partnership.”435
Works councils’ jurisdiction over dismissals constitutes an essential element
of conflict-partnership because it allows workers to mediate management’s
discretion over the fundamental terms of the employment relationship. Indeed,
works councils’ involvement with dismissals illustrates both elements of conflictpartnership. Cabining the issue of dismissals to the workplace, rather than involving
unions, facilitates partnership. On the other hand, assigning workers even limited
jurisdiction over dismissals enables them to directly oppose management’s
discretion in the workplace. Works councils played a central role in persuading
employers to avoid dismissals during the economic downturn in the 1980s and
during the economic crisis in 2008.436
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Although works councils’ role in enforcing dismissal protection legislation is
formally constituted by partnership, their success in protecting workers from
dismissals depends in large part on their ability to engage resources for conflict.
Works councils have formal jurisdiction over dismissals, but they have traditionally
worked with unions to enforce dismissal protection legislation.437 Unions provide
works councils the legal support they need to formally contest dismissals.438
Furthermore, unions’ ability to mobilize workers to disrupt production can threaten
employers so that they view negotiating with the works council as a more attractive
possibility.439 Even before liberalization, partnership always had to be viewed
alongside conflict.
The following chapters contribute to debates on conflict-partnership by
expanding on the observation that Germany’s institutions for industrial relations are
adversarial by design. I argue that, under liberalization, these institutions have
become adversarial in practice. Enforcing national institutions like dismissal
regulations has always depended on workers’ collective action in the workplace,
and, since the 1970s, the institutions for codetermination have provided works
councilors resources to mobilize workers. I extend Streeck’s argument that these
institutions supported conflict-partnership only because of the contextual
conditions that characterized Germany’s political economy through the mid-
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1990s.440 However, I argue that what changed at the end of the 1990s was the
arrival in Germany of the Silicon Valley model for economic growth, along with its
primarily financial discursive context of production. This Silicon Valley model
encourages managers to adopt the shareholder value orientation and to abandon
the norms that had heretofore governed Germany’s political economy.
In the chapters that follow, I show that protecting workers’ rights against
employer discretion requires works councils to engage the resources for
mobilization provided by national institutions. Thus, liberalization has led to a shift
in Germany’s institutions for industrial relations from being adversarial by design to
being adversarial in practice. The sections below first trace the discursive shift that
accompanied liberalization. I then show how, despite this shift, national institutions
still provide resources for mobilization, which increases the incidence of conflict in
industrial relations.
2. Germany’s adoption of the Silicon Valley model for economic growth
By the mid 1990s, Germany was facing the beginning of an economic crisis. As the
post-war economic miracle seemed to run dry and unemployment rose, policy
makers fastened on to the idea that they could spur economic growth by imitating
Silicon Valley, where billions of dollars had been generated by companies producing
technological innovation.441 A series of reforms followed this impulse as policy
makers pushed for what they understood as the drivers of Silicon Valley’s success:
“The German government worked with the financial community to introduce
measures designed to stimulate the provision of higher-risk investment capital and
allow technology firms to undertake rapid growth trajectories commonly seen
Streeck, “Von Konflikt ohne Partnerschaft zu Partnerschaft ohne Konflikt: Industrielle
Beziehungen in Deutschland.”
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within American technology clusters.”442 Implementing the Silicon Valley model,
policy makers reformed regulations around universities’ administration of patents,
developed a series of programs that emulated the US’s Small Business Innovation
Research program, and, most significantly, encouraged the growth of venture capital
in the German economy. These reforms departed from some of the pillars of the
social market economy and, just as in the US, reshaped the discursive context
surrounding the production of technological innovation.
The implementation of a growth model based on Silicon Valley led German
firms to articulate the employment relationship in a primarily financial discourse. As
new types of firms made their debut in Germany’s economy, older firms tried to
keep up by adapting management practices familiar to Silicon Valley but, in some
cases, inconsistent with the practices of conflict-partnership.443 In what follows, I
present three areas of reform through which the German state tried to support the
knowledge economy. I argue that these efforts institutionalized the primarily
financial discourse that drives liberalization, and suggest how this discursive shift
has contributed to the end of conflict-partnership.
2.1 Imitating the Bayh-Dole Act
Germany’s institutions for education and training had been lauded for rescuing the
automobile industry from global pressures in the 1980s, but in the 1990s they came
to be seen as a drag on economic growth. Required to turn over their patents to
universities, academic researchers had little reason to pursue technologies that
might otherwise generate profits. According to Casper, “This framework creates
poor incentives for the commercialization of more basic research, such as
biomedical science, in which start-ups typically spend several years
commercializing new research findings, often in close contact with founding
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university libraries, before technology can easily be applied to product markets.”444
In order to better capitalize public resources invested in higher education, the state
introduced a series of competitions among academic researchers and supported
public-private partnerships between industry and the academy.445 The federal
research ministry justified these efforts as necessary for encouraging the
technological innovation that would drive growth according to the Silicon Valley
model. On the basis of their conviction that “Scientists themselves must be
motivated to make the technology transfer of their knowledge succeed,” the
ministry set up “transfer organizations to assist scientists with contracts, patents,
licensing, marketing, invention issues, and the build-up of contacts.”446 The German
state had long played an important role in ensuring that education and training
institutions served the needs of industry. However, the series of reforms in the
1990s marked a shift toward creating market structures in order to encourage the
dynamics that policy makers believed were necessary to produce technological
innovation. Moreover, these reforms introduced and legitimized a financial framing
of technology production.
2.2 Imitating the SBIR
In addition to imitating the US’s Bayh-Dole Act, Germany instituted a program called
the Technologie-Beteiligungsgesellschaft (tbg), which mirrored the US’s Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program.447 Similar to the government’s shift
toward using market mechanisms to encourage research output, the tbg marked a
shift from providing subsidies to industry to providing equity capital. The tbg acted
as a venture capital fund for startups by providing up to DM 1 million, serving as the
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lead investor, and shouldering the majority of the risk.448 Between 1998 and 2000,
the tbg provided $165 million to startups.449 Rather than trying to simply improve
startups’ balance sheets, the goal of the tbg was to “forge competitive advantage for
German firms in new technologies.”450 To do so, the state attempted to encourage
venture capital in the tech sector.
This shift in public policy reflected a broader shift in popular beliefs that
Silicon Valley’s success depended not on direct governmental assistance, but on the
particular market forces beyond any single firm. Policy makers believed that “the
key to US dominance in biotechnology was the link between research and
commercial reward.”451 According to this line of thought, the best way to support
technological innovation was therefore to increase the commercial rewards for
research results. To meet this goal, policy makers “designed policies that mobilized
and directed crucial non-governmental actors, including the semi-public banks that
provided passive equity capital, the industrial associations that provided small
business support and risk analysis, and the ‘lead investors’ who made venture
investments.”452 In order to support growth in Germany’s fledgling tech sector,
policy makers adopted the instruments they viewed as responsible for the growth of
Silicon Valley. The discursive context surrounding technological production was
smuggled along when these policy instruments were imported the US.
2.3 Imitating the support for venture capital
Just as in Silicon Valley, venture capital (VC) was the cornerstone of the German
state’s efforts to support growth in the tech sector. Many in Germany came to view
Adelberger, “Semi-sovereign Leadership? The State’s Role in German Biotechnology and
Venture Capital Growth,” 114.
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VC as the reason that Silicon Valley became so profitable.453 Some explain the
association between VC and tech as a result of the dynamics of producing
technological innovation, whereby a firm may not be profitable during its first years
as it “burns” through funding to develop and market a novel technology.454 Others
look to successful lobbying by representatives of the VC and tech sectors.455
Whatever the reason, the German state threw its support behind VC in the mid1990s in its attempts to support growth in tech.
Up through the late-1990s, public discourse in Germany adhered to
strategies for economic growth based on Japan’s state-led MITI model. In 1989,
leaders of an effort to support Germany’s tech sector “argued that ideas about future
technologies could not be relegated simply to the ‘market,’ but that German firms
needed” more direct help from the government.456 By 1995, the discourse
surrounding the tech sector had shifted to the Silicon Valley model. Frustrated with
the government’s efforts, two founders of German software firms declared that,
“What we need is not a Minister of Research, but a Minster of Marketing!”457
Through the 1990s, the view became ever more widespread that government
support for the tech sector needed to focus on making finance capital available, and
politicians and the press began to speak of supporting “equity culture.” Finally, in
the late 1990s, policy makers passed a handful of reforms to encourage the flow of
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finance capital to the tech sector. Two of the most important include the
establishment in 1997 of the Neuer Markt, a separate stock market for tech startups,
and the 1998 “Law for control and transparency in firms” (KonTraG).
Germany’s primary stock market at Frankfurt made it difficult for startups to
raise capital, and the Neuer Markt was presented as a way around this obstacle:
“The aim of the Neuer Markt, which at least at a rhetorical level is modelled on the
US’s NASDAQ, is to serve the needs of both investors and young companies involved
in high-risk new technologies.”458 To do so, the Neuer Markt distinguished itself
from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange by waiving requirements for a firm’s minimum
profitability and age, and requiring each firm to have a designated sponsor.
Furthermore, the Neuer Markt encouraged small shareholders to invest in new firms
by mandating greater transparency in the form of quarterly reports, and by
requiring firms to adopt international accounting standards.459 By providing a
market for VC to invest in tech startups, the Neuer Markt was a key element of
reforms that sought to build a financial structure around Germany’s growing sector.
A second crucial step in promoting “equity culture” around the tech sector in
Germany involved the passage of the KonTraG, which established a statutory
framework to support the type of reporting that the Neuer Markt required of firms.
The law anticipated much of what became the US’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act, including a
requirement that supervisory boards oversee external auditing, rather than a firm’s
management board.460 In concert with the Neuer Markt, the KonTraG strengthened
the role of VC in Germany’s tech sector by increasing the power of smaller funds
against large shareholders like the big banks underlying Germany’s traditional
bank-based model. One key provision of KonTraG abolished plural voting rights in
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the name of a one-share-one-vote rule, which strengthened minority
shareholders.461
Like the Neuer Markt, KonTraG was promoted as a means to provide the
market dynamics necessary for supporting Germany’s tech sector. Germany’s efforts
to support its tech sector by imitating the Silicon Valley model for economic growth
marked a significant break from its traditional approach to economic policy. As
Ziegler points out, the Neuer Markt “consolidated a public-private effort to bolster a
new equity-driven entrepreneurial sector in Germany that was quite different from
the traditional Mittelstand.”462 The shift in tactics from providing subsidies to firms
to establishing an equity base for a sector saw some early successes. The Neuer
Markt ushered in a huge burst of public offerings, with more than 130 in
1999/2000.463 This success, however, was short-lived, as the Neuer Markt folded in
2002 amid widespread scandals.
Scholars attribute the failure of the Neuer Markt to policymakers’ inability to
transform complementary institutions in Germany’s political economy. Vitols and
Engelhardt, for instance, argue that Germany’s labor regulations prevented startup
tech firms from growing at the pace exhibited in Silicon Valley by making hiring and
firing too difficult.464 The complexities of institutional transfer guarantee that
wherever one looks, and whatever the reasons, Germany’s imitation of the Silicon
Valley model was far from perfect.465 Nonetheless, I propose that, however limited
this institutional transfer may have been, these efforts nonetheless shaped the
discourse surrounding production in Germany’s growing knowledge economy.
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Despite its brevity, the Neuer Markt and the other policy reforms surrounding it left
a long-lasting mark on Germany’s political economy by framing the tech sector in a
primarily financial discourse. Thus, Germany’s efforts to transition to the knowledge
economy have played a central role in the process of liberalization. Employers’
adoption of a primarily financial discourse threatens labor’s traditional power
resources by enabling managers to persuade workers that resisting dismissals will
be ineffective. As illustrated in the previous chapter, when workers do not recognize
the potential effectiveness of collective action, they choose not to activate national
institutions that otherwise could have protected their jobs. However, as I argue in
the section that follows, while the days of conflict-partnership may have passed,
Germany’s institutions for industrial relations provide workers precisely the
resources they need to defend against downsizing. These resources support
workers’ efforts to mobilize under liberalization and play a major role in explaining
why industrial relations have transformed from adversarial by design to adversarial
in practice.
3. Institutional resources for worker power
Although the 1990s saw some significant changes to institutions for corporate
governance and financial regulation in Germany, the institutions for industrial
relations remained stable. Despite this stability, however, the conditions for
enforcement changed dramatically. As illustrated in previous chapters, the
transition to the knowledge economy encourages management to frame the
employment relationship in a primarily financial discourse when firms orient to
producing shareholder value. When management succeeds in establishing this
financial discourse as hegemonic in the workplace, workers are disposed to
acquiesce to downsizing. Thus, the discursive shift associated with the transition to
the knowledge economy plays a central role in transforming the dynamics of
industrial relations in Germany. However, liberalization has not been marked by a
linear development toward worker acquiescence. On the contrary, as Streeck and
others have noted, industrial relations in Germany have become marked by more
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frequent conflict. In this section, I explain why introducing a primarily financial
discourse into the workplace has led to more adversarial industrial relations in
Germany.
Germany’s institutions for industrial relations provide workers precisely
what they need to challenge managers’ economic justifications for downsizing.
These resources thereby offer workers the possibility of mobilizing against
downsizing even under liberalization. This institutional support for worker
mobilization explains why liberalization has coincided with the end of conflictpartnership, as the formal elements for conflict now come to the fore and industrial
relations in Germany have become adversarial in practice rather than just by design.
Appreciating these developments requires a closer look at the mechanisms for
enforcement.
Workers’ ability to enforce the Dismissal Protection Act is grounded in
reforms to Germany’s codetermination institutions that were passed in 1972. These
reforms focused on strengthening works councils’ power in the workplace and
provided mechanisms for workers to examine and contest management’s financial
justification for business decisions, including dismissals. As noted above, employers
are permitted to dismiss workers when such measures are necessary for the
survival of the firm. Labor courts can afford employers broad discretion in
determining whether downsizing is in fact necessary. As long as employers
demonstrate some effort to include the works council in personnel decisions, they
can be given a free hand.466 Courts can, however, also be considerably stricter in
enforcing dismissal protection legislation, and in some cases of economically
justified dismissals, the employer must “verify the causality for the reduction of
jobs.”467 German employers face considerable uncertainty when they attempt to
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downsize during economic crises, which is one of the main complaints motivating
employers’ continuous calls to reform the Dismissal Protection Act.468 Once workers
contest downsizing in court, employers face the real possibility of being required to
pay significant sanctions, including damages and backpay.
To guard against this threat, employers succeeded in shaping the original
1951 codetermination law to prohibit workers from interfering with management
prerogative in economic matters. The 1972 reforms, however, extended works
councils’ jurisdiction to planning firm strategy, thus enabling workers to play a
proactive role in management decisions, rather than simply reacting.469 The most
substantive extension of works council jurisdiction was to include dismissal
decisions. According to the newly drafted §102.2, “the works council must be
consulted before every dismissal… Any dismissal performed without consulting the
works council is invalid.”
Lawmakers were sensitive to the necessary conditions for enforcement, and
in addition to extending works councils’ formal jurisdiction, they provided
institutional resources to ensure that that jurisdiction would be exercised. The 1972
reforms increased the quantity and quality of what management must report to the
works council, so that works councilors may receive more information about firm
performance than the supervisory board.470 Section 112 empowers works councils
to negotiate with management over general changes to firm strategy that may affect
workers. Section 106 calls for the creation of a “sub-committee for economic
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matters,” consisting of works council members who are specially charged with
negotiating more technical management issues with the employer. This
subcommittee may hire external economic advisors, at the employer’s expense.
Furthermore, section 37 requires employers to pay for works councilors’ training,
which must provide each member the skills they need to be effective, such as
making decisions about a firm’s economic strategy. In some cases, works councilor
training closely resembles the training that managers themselves receive.471
Despite these reforms, works councils’ jurisdiction over a firm’s economic
matters remains limited. Auffarth, for instance, emphasizes the significance of
extending workers’ codetermination powers, but concludes, “however, there is not a
real right to codetermination in economic matters as such,”472 because workers are
still barred from participating in a certain realm of economic decisions. Auffarth
emphasizes, “the standard is not the level [of participation] that can be exercised,
but simply the content.”473 Workers may have a voice in shaping the social effects of
management’s economic decisions, but the 1972 reforms specify that workers’
interests may, at best, be “balanced” with the firm’s economic interests.474
Even if the 1972 reforms do not guarantee that works councilors can fully
regulate management discretion, they do provide important resources for
mobilizing workers under liberalization. By providing works councilors access to
management’s financial data, the 1972 reforms allow the possibility for works
councilors to identify and exploit the contradictions inherent to management’s
primarily financial framing of the employment relationship. This ability to exploit
the contradictions underlying management’s hegemonic discourse in the workplace
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positions works councilors to develop a counterhegemonic strategy. The
institutions for codetermination give works councilors the resources to critique
management’s behavior, and to do so in management’s own terms. Therefore, these
institutions provide a setting where works councilors can meet the two conditions
necessary for mobilizing workers under liberalization.
As noted in the previous chapters, tech workers are disposed to find
management’s primarily financial framing of the employment relationship credible.
Believing management’s justification that downsizing is necessary for ensuring the
firm’s survival, tech workers are unlikely to participate in collective action because
they believe that it will be ineffective in protecting their jobs. However, to the extent
that Germany’s institutions for codetermination enable works councilors to critique
management’s justification for dismissals in management’s own discourse, they
enable works councilors to mobilize workers under liberalization. With access to
management’s financial data, along with guarantees of training and help from
economic advisors, workers councilors can investigate whether management’s
justifications for dismissals really check out or whether workers’ collective action
could potentially be effective in pressuring management to consider alternative
business strategies.
Moreover, because the institutions for codetermination provide works
councilors such access and training, they are able to demonstrate the potential
effectiveness of collective action in a discourse that workers find persuasive. As
illustrated in Chapter 5, in a workplace where management has established a
primarily financial discourse as hegemonic, workers are disposed to find this
financial discourse credible. Germany’s institutions for codetermination enable
works councilors to articulate the case for collective action in a primarily financial
discourse. Therefore, the institutions for codetermination provide workers
resources for mobilization against downsizing under liberalization.
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While the institutions for codetermination may provide a set of resources
that empower works councilors to mobilize workers, these resources must be
activated. Doing so can require significant creativity, in part because works
councilors are formally prohibited from participating in collective action, and in part
because the role of “organizer” is traditionally absent from industrial relations in
Germany. While the Works Constitution Act positions works councilors to establish
their credibility with workers and to direct collective action against management, it
also requires that they “refrain from activities that interfere with operations or
imperil the peace in the establishment.”475 Nonetheless, scholars note that works
councilors have historically played a central role in collective action that pressures
management by interfering with operations. Thelen, for instance, describes the
works council at Grundig called an all-employee meeting during working hours,
which had an effect very similar to a work stoppage.476
Works councilors’ strategic involvement in mobilizing workers can be
understood in parallel to the concept of the “organizer,” which is otherwise formally
absent from German industrial relations. In the US, organizers are responsible for
building membership and for assisting workers’ efforts to resist management
discretion through collective action. In Germany, however, unions enjoy greater
institutional support and their membership is formed at the sector-level, so their
interactions with workers in the workplace have traditionally been filtered through
works councils.477 As a result, works councilors assume many of the responsibilities
that would ordinarily be ascribed to organizers in the American context, such as
recruiting new members to the union. More importantly, what makes organizers
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effective are precisely the same characteristics that make works councilors effective,
namely their credibility with workers.
In explaining what makes organizing successful, scholars often point to
organizers’ ability to establish strong links with workers. In ideal-typical grassroots
organizing, workers organize themselves, so the “organizer” is in fact just another
worker. “The key to this model,” writes McAlevey, “are [sic] the respected worker
leaders.”478 Organizing has been effective in the relatively weak institutional context
of the US,479 but German unions have found it more difficult to implement. Cultural
differences and organizational inertia no doubt play a role,480 but one chief barrier
has been German unions’ lack of credibility with workers.481 This is because
institutions for codetermination have established mechanisms to support works
councilors’ credibility with workers in a manner that can substitute for unions’.482
During the decades in which Germany’s economy revolved around heavily
unionized manufacturing sectors, the division of credibility between unions and
works councils was seen as a weakness for labor. However, in the knowledge
economy, where workers are unlikely to be unionized, works councilors’ credibility
in the workplace can be an asset in building associational power against
management. Industrial relations in Germany have become more adversarial in
practice because the adoption of a primarily financial discourse surrounding
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production has increased management’s propensity to violate existing norms of
social partnership at the same time that it has increased the effectiveness of
workers’ power resources anchored in the institutions for codetermination. As
workers are increasingly disposed to understand the employment relationship in
primarily financial terms, works councils are better positioned to make a persuasive
case for collective action. However, as I illustrate in the case studies that follow,
while Germany’s institutions for codetermination endow works councilors with the
resources to mobilize workers against downsizing under liberalization, activating
these resources requires considerable creativity.
4. Two cases of downsizing
If we looked no further than the discursive context of production, we would expect
tech workers in Germany to acquiesce to downsizing like the workers at IBM San
Jose. With the transition to the knowledge economy, tech workers in Germany form
their occupational identities under workplace conditions that resemble those of the
US, where management has established a primarily financial discourse as
hegemonic. While policymaking and public discourse in Germany remains oriented
to the norms of the social market economy, research shows that tech workers have
adopted an individualism more readily associated with the Anglo-American forms of
capitalism.483 Disposed to understand the employment relationship in a primarily
financial discourse, tech workers in Germany should similarly be persuaded that
collective action is not a reasonable response to dismissals because it will be
ineffective. Furthermore, having also adopted an individualistic understanding of
their position vis-à-vis management, we would expect them to avoid both
participating in collective action and joining a union.
However, as I show in the following chapters, comparing tech workers’
responses to downsizing at Infineon and Siemens highlights that workers’ job
security depends on more than the discursive context surrounding production.
Haipeter, “The Interests of White-Collar Workers and Their Representation in the German
Manufacturing Sector,” 305.
483
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Indeed, national institutions and organizers’ creativity each play a role in
determining whether tech workers mobilize to defend their jobs against
downsizing.
Chapter 7 follows workers’ acquiescence to dismissals at Infineon in order to
show that Germany’s institutions for dismissal protection and codetermination do
not protect workers’ job security unless workers mobilize to enforce them. Rather
than mobilize workers, however, the works council at Infineon encouraged their
acquiescence by supporting management’s economic justification for dismissals.
Extending the analysis of Germany’s institutions for industrial relations from above
shows that these institutions are adversarial by design and suggests a handful of
mechanisms by which works councilors can mobilize workers against management.
Chapter 8 substantiates these mechanisms by tracing resistance to dismissals
at Siemens, showing that works councilors can protect tech workers against
dismissals at a firm that has adopted the orientation to shareholder value. At
Siemens’ Information and Communication Networks (ICN), the works council
creatively interpreted the institutions for codetermination in order to persuade
workers that mobilizing against management could protect their jobs. Works
councilors at ICN relied on institutional resources to develop a counterhegemonic
discourse that undermined managers’ economic justification for dismissals and
presented an alternative business strategy in a discourse that workers found
persuasive.
The enduring relationship between Infineon and Siemens accords this pair of
cases a degree of causal homogeneity on par with the two IBM sites presented in
Part One. As a result, existing approaches to downsizing, which focus on variation
between firms in terms of financial performance and corporate governance, cannot
explain the variation in workers’ responses to dismissals at the two firms. While
Infineon no longer belonged to Siemens when dismissals were announced, in 2001,
Siemens remained a majority shareholder until the end of 2002.484 Throughout this
484
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time, Siemens exerted significant control over Infineon. Immediately prior to
dismissals, in April 2001, Siemens lent Infineon €450 million, which did not prevent
Infineon’s CEO from complaining to the Financial Times in the summer of 2001 that,
“Siemens acts as if Infineon still belonged them.”485
Unlike Infineon, ICN was still a division of Siemens during the period
surrounding dismissals, but ICN’s managers also reported directly to the Siemens
board. In the late 1990s, Siemens underwent a reorganization, after which it “was no
longer viewed as an organically grown whole but rather as a portfolio of an investor
who buys and sells in the short term.”486 Siemens’ board thus governed Infineon and
ICN according to the same strategy. When poor performance at ICN caused concern
across the firm, managers at ICN were required to personally update the
supervisory board in November 2001 and again in April 2002, immediately
preceding dismissals.487 Although Siemens treated business groups as investments,
the firm retained strategic control, so that, “even business groups that incurred
heavy losses for a long time were kept and an attempt was made to repair them. The
same strategy was followed in the semiconductor business…A spin-off with
continuing influence seemed the more promising alternative for a business in which
Siemens never really succeeded.”488 Thus, although Infineon’s legal relationship to
Siemens AG differed from ICN’s, both faced the same treatment from Siemens’s
supervisory board.
Infineon may have faced more challenging business conditions than ICN, such
as lower profitability, (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2) but variation in external market
forces cannot explain why workers at ICN had greater job security than workers at
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Infineon. Both firms faced the same group of decision makers who treated both
firms according to the same strategy. Instead, as I argue in the following chapters,
variation in workers’ job security was due to whether they mobilized against
management’s threats of dismissal.

Table 6.1 Infineon’s Financial Performance
1999
2000
2001

2002

2003

2004

Earnings per
share

0.10

1.83

-0.92

-1.47

-0.6

0.08

Debt to equity
ratio

0.17

0.05

0.5%

0.3

0.44

0.33

EBIT

(13)

1658

(1018)

(1135)

(299)

256

3992

6989

5347

4890

6152

7195

--

44

117

16

29

17

0.6%

(2.1%)

(0.3%)

(0.5%)

(0.2%)

29166

33813

30423

32308

35570

Net Sales
Restructuring
charges
(percentage of
net sales)
Total employees

25779

(€ in million)

Sources: Infineon Technologies AG Annual Reports, 2001-2004; Infineon
Technologies AG Financial Review, 2001

Table 6.2 Siemens Financial Performance
1999
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Earnings per
share

1.36

9.97

2.36

2.92

2.75

3.66

Debt to equity
ratio

0.2

0.24

0.42

0.44

0.48

0.36
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ICN EBIT

366

692

(861)

(691)

(366)

222

ICN Total Sales

9909

11412

12882

9647

7122

6994

ICN
Restructuring
charges
(percentage of
total sales)

--

--

387

352

218

--

(3.0%)

(3.6%)

(3.1%)

ICN Total
employees

--

51000

39000

33000

--

--

(€ in million)
Sources: Siemens AG Annual Reports, 2001-2004
Notes
1. Siemens switched to US GAAP in 1999, so data from before 1999 are not
included, due to the immense difficulty of generating reliable comparisons
Siemens AG, “Annual Report,” 2002, 138..
2. In comparing the percentage of sales consumed by restructuring charges
between Infineon and Siemens, one should note that Infineon reports only
net sales, while Siemens reports only total sales for ICN. Because ICN’s net
sales would be lower than its total sales, we can conclude that restructuring
costs would be an even greater percentage of ICN’s net sales, reinforcing the
argument presented here that workers at ICN exerted greater economic
pressure on management than workers at Infineon.
In contrast to the preceding chapters, both workplaces in this section were
embedded in the same discursive context. Infineon and Siemens
telecommunications were located five kilometers from one another in Munich.
Although politicians began to seriously consider reforming Germany’s social market
economy in the early 2000s, the discursive context surrounding production
remained oriented to a particular set of “normative legacies,” according to which
employers should take responsibility for their workers’ welfare.489 Public discourse
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concerning the social market economy played a role at each workplace because each
case of dismissals unfolded during an election year in which questions about the
resilience of the welfare state against neoliberalism were central topics. This public
discussion undoubtedly shaped the discursive context at each workplace, but
because workers faced the same conditions, this cannot explain the variation in
their responses to dismissals. Moreover, each firm’s adoption of the shareholder
value orientation played a much more significant role in the workplace because it
led managers to reject the norms associated with the social market economy. Each
case study shows that workers’ discourse in the workplace, and their occupational
identities, strongly mirrored tech workers’ in Silicon Valley.
As I illustrate in the chapters that follow, adopting the shareholder value
orientation at Infineon and Siemens led management to establish the same
hegemonic discourse in the workplace as at IBM San Jose, namely, one that framed
the employment relationship in primarily financial terms. While Part One
emphasized how the discursive context of production shapes workers’ job security,
Part Two builds on this analysis by illustrating the causal significance of actors’
creative interpretations in determining workplace dynamics in the tech sector.
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Chapter 7. Institutions by the Wayside: Acquiescence at
Infineon
So, I know that the works council held a meeting. But, actually, it became clear to
everyone relatively quickly that they had no legal possibilities [for resistance].
Former Infineon Worker.
Author Interview, Munich, November 17, 2014.

On July 26, 2001, Infineon announced that it was firing 943 workers from its
headquarters on Balanstr., which amounted to nearly 20% of the facility.490
Dismissals were part of a program that management named Impact, which was
supposed to save “about €1 billion over the next 12 to 18 months, and thereby
significantly improve the firm’s cash position as well as its earnings.”491
Management was desperate to improve earnings: after the price of semiconductors
dropped by 90% in 2000, Infineon posted a loss of €591 million in 2001.492
Workers at Infineon were well positioned to protect their jobs against
downsizing, given that they were covered by Germany’s Dismissal Protection Act
(Kündigungsschutzgesetz) and were represented by a dedicated and competent
works council. However, while the works council had access to institutional
resources that would have supported efforts to mobilize against management,
works councilors limited their response to formal institutional channels for
negotiation and actively discouraged workers from mobilizing. Despite their access
to significant power resources, workers at Infineon failed to develop effective

Works Council, Infineon, “Presentation Notes from All-Employee Meeting,” February 20,
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protection against management discretion, and hundreds were dismissed under the
Impact program.
In this chapter, I trace workers’ response to dismissals at Infineon against the
backdrop of the institutional analysis of industrial relations in Germany offered in
the previous chapter. I argue that liberalization exposes workers to significant job
insecurity as long as organizers do not creatively interpret and apply national
institutions. Although German workers have long been protected by institutions for
codetermination that support practices of “conflict-partnership,” firms’ adoption of
the shareholder value orientation requires works councilors to assume a more
active role in the workplace in order to protect workers’ rights. The effectiveness of
conflict-partnership in limiting employers’ discretion was always contingent on
works councilors’ strategic choices, but the transition to the knowledge economy in
general and management’s orientation to shareholder value in particular has led
employers to abandon the norms that once regulated employment relationships in
Germany. Unless works councilors actively mobilize workers against employer
discretion, tech workers in Germany stand at equal risk of being dismissed as their
counterparts in the US.
The chapter begins by showing how management at Infineon established a
hegemonic discourse in the workplace based on a primarily financial framing of the
employment relationship. Just as at IBM San Jose, management justified downsizing
in this primarily financial discourse, and workers acquiesced so that hundreds were
dismissed. I argue that workers acquiesced because works councilors failed to meet
the two conditions necessary for mobilization. Moreover, I show that the works
council chose to acquiesce on the basis of three beliefs, all of which turned out to be
false. First, workers at Infineon did not oppose collective action per se. Second,
formal channels for negotiating with management are not independently effective in
protecting workers from management discretion. Third, as suggested in the
previous chapter, Germany’s institutions for codetermination offer works councilors
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resources for developing worker power far beyond formal channels for negotiation.
Extending this second point, I present a counterfactual by showing how works
councilors could have interpreted national institutions in order to meet the two
conditions necessary for mobilization and thereby lead workers in opposition to
downsizing. The chapter concludes by illustrating how the transition to the
knowledge economy transforms Germany’s institutions for codetermination from
stabilizing forces into resources for adversarial action in the workplace.

Table 7.1 Timeline of workers’ response to dismissals: Infineon
July 26, 2001
Management announces 943
dismissals
August 8, 2001

Management agrees to
reduce number of dismissals
for newly hired workers

August 10, 2001

Works council holds
information session for
workers

September 12, 2001

Works council holds allemployee meeting

November 27, 2001

Works council holds allemployee meeting

January 16, 2002

Agreement reached between
works council and
management: reduced
dismissals to 847
[10% reduction]

February 20, 2002

Works council holds allemployee meeting

July 31, 2002

Management calls off
dismissal plan
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1. Management’s hegemonic discourse at Infineon
When Infineon split off from Siemens in 1999, management made clear that the firm
was oriented to shareholder value. As part of the run up to Infineon’s public debut,
CEO Ulrich Schumacher drummed up excitement in financial markets by
announcing that one of the firm’s central goals would be to produce shareholder
value, announcing that, “We’re convinced that Siemens Semiconductors will produce
shareholder value, and we’re focused on a specific investor profile.”493 Just as
executives proclaimed to the public that Infineon was oriented to producing value
for shareholders, managers ensured that a primarily financial discourse was
hegemonic within the firm.
Managers at Infineon established a hegemonic discourse in the workplace
based on the conception that the firm’s financial performance shapes the
employment relationship. In a strategy document from 2001, management boasted
that, “With our ‘International Long-Term Incentive Plan’ we offer the best staff at
each location an equitable and shareholder-value-oriented rewards system.”494 By
linking workers’ compensation to Infineon’s stock price, management reinforced the
conception that the firm’s financial performance sets parameters on working
conditions. Furthermore, managers at Infineon insisted that market conditions
external to the firm established the fundamental terms of the employment
relationship. When it came time to negotiate a new compensation scheme with IG
Metall, management attempted to weaken the bounds established by the collective
agreement in order to increase the effects of Infineon’s performance on workers’
pay. According to union representatives, “Infineon wants to give staff the chance to
earn more in good years. But only if IG Metall agrees that, in bad years, workers will
be paid below the negotiated level.”495 Similar to IBM San Jose, managers established
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a hegemonic discourse in the workplace based on an unstable set of relations
between external market conditions, firm performance, and working conditions.
The system of variable pay at Infineon relied on a contradictory conception
of workers’ agency over their working conditions. On the one hand, workers’ agency
was tightly limited by external market conditions. According to management,
market conditions directly shaped Infineon’s performance, and the firm’s
performance dictated the parameters for working conditions. Therefore,
management’s hegemonic discourse implied that external market conditions
dictated working conditions. On this basis, Infineon managers insisted that workers
should earn more during profitable years and less when the firm was less profitable.
On the other hand, management’s hegemonic discourse implied that workers have
some agency over working conditions. Managers recognized that workers’
performance drove Infineon’s performance. Indeed, this is the assumption
underlying variable pay. Therefore, because firm performance dictates the
parameters for working conditions, workers must have some degree of agency over
working conditions, so that if workers can improve Infineon’s performance, they can
improve their working conditions. Management’s hegemonic discourse was thus
based on a contradiction because managers explicitly denied workers’ agency over
their working conditions while implicitly affirming it.
This contradiction underlying management’s hegemonic discourse at
Infineon provided workers a potential set of resources for defending their job
security. Taking advantage of this discursive opening, however, required works
councilors to develop a counterhegemonic strategy. As I show below, because the
works council at Infineon failed to exploit management’s contradictory discourse,
they failed to meet the two conditions necessary for mobilizing workers against
dismissals.
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1.1 Management’s framing of dismissals
Management at Infineon framed dismissals in the same primarily financial discourse
as management at IBM. For months, executives at Infineon refused to react to falling
prices for semiconductors. However, after reporting solid margins in the first
quarter of 2001, Schumacher finally announced in late June 2001 that the firm
expected to report a loss of €600 million.496 With the announcement, Infineon’s
stock immediately dropped by 14%. The stock price continued to fall from its high
of €90, so that by July, it had reached a low of less than €30.497
In late July, management announced that it was implementing a costreduction plan called “Impact,” which was supposed to save “about 1€ billion over
the next 12 to 18 months, and thereby significantly improve the firm’s cash position
as well as its earnings.”498 In a press release, management justified Impact as a
necessary response to massive drops in the price of semiconductors: “The global
semiconductor market will decline in 2001 by approximately $60 billion, and in
relation to market prognoses from October 2000, by more than $100 billion.
Infineon will not be able to avoid this exceptionally strong downturn.”499 Impact
included a number of strategies to optimize existing business processes, but its most
notable feature was the plan to reduce Infineon’s global workforce by 5000. Of that
5000, 943 were to be cut from the firm’s headquarters on Balanstr.500 Just as at IBM,
management framed dismissals as the necessary response to market developments
external to the firm and beyond managers’ control.
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2. The works council acquiesces and workers face dismissals
This section traces the works council’s response to downsizing at Infineon and
shows that their attempts to negotiate with management did little to protect
workers from dismissals. The section that follows extends this analysis by arguing
that workers at Infineon were exposed to dismissals because the works council
failed to meet the two conditions necessary for mobilizing in the workplace.
The Infineon works council initially opposed dismissals. Less than a month
after management announced downsizing, the works council emailed workers on
August 24 to announce that, “These firings, in the works council’s opinion, are illegal
(because there’s still no Interessensausgleich/Sozialplan [agreement with the works
council]).”501 Works councilors justified their opposition to management by arguing
that they were responsible for protecting workers’ interests against management
discretion: “Of course you can say, ‘management is right, and you have to just stand
back and sign the dismissals.’ But that’s not our job.”502 Instead, works councilors
believed that their job was to identify alternative firm strategies that would serve
workers’ interests alongside the firm’s. Of course, there was likely disagreement
among individual works councilors but the works council chose particular strategies
collectively in how they engaged both workers and management, as evidence by
their presentations at all-employee meetings and the course of negotiations with
management.
The works council at Infineon believed that the best way to protect workers’
rights was to negotiate with management through formal institutional channels,
rather than engaging informal means of resistance to exert pressure.503 The works
council’s negotiations were only minimally successful in limiting management
discretion. After multiple rounds of negotiation, management agreed on November
27, 2001 to spare 100 workers from dismissal by introducing part-time work and
Chair, Infineon Works Council, “Neues von der Interessenvertretung,” August 24, 2001.
Former Infineon Works Councilor, Author Interview, Munich, October 24, 2014.
503 Ibid.
501
502
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other measures. By this point in November, however, more than 550 workers had
already left the firm, either because they were dismissed, or because they were
pressed into accepting special severance agreements, and hundreds remained on
the dismissal list.504
The agreement that the works council and management reached on January
16, 2002 included a number of measures to soften the effects of Impact on the
workforce. In their press release about the agreement, the firm-level works council
(Gesamtbetriebsrat) proudly announced that they had reduced the number of
German workers affected by Impact by 200, although it is unclear what effect that
had at Balanstr. The Gesamtbetriebsrat was also proud of the severance conditions it
negotiated for dismissed workers, which would make it easier for affected workers
who otherwise faced tough chances on the labor market.505 As the terms of the
agreements were applied to the remaining workers over the next several months,
management eventually called off the dismissals on July 31, 2002. In an email to the
entire workforce, Jürgen Buschmann, the head of HR, wrote, “I’m pleased to be
announce that, in line with our current knowledge of the situation at Balanstr., there
will be no more dismissals according to the measures laid out in the
Interessensausgleich.”
In announcing the end of downsizing, Buschmann went out of his way to
thank the works council: “I add to this [message] my thanks on the works council at
Balanstr., and its personnel committee, for their work in leading the implementation
of the agreement [Interessensausgleich].”506 Workers confirmed Buschmann’s
implication that the negotiations surrounding Impact were peaceful and
collaborative. I spoke with one worker who insisted that while the works council did
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critique management’s dismissal plan, their engagement avoided direct
confrontation. The worker compared this strategy to how the works council resisted
management discretion at later points in Infineon’s history, such as when executives
attempted to introduce a forced-ranking system for assessing performance. In
contrast to the resistance at these later times, “that was actually a really good
cooperation then [during Impact].”507 However, while peaceful, the works council’s
negotiations with management were not effective at protecting workers’ jobs.
Reviewing the path of the dismissals at Infineon raises serious doubts about
the effectiveness of formal negotiations in limiting management discretion. Most
importantly, despite highly competent works councilors who led multiple rounds of
negotiation with management, the works council failed to significantly reduce the
number of workers who were dismissed. When management introduced Impact in
July 2001, they planned to dismiss 943 workers from Balanstr. By early May 2002,
after nine months of negotiations, and with three months left until Buschmann
called off Impact, Infineon had cut more than 900 workers from Balanstr.508 At best,
therefore, the works council reduced the number of dismissed workers by less than
5%. Furthermore, while the agreements they reached certainly improved the
conditions of workers affected by Impact, these came too late for the more than 500
workers who had already left the firm by the time consensus was reached.509 An IG
Metall newsletter from May 2002 reported on the statuses of 53 workers dismissed
after the negotiations, showing that while 14 were reinstated, the majority simply
lost their jobs, and only 20 workers filed a legal complaint.510 After reporting these
statistics, the article concluded that, with Impact, “The firm achieved its goal: to
quickly and cost-effectively get rid of workers.”511
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In some instances, the works council’s implicit acquiescence to downsizing
was made explicit. In an all-employee meeting on January 8, 2002, the works council
announced, “The employees are ready for the demanded and necessary flexibility.
The government has made the laws more flexible, and IG Metall has made the
collective bargain more flexible…. It’s now about also using this flexibility. Please
now declare your willingness to do so.”512 Rather than calling on workers to
mobilize against the threat of mass dismissals, the works council at Infineon
encouraged workers to accept a narrow interpretation of their power resources and
respond to downsizing only through formal channels of conflict resolution.
3. The works council’s failure to meet the two conditions necessary for
mobilization
The contradictory understanding of workers’ agency underlying management’s
hegemonic discourse at Infineon provided resources for workers to mobilize against
dismissals, but the works council failed to demonstrate to workers that collective
action could be potentially effective in protecting their jobs. Rather than amplifying
workers’ sense of agency over working conditions, works councilors at Infineon
simply repeated management’s conception that working conditions were shaped by
an unstable balance between external market forces and workers’ agency. Without
evidence that mobilizing would be effective in protecting their jobs, workers at
Infineon chose to acquiesce to management’s downsizing plan rather than
participating in ineffective, and thus senseless, collective action. In this section, I
show that workers acquiesced because the works council failed to demonstrate to
workers the potential effectiveness of collective action, thus failing to meet one of
the two conditions necessary for mobilization.
Workers at Infineon chose not to mobilize because management convinced
them that mobilization would be ineffective in saving their jobs. This conclusion was
rooted in the discourse that management established as hegemonic in the
Works Council, Infineon, “Presentation Notes from All-Employee Meeting,” January 8,
2002.
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workplace. Workers believed that their technical skills drove firm performance, but
that external market forces also played an important role. After a handful of
unprofitable development runs in Infineon’s earlier years, workers came to
recognize that external market forces played a significant role in shaping Infineon’s
performance. Rather than just developing cutting edge products, workers learned
“that you need to have more contact with your clients and get to know them, what
kind of needs they have, in order to develop practically in the right direction, rather
than just bringing your own innovations to the market when nobody wants them.”513
In addition to developing cutting edge products, workers also had to respond to
market forces beyond their control, such as customers’ demands. Workers’
invocation of managers’ discourse that they must adapt themselves to external
market forces is evidence that management succeeded in establishing a hegemonic
discourse in the workplace that revolved around a primarily financial conception of
the employment relationship.
Presenting working conditions as though shaped by an unstable balance
between market forces and workers’ agency, management’s hegemonic discourse
provided the works council with resources to demonstrate to workers their agency
in the workplace and thus the potential effectiveness of collective action. As long as
working conditions are shaped by an unstable balance, workers should be able to
exercise at least some agency. Nonetheless, rather than amplifying workers’ agency
by exploiting the contradiction underlying management’s hegemonic discourse,
works councilors at Infineon just repeated management’s contradictory
understanding of the relationship between workers’ agency and their working
conditions. Works councilors failed to argue that collective action could be effective
in protecting workers’ jobs, thereby leaving workers no alternative but to believe
management’s argument that downsizing was unavoidable.
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In newsletters and all-employee meetings, the works council reinforced
management’s emphasis on how workers needed to adapt themselves to market
forces. The works council underlined their request for workers’ flexibility by
arguing that pressure from shareholders made downsizing unavoidable. As a result,
implied the works council, workers’ resistance to the measures would be ineffective
and thus senseless. Even if they were able to pressure managers to reconsider
downsizing, the real decision makers remained out of reach, because “the executives
are not responsible for this [approaching bankruptcy]. There is a very influential
majority shareholder who has a heavy hand in these decisions.”514 Rather than
challenging management’s justifications for downsizing, the works council at
Infineon affirmed management’s presentation of market forces as setting tight
parameters on working conditions. Works councilors thus reinforced workers’
beliefs that their agency over working conditions was minimal in comparison to
external market forces. On such a view, collective action would be ineffective in
protecting their jobs.
Workers at Infineon believed that dismissals were unavoidable due to
market conditions outside their control. According to a former worker, “I think that
that [downsizing] was not just about optimizing profits or something. No, I think
that the dismissals actually made sense, that you basically wanted to keep the entire
firm alive.”515 Participating in collective action would have been senseless because
workers had no reason to believe that it would have had any effect on their job
security. Indeed, to many workers, downsizing seemed like a logical response to
conditions that everyone could observe: “We knew that a third of our business was
in mobile telephones. And suddenly there were no more Siemens mobile phones.
And so we couldn’t sell all the chips that we had stockpiled. We didn’t have any new
customers… and it was clear to everyone: if so much was cancelled, we can’t go
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forward with the same team.”516 For workers who understood working conditions
to be directly shaped by market forces external to the firm, the disappearance of a
major customer logically entailed a drastic change in the workplace. Indeed, on this
view, if business declined by a third, downsizing appeared quite reasonable.
Works councilors at Infineon did not accord workers more agency over their
working conditions than the minimal degree that management explicitly
acknowledged. As a result, workers failed to recognize that collective action could
potentially protect their jobs against downsizing. According to one former worker, it
was a widespread belief that mobilizing would have been senseless: “Everyone
agreed about the causes [of downsizing]. I don’t think there were any doubts. Of
course, the works council side and the union side said, ‘yeah, you [management]
should have seen that earlier.’”517 The works council’s affirmation that external
market forces made downsizing necessary for Infineon’s survival helped dissuade
workers from collective action. Although management accepted the works council’s
and union’s critiques that they should have planned better, these critiques actually
further supported management’s justification for dismissals because all parties
recognized that, however regrettable, the firm was in a situation where downsizing
was the only way to remain in business.
While the works council at Infineon failed to demonstrate to workers that
collective action could be effective, they did succeed in establishing their credibility
with workers. Because workers found management’s framing of the employment
relationship persuasive, the works council’s invocation of this primarily financial
discourse helped establish their credibility with workers. As noted above, workers
were persuaded not to mobilize in part due to management’s efforts, but also due to
the works council’s own appeals for acquiescence.
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Works councilors reiterated management’s economic justifications for
downsizing, but they also offered their own arguments for acquiescence on the basis
of an institutional analysis that workers subsequently adopted. The works council
argued that they had no institutional resources to resist downsizing because the
measures were justified by the firm’s business conditions: as long as dismissals
really were necessary for Infineon’s survival, they were valid according to the
Dismissal Protection Act. Because workers found the works council credible, they
also adopted this reasoning in their decision to acquiesce. I spoke with a worker
who appreciated that the works council held an all-employee meeting closely
following the announcement of dismissals, implying that he trusted the information
they communicated. He went on to articulate the works council’s message that there
was little the works council could do because they lacked formal rights to intervene:
“In such a situation, if the firm wants to fire someone, it may, and because there is
no law prohibiting it, the works council also can’t do anything.”518 While it is true
that a judge may have found that economic conditions justified downsizing, legal
experts emphasize that these decisions are highly discretionary so that there is no
way to know for certain whether downsizing is justified.519 One thing, however, is
certain: if workers do not mobilize, the Dismissal Protection Act will not be enforced
and workers will simply lose their jobs.
Workers at Infineon acquiesced to downsizing because their works council
failed to fulfil one of the two conditions necessary for mobilization. In contrast to
IBM San Jose, the works council at Infineon established their credibility with
workers and thus framed collective action in a discourse that workers found
persuasive. However, they failed to demonstrate to workers that collective action
could protect their jobs. As a result, works councilors inadvertently reinforced the
Ibid.
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plausibility of management’s arguments that acquiescence was the most reasonable
response to dismissals. Because workers found the works council credible, they
believed that they had few possibilities for protecting their jobs beyond the
channels for formal negotiation provided by institutions for codetermination. With
their possibilities for resistance through formal channels significantly limited,
workers believed they had no alternative but to acquiesce to dismissals. The works
council at Infineon did fulfill one of the necessary conditions for mobilization in that
they earned workers’ credibility. Why then did works councilors encourage workers
to acquiesce?
4. The works council chooses to acquiesce
As demonstrated by their initial opposition to dismissals, the works council at
Infineon was committed to protecting workers’ rights. However, they decided to
acquiesce to management’s strategy on the basis of three beliefs.
First, works councilors believed that their power vis-à-vis management was
limited to formal negotiations. One works councilor explained to me that, “As the
works council, we don’t have the power to push things through
[durchsetzungskraft]. We are not allowed to call a strike, nothing. It’s all about
argumentation and building a feeling among employees.”520 On the basis of this
interpretation, which views the institutions for codetermination as legal constraints,
rather than political possibilities, the works council asked workers not to mobilize,
but to acquiesce to management’s threat of dismissals.
Second, works councilors believed that the formal channels for negotiating
with management did provide them significant power resources. According to a
works councilor:
That’s the advantage that we have with this Works Constitution Act:
Management must negotiate with us. They cannot say, ‘it is this way.’
In the end, they can make far-reaching decisions alone, but it must
520
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first pass through a discussion process. And this discussion process by
itself brings time, arguments, considerations, and tempers [dämpfen]
these kinds of events.521
The works council believed that they could protect workers’ rights by facilitating
discussions in the workplace through at least three mechanisms. First, forcing
management to negotiate slows down dismissals, opening the space for market
conditions to change enough for management to decide to call of dismissals. Second,
negotiations could theoretically allow the works council to persuade management to
consider alternative strategies to reduce costs without dismissals. Lastly, works
councilors believed that they could use open discussions with management to sow
doubt among workers about managers’ competence. Management knew that
workers are less effective when they worry about the firm’s future, so encouraging
workers’ doubts could indirectly exert pressure on management.522
Lastly, works councilors at Infineon believed that they should limit their
response to dismissals to formal negotiations because workers were unwilling to
participate in collective action. Discussions were potentially effective because
Infineon workers were disposed to oppose management on a discursive level, rather
than through collective action. According a works councilor, “there are no red flags
here that you wave and threaten [management] with something.”523 While tech
workers may have been more open to discursive strategies, works councilors also
believed they were unlikely to support collective action. During negotiations
surrounding dismissals, one reporter spoke with Alfred Eibl, the chair of the works
council. According to Eibl, “IG Metall’s membership level in the high-tech sector is
too low to really exert pressure [dampf zu machen].” Eibl explained that he “cannot
imagine a strike, because workers are not accustomed to fighting management
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[Kampfbereitschaft].”524 Believing that workers were unlikely to support a more
aggressive strategy against management, works councilors at Infineon limited their
response to downsizing to formal channels for negotiation, which were hardly
effective in protecting workers.
5. Workers support collective action
Well-intentioned as it was, the works council’s concentration on formal channels for
negotiation was ineffective at protecting workers’ rights and it was based on
dubious reasoning. In this section, I show that, contrary to works councilors’ beliefs,
workers at Infineon did not oppose collective action against management.
In 2001, when management introduced Impact, Infineon was organized to
develop and deliver products to six market segments, from automobiles to optics,
but all product divisions relied on a central pool of development groups.525 I spoke
with workers in one development group, eight of whom had been working together
for more than fifteen years. These eight were embedded in a larger division of about
20 workers who deployed to short-term projects in various departments.
Development teams were often called in to solve difficult problems, and they were
composed of the firm’s most skilled workers. One worker I spoke with had amassed
more than 40 patents during his 20 years first at Siemens’ semiconductor division
and then Infineon.526 Despite these workers’ skills, and their necessity to
production, they were as vulnerable to dismissal as any other workers at Infineon,
and when Impact was announced, two members of this eight-person team were
selected. Instead of following the works council’s strategy, these workers mobilized
to save their colleagues by directly confronting management. Tracing the process by
which the workgroup mobilized shows that tech workers can support direct
confrontation with management. Furthermore, this small-scale mobilization
Martin Hammer, “‘Personalpolitik in Rambo-Manier’ -- Gewerkschaften wollen
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underlines that collective action is necessary for protecting workers’ rights in an era
of shareholder value, even in Germany.
Many workers at Infineon responded to the announcement of dismissals with
anger. Those in the development division were no different: “We were very furious
then, because it meant suddenly that a colleague could no longer come, that he was
fired. That was simply communicated to us by our boss.”527 However, in contrast to
workers who followed the works council to limit their response to formal channels
for negotiation, workers in the development division acted on their anger by writing
a collective letter to the head of the division:
In that time, you sat together in one office. We had two- or threeperson offices. And ten of us stood there in an office and discussed,
and we said, ‘What can we do?’ And then one of us just said, ‘Come on,
let’s at least just try to defend this [saving the worker from dismissal].’
Then he sat directly at the nearest computer and wrote it out.528
In addition to writing to the division head, the workers also “spontaneously wrote
an email to [CEO] Schumacher, signed by all the members of the team, that this case
should please be reconsidered. And we wrote an email to the supervisory board [as
well].”529 These letters were originally drafted by a core group of eight workers, but
were distributed and eventually signed by twenty members of the division.530
This collective action is significant not just because it occurred, which
demonstrates that tech workers do not necessarily oppose direct confrontation with
management, but also because it was successful. Two days after workers sent the
letter, “our boss’s boss suddenly appeared and was totally upset: ‘What’s going on
here?!’ And he had received orders from above to take care of what was going on
here.”531 In this case, “taking care” meant fulfilling the workers’ requests to
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reconsider the dismissal, and the worker who was originally threatened had his
date of termination extended. The termination was extended a second time, until the
worker was ultimately hired on a full-time open contract.532 This worker’s path
from being threatened with dismissal to being hired on a full-time open contract
was all the more unusual because the Impact program included a hiring freeze.
Despite management’s declared strategy, workers were able to force them to
reconsider. The threatened worker was hired full-time “basically only because we
wrote that letter… And because of that, they [management] decided that he [the
selected worker] would be good, and they hired him without a problem, which in
that time never happened.”533
My interviews with workers and works councilors at Infineon suggest that this
type of mobilization through informal channels was not as rare as one might expect,
given the system of conflict-partnership and tech workers’ apparent aversion to
direct confrontation. The workers in the development division were not the only
ones who appealed directly to management to avert dismissals. While the works
council made every effort to channel conflict through formal institutions for conflict
resolution, a works councilor also underlined the importance of informal
mobilization: “The question is, do you let him [a targeted worker] hang, because you
say, ‘essentially, he’s gone’…. Or does the group say, ‘you’re one of us and we’ll resist
together?’”534 Works councilors thus recognized broader opportunities for
resistance, although they did not mention these alternatives during all-employee
meetings or in emails to workers. Although works councilors were aware that
workers were in principle capable of mobilizing in direct confrontation with
management, they chose to advocate limiting resistance to formal channels for
negotiation. In the section that follows, I build on the fact of workers’ resistance
through informal channels in order to suggest how Germany’s institutions for
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codetermination can provide resources for worker mobilization under
liberalization.
6. Institutional resources for mobilizing under liberalization: A counterfactual
This section extends the analysis of Germany’s institutions for industrial relations
from the previous chapter to highlight why we should be surprised by workers’ job
insecurity at Infineon. After showing that the workers who mobilized at Infineon
through informal channels developed an effective counterhegemonic discourse, I
detail how national institutions provide the works council the resources necessary
for developing the very same strategy. While codetermination has been recognized
for decades as “conflict-partnership,” I show that institutions for conflict resolution
in Germany are in fact adversarial by design because they provide works councils a
set of resources for mobilizing workers against management. Even when
management establishes the primarily financial discourse of shareholder value as
hegemonic in the workplace, workers councilors can rely on these institutions to
mobilize workers. When works councils choose not to engage these institutions,
however, workers in Germany are as vulnerable to management discretion as
workers in the US, where such institutions do not exist.
6.1 Outline for a counterhegemonic discursive strategy
Not all workers at Infineon believed that dismissals were necessary for keeping the
firm in business. The workgroup that mobilized to protect their colleague’s job, for
instance, doubted management’s justifications for reductions in their division.
Although these workers mobilized independently of the works council, the path of
their collective action illustrates how the works council’s institutional resources
endowed it with the capabilities to have pursued this action themselves.
Workers in the development division relied on their familiarity with
Infineon’s business model to critique management’s economic justification for
dismissals. While they followed the developments in semiconductor markets and
noted the massive drop in prices, workers in the development division identified
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flaws in managers’ justifications for dismissals. One worker emphasized that the
division had enough contracts to support all their staff. On his view, management
was simply trying to make the firm’s accounting look better for investors, because
managers “had basically not sorted through the projects, and instead had let the
projects just keep running. They just tried to reduce the numbers [of workers].”535
Due to their knowledge of surrounding market conditions, workers in the
development division were convinced that there was no solid business reason to
dismiss their colleague.
At the same time, workers in the development division were familiar enough
with the surrounding national institutions to know that their options for responding
through formal channels were restricted. According to one worker, “We had no
resources.” The threatened worker “was in the probationary period, and he could be
dismissed in the probationary period. So there were no legal resources [we could
rely on].”536 However, rather than believing that their options were limited to formal
channels, workers in the development division believed that they should “at least
try to defend this, to say to our highest boss, ‘Here, we need him [the dismissed
worker].’”537 Rather than believing in a fixed choice between contesting dismissals
through formal channels or acquiescing to management’s plan, workers in the
development division believed that if formal institutions provided no options, then
they should try developing power resources through other channels.
Workers emphasized that they were able to save their colleague because
they defended his position on economic grounds, and that was why the Board
approved his retention, despite the hiring freeze. The targeted worker’s “necessity
to the project was the explanation, but normally in that time there were no new
hires. The board had to sign off on every single worker, whether it went through or
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not. And normally they said, ‘no,’ first, because they wanted to let everything wind
down.”538 Workers framed their argument for retaining their colleague in
management’s own discourse of business necessity. They emphasized “how
important he is for our team, also justified on technical grounds, because he really
was important. He had already learned a lot with us over the years, and could start
immediately, without any training. So we wrote all that as concisely as possible. And
we signed all of our names underneath and then sent it off.”539 These workers were
spurred to action in part because of the affective bond they had formed by working
together, but they were also convinced that they were acting in the firm’s best
interests.540 Disposed to identify with the scientific and financial aspects of
technological production, these workers believed that Infineon’s performance
would suffer if their team lost a member.
While management and the board apparently recognized a positive case for
retaining a worker whose participation was necessary for production, it is
important to underline that resistance in the division was effective because of the
credible threat they posed of disrupting production. If management had not ceded
to workers’ demands, they risked lowering the group’s productivity by removing a
key participant, and also risked demoralizing the remaining workers, who might
then be less prone to follow management directions, whether out of spite or lack of
confidence in managers’ competence. Not only did each member of the workgroup
sign the letter to management, but it was also signed by a broader swath of the
division, signaling that a substantial number of workers could potentially withdraw
their labor power if management did not take heed.541 As a result, while workers
phrased their letter to management as a plea to reconsider, it can be understood as
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a credible threat because of the indication that, were management to terminate the
targeted worker, production would be disrupted in one way or another.
Works councilors are formally prohibited from disrupting production, but
the counter-hegemonic strategy implemented by workers in the development
division illustrates a path they nonetheless could have pursued. Indeed, one half of
the conflict-partnership model is conflict, and work councils are known to find ways
to threaten production while adhering to the law, as noted in the previous chapter.
More importantly, the micro-mobilization against dismissals in Infineon’s
development division shows that these workers developed a strategy that relied on
precisely the resources available to works councilors. Due to the employer’s
reporting requirements, works councilors are as familiar with their firm’s business
model as though they worked in a central operating division, such as development.
Their frequent contact with workers reflects the degree of access that co-workers
have to one another. Moreover, works councilors are drawn from the workforce
itself, so that works councilors have access to workers in their everyday jobs, which
allows them to lead discussions with workers to frame management’s decisions in a
particular discourse.
In what follows, I show how the Works Constitution Act gives works
councilors the resources to establish themselves as credible leaders in the
workplace. While these resources may have been designed to facilitate conflictpartnership, they also position the works council to mobilize workers against
management. Effective organizing depends first and foremost on workers’ trust in
their leaders. Organizers are successful only when they can persuade workers that
mobilizing will fulfill workers’ interests. This requires that organizers are familiar
with workers’ interests and that they can persuade workers that mobilizing will
fulfill those interests. The following section illustrates how the works council at
Infineon engaged the Works Constitution Act to establish their credibility with
workers. I show that the works council was able to use its institutional resources to
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overcome the challenges of distance from the workplace that prevented organizers
at IBM San Jose from effectively mobilizing workers. Despite this institutional
advantage, however, the works council at Infineon nonetheless decided to acquiesce
to management’s downsizing plan, and workers there faced the same risk of
dismissal as workers at IBM San Jose. Therefore, the analysis that follows is offered
as a counterfactual to outline how things could have proceeded at Infineon.
6.2 Institutional resources for mobilization
6.2.1 Access to workers
Organizers can play an important role in mobilizing workers by framing the
employment relationship and management’s decisions in a manner that workers
find plausible. Persuading workers that mobilization is necessary or reasonable
requires maintaining close contact with workers, which facilitates “discussions that
provide the opportunities for leaders to frame issues in particular ways, intensifying
or moderating employees’ sense of injustice.”542 According to Kelly, workers
mobilize against employer discretion when they feel that doing so is necessary to
correct an injustice, so one of organizers’ main tasks is to become familiar with, and
amplify, workers’ sense of injustice. By ensuring that works councilors have regular
contact with workers, the Works Constitution Act fulfills a necessary condition for
effective mobilization against management discretion.
A works council is required to meet every quarter with the workers they
represent,543 and the Infineon works council went beyond the formal requirements,
holding multiple all-employee meetings per year.544 Furthermore, the Infineon
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works council fostered a climate of open discussion by organizing informational
meetings and operating an email listserv for employees.
Workers at Infineon consistently described a close relationship with their
works council, remarking how works councilors were not just competent, but also
highly communicative.545 Alfred Eibl, the chair of the works council for many years,
emphasized the works council’s commitment to transparency and open discussion
in an email to Infineon workers sent on September 20, 2001:
It doesn’t make sense to report on every preliminary agreement within
ongoing negotiations. But I believe that employees should not simply
be informed about outcomes that are already decided. The works
council is not a secret council, and should ensure that affected workers
know the state of negotiations. Presenting the planned reduction
measures must necessarily be included in such discussions.546
Eibl’s commitment to transparency was based in his belief that workers should be
involved in management decisions that affect them, but he was also simply fulfilling
a legal requirement of his role as works councilor.
Unlike IBM San Jose, where organizers’ access to workers was so limited that
they did not know workers’ actual jobs, the works council at Infineon communicated
regularly with workers, through a variety of media. Whether in meetings, emails,
and individual consultations, the works council had many opportunities to frame
the employment relationship in the primarily financial discourse that would have
supported collective action.
6.2.2 Common occupational identity
Similar to IBM San Jose, workers at Infineon identified closely with producing novel
technologies. One worker described how developing new technology was an ecstatic
experience comparable to giving birth: “You work very intensely on a technical
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solution. And when it works, it’s like a birth. You are so happy when simulations line
up and the first silicium is there and it works. It’s like a birth. It’s simply
beautiful.”547 This enthusiasm for technological innovation was one element of the
discourse that management established as hegemonic at Infineon. Whether
intentional or not, management at Infineon succeeded in replicating the unstable
discourse surrounding technological innovation from Silicon Valley. What set
Infineon apart from San Jose, however, was that works councilors shared workers’
occupational identity rather than speculating about it from afar.
Closely echoing workers’ occupational identities, works councilors also
clearly enjoyed participating in technological innovation. One former works
councilor explained that after he got his engineering degree, he chose a career in
technical development
simply because that was where the highest demands were. And also to
go into development, where large quantities were not produced, it
wasn’t a large volume business, but instead a small volume business…
If only 1000 or 5000 pieces are built, the quality, the speed is much
more important. And that’s much better engineering work.548
Works councilors’ identification with the pleasures of technological innovation
allowed workers to more easily trust works councilors, for they saw the world
through similar frameworks and were oriented toward similar concerns. Workers
saw workers councilors as legitimate representatives in part because they could be
certain that works councilors understood their interests.
While organizers at IBM San Jose were prevented from understanding
workers’ interests due to their distance from the workplace, the Works Constitution
Act ensured that works councilors shared a common occupational identity with
workers. Works councilors must be drawn from a firm’s employees, who vote works
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Infineon worker, Author Interview, Munich.
Former Infineon Works Councilor, Author Interview, Munich, October 24, 2014.
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councilors into office.549 In the works council election preceding dismissals, 57.3%
of workers at Infineon voted, and candidates from IG Metall received a plurality of
votes with 35%.550 Workers generally distrusted IG Metall, so the fact that they
received such a high vote share indicates the degree to which workers identified
with the works council independent of their union affiliation. Although the Works
Constitution Act ensured that works councilors shared a common identity with
workers, works councilors did not leverage this resource to mobilize workers to
defend against downsizing through collective action.
6.2.3 Deep familiarity with firm
The formal provisions for codetermination that allow works councilors access to
workers and ensure their common occupational identities are further supported by
legal mechanisms guaranteeing that works councilors are deeply familiar with their
firm’s business operations. Works councilors are charged not just with protecting
workers’ social interests in matters like securing a break room, but are also
responsible for overseeing significant management decisions.551 As a result, the
Works Constitution Act ensures that works councilors are capable of participating in
managing the firm. The works council is to form a “financial subcommittee,” charged
with overseeing management’s economic decisions.552 Even for those workers not
on the financial subcommittee, the employer must pay for works councilors to
receive training in business matters, which in practice often requires employers to
send works councilors to management seminars.553 Furthermore, employers are
required to share detailed business data with the works council so that it has the
information it needs to participate in important decisions.554 Each of these
provisions contributes to the works council’s credibility with workers because they

Works Constitution Act, sec. 1.5, 8, 7-20.
Infineon works councilor (anonymous), “BR/AR-Wahlen Infineon Mch Campeon,” 2010.
551 Works Constitution Act, secs. 106–113.
552 Works Constitution Act, secs. 106–109.
553 Ibid., sec. 37.6.
554 Ibid., sec. 80.2.
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allow the works council to speak to workers in the discourse that management
established as hegemonic in the workplace.
As noted above, workers at Infineon identified with technological innovation
as both scientific and as economic actors. Works councilors demonstrated their
shared interests with workers by referring to their enthusiasm for the scientific
aspects of technological production, and they demonstrated their competence in
representing those interests by communicating in the economic discourse that
management used. Both of these capabilities were enabled by the Works
Constitution Act.
The Infineon works council did not shy away from engaging management’s
financial discourse, and Alfred Eibl, the former chair, included business analyses in
his weekly emails to workers. An email from December 2000 illustrates Eibl’s
comfort with technical business data. The email begins by wishing workers a Merry
Christmas. Hardly missing a beat, Eibl goes on to present articles about Infineon’s
current business ventures, including the firm’s investment in memory technology,
as well as information about the industry in general, such as the drop in a
competitor’s stock price.555 Eibl’s invocation of technical business analysis framed
the employment relationship in the primarily financial discourse that workers
recognized and trusted, which led workers to view the works council’s credibility on
par with management’s.
While the institutional resources of the Works Constitution Act endowed the
works council with workers’ credibility, works councilors did not use this credibility
to cast doubt on management’s justifications for dismissals. Although the works
council expressed its frustration with the position in which management had placed
Infineon, they did not dispute that this position required dismissals. As described
above, works councilors falsely believed that workers at Infineon opposed
Chair, Infineon Works Council, “Neues von der Interessenvertretung,” December 20,
2000.
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participating in collective action against management. As a result, the works council
explicitly requested that workers acquiesce to downsizing by asking those who
were not selected to adjust their working times rather than protesting against the
hundreds of dismissals.
7. Institutional change under liberalization
Despite Germany’s institutions for industrial relations, management’s adoption of
the orientation to shareholder value had similar effects on workers’ rights at
Infineon as at IBM San Jose. In both cases, management justified dismissals as a
necessary response to challenging market conditions. In both cases, workers
acquiesced to management’s downsizing plans. At IBM San Jose, workers acquiesced
because organizers failed to adapt their discursive strategies to the specific context
of production in Silicon Valley. Without establishing closer contact with the
workplace, organizers at San Jose did not have enough information about workers
to formulate a strategy that framed dismissals in a discourse workers found
plausible. At Infineon, however, workers acquiesced because the works council
insisted on responding to dismissals through formal channels for negotiation and
they actively discouraged workers from pursuing collective action. As a result,
workers in Germany were equally vulnerable to the threat of dismissal as workers
in the US, despite a far more robust set of formal institutions for protecting workers’
rights. In this section, I propose that the ineffectiveness of Germany’s national
institutions at Infineon indicates a broader pattern of institutional change under
liberalization.
As I argued in the previous chapter, the institutions for industrial relations in
Germany are adversarial by design, and they supported a mixture of conflict and
partnership up through the 1990s. In the late 1990s, however, the contextual
conditions surrounding Germany’s political economy shifted, upsetting the balance
of power between employers and workers. Once unions were significantly
weakened, works councils could no longer pressure employers to negotiate through
implicit threats of disrupting production, nor could they rely on unions for training
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and other forms of support.556 As a result, industrial relations have tended toward
either partnership without conflict or conflict without partnership, but the balance
between the two dynamics has been lost.
Management’s focus on delivering value to shareholders leads them to
abandon the norms that long governed industrial relations in Germany, such as
going to great lengths to avoid downsizing, even during economic crises. Moreover,
as observed at both IBM and Infineon, the orientation to shareholder value leads
managers to justify dismissals in a primarily financial discourse. In the tech sector,
this discourse is highly effective in persuading workers to acquiesce to dismissals.
As firms adopt the discourse of technological innovation that was developed in
Silicon Valley, workers take on an occupational identity that is constituted by an
unstable mixture of financial and scientific elements. Tech workers are thus
especially likely to find management’s economic justifications for dismissals
persuasive, which leads them to view collective action to protect their jobs as
ineffective and thus unreasonable. Organizers at IBM San Jose were unsuccessful in
persuading workers that they could mobilize to defend against dismissals, and
works councilors at Infineon were unwilling.
Rather than describing the institutional changes that have unfolded in
Germany under liberalization as leading to conflict without partnership or
partnership without conflict, I prefer to characterize the transformation as a trend
toward increasingly adversarial industrial relations. Situations that could otherwise
be referred to as partnership without conflict are frequently cases of management
exercising discretion in a manner that threatens workers’ rights. While Streeck
refers to “partnership without conflict,” he acknowledges that, from unions’
perspective, such cases involve “junior partnership, as a passenger in the backseat,

Wolfgang Streeck, “Von Konflikt ohne Partnerschaft zu Partnerschaft ohne Konflikt:
Industrielle Beziehungen in Deutschland,” Industrielle Beziehungen 23, no. 1 (2016): 47–60.
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far from the steering wheel.”557 This characterization hardly suggests partnership,
instead indicating a relationship of domination.
As observed at Infineon, when a works council does not enforce Germany’s
institutions for industrial relations, workers are as vulnerable to management
discretion as if those institutions did not exist. Management discretion is not a
neutral action, but instead must be recognized as adversarial, given that managers’
and workers’ interests are diametrically opposed, at least when it comes to
downsizing. Moreover, as illustrated by the micro-mobilization of the individual
workgroup at Infineon, workers stand a chance of protecting their rights in the
context of liberalization when they are able to mobilize for their own adversarial
action to counter management’s. The case of Infineon demonstrates that, once
management has adopted the primarily financial discourse of shareholder value,
“pure partnership” is ineffective in protecting workers’ rights. With the discursive
shift to the knowledge economy, management is motivated to threaten workers’
rights, and workers’ best chance of defending themselves requires equally
adversarial action. As a result, the transition to the knowledge economy in Germany
has been accompanied not just by a wholesale discursive shift, but also by an
attendant institutional transformation, whereby conflict becomes the dominant
mode in industrial relations.
While the case study above indicates the dynamics underlying this
transformation, more macro-level statistics reinforce that these dynamics are
increasingly widespread. The incidence of legal cases involving conflicts between
works councils and their employers, for instance, has risen significantly over the
past two decades. In 1991, there were 383 settlements involving works councils and
employers. By 2005, there were 1269.558 This growth is all the more remarkable

Streeck, 58.
Data retrieved from juris, “Federal Labor Court Cases Involving Works Councils,” April
9, 2017.
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given the decline in union density and coverage in Germany, because one might
assume that stronger unions would lead to more conflicts with employers. However,
given the mechanisms for enforcing Germany’s institutions for economic
governance, the opposite is the case. With the underlying adversarial orientation of
Germany’s institutions, and unable to rely on the threat of union action, workers
must mobilize against their employers in order to protect their rights.
Although workers have seen their job insecurity rise with the increasingly
adversarial nature of industrial relations, the rising incidence of conflict in
Germany’s industrial relations does not necessarily entail a threat to workers’
rights. Certainly, employers enjoy a privileged structural position in the
organization of production under capitalism, but, as argued in previous chapters,
workers can develop effective power resources to defend against employer
discretion. Recalling the micro-mobilization that unfolded among the individual
workgroup at Infineon, I propose that tech workers can develop a counterhegemonic discursive strategy to defend their jobs against economically justified
dismissals. I suggest that the success of this strategy depends on works councilors’
creative interpretation of the institutional elements presented above. If only they
leveraged their institutional resources, the works council at Infineon could have
been much more effective at protecting workers’ job security than the single
workgroup’s micro-mobilization. The next chapter shows that, rather than allowing
management to take all the credit for the rising incidence of conflict in Germany’s
industrial relations, workers can also develop effective strategies for contesting
management discretion through collective action.
8. Conclusion
This chapter showed that firms’ adoption of the orientation to shareholder value in
Germany undermines workers’ job security as much as in the US, despite Germany’s
robust institutions for workers’ rights. As long as a firm’s works council chooses not
to mobilize workers against management discretion, workers face the risk of being
dismissed when management announces downsizing.
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At Infineon, sharp decreases in the price of semiconductors led management
to consider dismissals as a means to deliver earnings to shareholders. Similar to
IBM, management justified downsizing in the primarily financial discourse of
shareholder value, arguing that they needed to reduce labor costs in order to remain
profitable. Works councilors chose to limit their response to formal channels for
negotiation with management because they believed that these could potentially be
effective and that workers would not support more aggressive types of collective
action. However, as micro-mobilization within individual workgroups
demonstrated, workers did not reject collective action per se. Furthermore,
analyzing Germany’s institutions for economic governance illustrates that works
councilors have access to precisely the resources they need for mobilizing workers. I
showed that workers mobilized successfully in Infineon’s development division by
developing a very similar set of resources. Although the works council could have
mobilized a much larger resistance that included workers across the firm, they
chose not to engage the resources provided by the institutions for codetermination.
This case study confirms existing research suggesting that Germany’s system
of conflict-partnership is disintegrating, and it identifies the role played by firms’
adoption of the orientation to shareholder value. When firms put the interests of
shareholders’ above other stakeholders’, they are more likely to abandon the norms
that have heretofore ensured a modicum of partnership with labor. As the
institutional analysis above demonstrates, enforcing the Dismissal Protection Act
requires a works council to mobilize collective action in the workplace.
Furthermore, given tech workers’ disposition to view the employment relationship
as shaped by market forces external to the firm, they are likely to be persuaded by
management’s framing of dismissals in the financial discourse of shareholder value
unless they have access to a source of critique. Works councilors’ familiarity with
their firm provides them the information they need to question management’s
strategy and their access to workers provides the medium to communicate their
critiques across the firm. These institutional resources make it possible for the
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works council to step in where unions had previously protected workers against
management discretion. However, as long as workers choose not to resist
dismissals, management faces little obstructions to downsizing.
The transition to the knowledge economy in Germany thus appears to play
an important role in transforming the system of conflict-partnership. As
management increasingly implements a primarily financial discourse of shareholder
value in the workplace, they dispose workers to acquiesce to downsizing. Rather
than balancing between conflict and partnership, industrial relations are
increasingly characterized by adversarial dynamics. In the case of Infineon, the
works council chose not to resist management’s threats of downsizing, leaving
workers exposed to dismissals. This chapter, however, underlined the contingency
of works councilors’ choice to acquiesce to management. In the next chapter, I show
how works councilors can choose to resist management, and I trace how they
creatively interpret and apply their institutional resources in order to mobilize
workers against downsizing.
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Chapter 8. Adaptation: Counterhegemonic Strategy at Siemens
The law doesn’t fall from the sky. Someone comes and says, “We’re doing it this way
now because we think it’s right.” The creation of laws is influenced by many things.
That there is no codetermination over economic issues was course due to influence
– it could have been different. That there is dismissal protection, that’s because the
unions worked on it. What’s written in the law depends on workers’ capacity to
pursue it, how history develops so that it comes to this law. But then you also need
other things. A warn-strike alone can never ensure that the law will be implemented
if there was no labor court. So everything must be there. It has to fit together. If one
element is missing, there will always be a weakness.
Former Siemens Worker.
Author Interview, Munich, November 6, 2014.

Management at Siemens’ telecommunications’ division (ICN) chose to announce
dismissals in the middle of Bavaria’s summer break. After months of rumors, on
August 2, 2002, the works council at ICN’s headquarters on Hofmannstr. in Munich
learned that management planned to terminate 2600 workers from their facility.
Press reported the story as one of economic necessity, echoing management’s
justification for the measures by quoting financial analysts: “When you have so
many employees and your world is falling apart, you have to cut jobs.”559 Indeed,
ICN reported a loss of €861 million in 2001, and while that was reduced to €691 in
2002, sales had shrunk by 25%, and management was desperate to keep the
division afloat.560 Their solution was to execute mass dismissals under a plan known
as “Profitability and Cost Turnaround” (PACT), which would reduce ICN’s
worldwide headcount from 51,000 to 30,000 by the end of 2003, including 2600

Sonja Diekhoefer and Reto Gregori, “Siemens to Cut 5,000 Jobs as Demand Wanes:
Union,” Toronto Star, August 3, 2002, Saturday Ontario Edition edition.
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Siemens AG, “Annual Report,” 2002, 52.
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workers from Hofmannstr.561 Management implemented the dismissals in rounds,
and on November 11, the first 876 workers received the Blaue Brief (“blue letter”),
giving workers an option to either accept a severance package or face an
economically justified dismissal.562 When 366 workers refused the severance
package, management fired them.563
In contrast to the dismissals at IBM San Jose and Infineon, management
called off the measures before a single worker had been dismissed. On February 10,
2004, management reached an agreement with the works council and IG Metall that
no more workers from Hofmannstr. would be threatened with dismissal and they
agreed to reinstate 217 workers who had already received the Blaue Brief.564
Management conceded to workers’ demands because, by February 2004, the firm
had lost every single one of the 89 cases that had been litigated thus far.565 Facing
the prospect of losing 200 more cases, the rising cost of severance payments and
legal fees led management to conclude that it would be in the firm’s best interest to
adopt an alternative business strategy that avoided dismissals. Workers at
Hofmannstr. succeeded in protecting their jobs because they mobilized for collective
action, which exerted significant economic pressure on management.
This chapter argues that workers at Siemens mobilized successfully because
their works council developed a counterhegemonic discourse that undermined
management’s justification for dismissals. Just as at IBM and Infineon, management
at Siemens established a hegemonic discourse in the workplace that framed
Thomas Ganswindt and Michael Kutschenreuter, “Facts & Figures: The Present and
Future of ICN,” May 13, 2003.
562 Conrad Schuhler, Der Wandel der Unternehmenskultur durch Wissensproduktion und
Globalisierung: am Beispiel des Siemens-Konzerns und seines IT-Standorts München
Hofmannstraße, isw forschungshefte 2 (Munich: institut für sozial-ökologische
wirtschaftsforschung, 2005), 31.
563 “22 Kilo Kündigungswidersprüche,” Information & Kommunikation, February 2003.
564 IG Metall, ed., “Konsequente Interessenvertretung führt zum Erfolg,” Information &
Kommunikation, February 2004.
565 NCI, “Kündigung ArbG Prozesstabelle,” accessed August 30, 2016, http://www.ncinet.de/Archiv/Recht/Gerichtsprozesse/Guetetermine-Historie.htm.
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technological production in primarily financial terms. Workers at Siemens were
unlikely to resist dismissals because they were disposed to believe management’s
economic justification for the measures. However, I show that works councilors
undermined management’s justification by redeploying the firm’s business data to
show that alternative business strategies were possible that avoided downsizing.
Works councilors demonstrated to workers the potential effectiveness of collective
action in a discourse that workers found persuasive, thereby satisfying the two
conditions necessary for mobilization.
After showing that management’s adoption of the orientation to shareholder
value at Siemens led them to establish the same hegemonic discourse in the
workplace as management at IBM and Infineon, I show how workers resisted.
Coordinating their efforts to activate national institutions by bringing hundreds of
legal cases against Siemens, workers developed sufficient economic pressure to lead
managers to reconsider dismissals. While formal legal arguments were necessary
for workers to pressure management, I show that collective action played a critical
and independent role in developing workers’ power. Workers at Siemens held the
same biases against unions and collective action as workers at IBM and Infineon, but
works councilors were able to convince them to participate in collective action by
demonstrating the potential effectiveness of mobilization. Works councilors
undermined management’s economic justification for dismissals and presented
workers with a detailed alternative business strategy. Despite facing the same set of
national institutions as workers at Infineon, workers at Siemens were in fact
protected by codetermination and the Dismissal Protection Act due to works
councilors’ creative interpretation and strategic application of these institutions in
the workplace. The spread of primarily financial discourse of shareholder value
threatens workers’ job security, but workers can nonetheless develop power
resources to defend their rights in the knowledge economy.
Table 8.1 Timeline of workers’ response to dismissals: Siemens
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August 2, 2002

Management announces
2600 dismissals

August 14, 2002

Works council emails
workers with alternative
strategy

September 7, 2002

Workers hold mass
demonstration in
Marienplatz

September 18, 2002

Works council holds allemployee meeting

September 24, 2002

Works council holds allemployee meeting

October 7, 2002

Works council holds allemployee meeting

October 11, 2002

Workers hold mass
demonstration in
Wittelsbacher Platz

October 23, 2002

Agreement reached between
works council and
management: dismissals
reduced to 1250
[52% reduction]

November 11, 2002

Management dismisses 800
workers

November 13 – 15, 2002

Works council advises
workers on legal response

January 14, 2003

Workers march 362
objections to labor court

February 10, 2004

Management calls off
dismissal plan
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1. Management’s hegemonic discourse at Siemens
In this section, I show how management at Siemens established a hegemonic
discourse in the workplace that framed the employment relationship in primarily
financial terms. Just as at IBM and Infineon, workers at Siemens formed their
occupational identities around management’s primarily financial framing of
technological innovation. Management’s framing of the employment relationship at
Siemens, however, was as unstable as at IBM and Infineon, which led workers to
develop an occupational identity in terms of both science and business. When
management announced dismissals, they framed downsizing in a primarily financial
discourse, justifying the measures as a necessary response to market pressures that
originated external to the firm. Given workers’ propensity to understand the
employment relationship in financial terms, we would expect them to acquiesce to
dismissals, just as workers did at IBM and Infineon.
1.1 Management’s framing of dismissals
After nearly a century of striving to produce cutting edge technology, managers at
Siemens redirected the firm’s business strategy in the 1990s in order to focus
primarily on serving shareholder value. Facing pressure from shareholders, CEO
Heinrich von Pierer announced, “We must do something for our stock price, and
quickly.”566 Shortly thereafter, “The firm was structured so that it could more
aggressively take over global markets. The brutality of the market was brought to
each job.”567 As divisions were reorganized to produce value for shareholders,

Daniela Decurtins, Siemens: Anatomie eines Unternehmens (Frankfurt: Redline Wirtschaft
bei Ueberreuter, 2002), 78; Some analysts focus on other aspects of management in order to
support the view that Siemens did not in fact adopt a shareholder value orientation. See
Alexander Börsch, Global Pressure, National System: How German Corporate Governance Is
Changing (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
567 Fred Schmid and Ernst Antoni, “150 Jahre Geschäfte des Siemens-Konzerns” (München:
sozial-ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung München e.V., Oktober 1997), 27; Cited in Susanne
Glas and Frank Rehberg, “Beteiligung und Ergebnisse der Betriebsratswahl 2002 als
Ausdruck des Angestelltenbewusstseins?” (München: IMU - Institut für Medienforschung,
July 2003), 20.
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managers at Siemens adopted a discourse based on the conception that market
forces external to the firm set tight parameters on the employment relationship.
Managers’ primarily financial discourse of shareholder value was especially
evident during downsizing. Aware that the firm could face significant costs if
workers filed legal objections to dismissals,568 managers did everything they could
to confine workers’ reactions to formal institutional channels and relied especially
on discursive strategies. Insisting that dismissals were required for the firm to
survive the business challenges it faced, management tried to convince workers that
dismissals were legally valid because they were justified by “urgent operational
conditions,” under the terms of the Dismissal Protection Act.569 Managers
encouraged workers to accept their termination by using a primarily financial
discourse to persuade workers that dismissals were caused by market conditions
external to the firm and thus beyond managers’ and workers’ control.
Managers used every opportunity to convince workers that dismissals were
caused by external market forces. When workers received the Blaue Brief in
November, 2002, they read that, because of “the business situation of Siemens’
Information and Communication Networks Division, the division is forced to
undertake significant workforce adjustments.”570 Human resources distributed
brochures encouraging workers to accept severance packages because “the business
numbers speak clearly: ICN must fit its capacity to the market.”571 Workers who
were dismissed on January 7, 2003, received letters telling them that, “The dismissal
is required by pressing economic conditions.”572

Interview, Director, Corporate Human Resources, Siemens AG, Author Interview,
Munich, October 9, 2014.
569 “Kündigungsschutzgesetz (Protection Against Dismissal Act)” (1951), sec. 1.2.
570 Siemens AG, “Beendigung Ihres Arbeitsverhältnisses,” November 11, 2002. (Emphasis
mine).
571 ICN Personnel, “Externer Arbeitsmarkt die PA informiert!,” December 3, 2002.
572 Siemens AG, “Anhörung des Betriebsrats zur ordentlichen betriebsbedingten Kündigung
gemäß §102 BetrVG,” January 7, 2003.
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Executives at Siemens’ headquarters developed specific tactics to persuade
workers to accept termination, including detailed handbooks for managers on how
to lead “separation discussions” and a centralized team of seven consultants to lead
dismissal processes at sites across Germany.573 One critical aspect of management’s
strategy focused on persuading sites’ works councils that collective action would be
ineffective. According to a former director of labor relations at Siemens AG:
The most important is that the storyline has to fit. That means you
must always be able to argue why you’re downsizing. So which work
is being eliminated…And if there is no more work in a division,
because we no longer sell large steam turbines, because I don’t need a
development department anymore, then the works council knows
that I simply cannot pay these people if they have nothing to do.
…You’re not applauded, but the works council understands and
accepts it.574
There are certainly situations in which market forces require firms to reduce costs
by dismissing workers, but managers at ICN were not trained to justify dismissals
according to the actual conditions facing the firm. Instead, managers were trained to
develop a “storyline” to persuade works councilors and workers that external
market forces required dismissals.
Managers at ICN followed their training. At every turn, they framed
dismissals as though the division faced unassailable external market forces.
According to managers’ primarily financial discourse, workers’ only rational option
was acquiescence. In what follows, I show that workers nonetheless mobilized
against dismissals, and that they succeeded in protecting their jobs.
2. Contradictions inherent to management’s primarily financial discourse
While management’s framing of dismissals in a primarily financial discourse
succeeded in persuading workers to acquiesce at IBM San Jose and Infineon, these
ICN Personnel, “Übergänge gestalten: Gespräche zur beruflichen Neuorientierung,” 2002;
Director, Division of Labor Relations, Siemens AG, Author Interview, Munich, October 29,
2014.
574 Director, Division of Labor Relations, Siemens AG, Author Interview, Munich.
573
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strategies were less effective at Siemens. In this section, I build on the observation
that management’s primarily financial framing of the employment relationship is
based on a contradictory understanding of worker agency. I show that these
inherent contradictions in management’s discourse gave organizers at Siemens the
resources they needed to mobilize workers.
Management’s adoption of the shareholder value orientation at Siemens was
based on the conception that the firm’s financial performance directly shapes
fundamental elements of the employment relationship. This conception drove a
number of structural changes, such as management’s introduction of variable pay,
so that workers’ salaries were linked to market forces external to the firm. An
internal memo from April 2000 announced that, “The salary bands of different
function levels are fit to the development of the market as well as internal salaries,
in addition to changes in the payment rubric.”575 As a result, Siemens’ performance
in financial markets dictated one of the most important parameters for working
conditions. Although workers’ compensation depended on internal factors as well,
management emphasized that external market forces remained the most important
factor, so that market developments could override the other determinants of a
worker’s salary: “If higher salary standards are made necessary by the market, then
these [salary levels] can be surpassed.”576 Management’s orientation to shareholder
value led not only to changes in the structure of workers’ salaries, but also
introduced an unstable set of discursive relations between external market
conditions, firm performance, and working conditions.

“ÜT-Einkommen EFA 2000, Siemens AG (ZP-Mitteilung, ZU F-Rundschreiben Nr.
6/2000),” April 27, 2000 This agreement concerned only those workers not included in the
collectively bargained wage. However, that constituted 45% of the workforce at Hofmannstr.
in 2002, and 34% of those affected by dismissals. Works Council, Siemens Hofmannstr.,
“Statistik Der ICN-MitarbeiterInnen-Daten,” January 14, 2003.
576 “ÜT-Einkommen EFA 2000, Siemens AG (ZP-Mitteilung, ZU F-Rundschreiben Nr.
6/2000).”
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According to management’s discourse of shareholder value, workers’ agency
over working conditions was tightly limited from one perspective, but, from another
perspective, workers could exercise significant agency. The system of variable pay
made clear that market forces shaped Siemens’ performance and dictated the
parameters for working conditions. Therefore, the structure of variable pay implied
that external market conditions dictated working conditions. On the other hand,
variable pay recognized that workers’ individual performance drove Siemens’
overall performance. Variable pay makes no sense without this assumption. Indeed,
management allowed that if a worker performed exceedingly well, his salary might
increase, even if this contradicted market trends: “the lack of market conformity
does not prevent the recognition of good performance.”577 According to this
perspective, workers drive firm performance, and firm performance dictates the
parameters for working conditions. Therefore, workers have must have some
agency to shape their working conditions, if only by driving Siemens’ overall
performance. Adopting the orientation to shareholder value thereby trapped
managers in a contradiction because they explicitly denied workers’ agency over
their working conditions while implicitly affirming it. This contradiction underlying
management’s hegemonic discourse provided workers important resources for
defending their job security, although it required organizers’ counterhegemonic
strategy in order to be activated.
As Siemens increasingly demanded financial, rather than scientific,
performance from ICN, management emphasized the financial aspects of the
employment relationship over the scientific ones. Workers at ICN were responsible
for many of the patented technologies that had made Siemens a global leader in
telecommunications for decades. In the late 1990s, however, management began
assessing workers’ performance in terms of business rather than scientific goals. Of
course, management had always assessed workers’ contribution to the firm’s
“ÜT-Einkommen: Orientierungswert für 1999/2000 - Siemens AG (ZP-Rundschreiben
A**) Nr. 45/99, ZU F Rundschreiben Nr. 3/99),” Mai 1999.
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bottom line, but a memo that managers received in 1997 illustrates that these were
to become the primary criteria by which workers were assessed. Managers were
ordered to formulate agreements with their direct reports in order to hold workers
accountable to specific goals, defined exclusively in financial terms: "Each worker's
agreement on performance targets must support the [firm's] overall business
goals.”578 As examples of acceptable goals, the memo lists revenue, sales,
marketshare, but nothing about the longer-term projects characteristic of
technological innovation. This memo sheds light on the type of conversations that
managers led with workers, thus illustrating the primarily financial discourse that
management established as hegemonic in the workplace.
Such conversations were likely to make an impression on workers, because
these goals could play a role in managers’ decisions regarding whether to select a
particular worker for dismissal.579 Despite the marked switch from a discourse
revolving around science to a discourse revolving around business, the two existed
alongside one another at Siemens, leading workers to develop an unstable
occupational identity based on elements of each.
As Siemens adopted the orientation to shareholder value, workers’ identities
oscillated with greater magnitude between science and business. Workers had been
socialized in a firm known for its “fetish for technical perfection and the inhouse
awe in which its engineers are held” and were thus accustomed to a production
environment where they applied technical expertise to develop new products.580
Many workers identified with the scientific aspects of production:
I was always a curious person and wanted to participate in the newest
technologies, and so I said, ‘I want the latest.’ And then it was pretty
quick with the Softswitch stuff, because I also said, ‘I want to do that.’
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So Voice-over-IP, Softswitsch, Controller, Gateway…and that was
always so, so much fun. It was really great.581
While many had joined Siemens because they were enthusiastic about the scientific
aspects of technological innovation, workers also identified with the financial
aspects, and did not shy away from their role in supporting Siemens’ performance
on the market: “I’m also somebody who honestly, I mean, I also want to earn money,
and I also want the firm to do well, that we’re winners.”582 But when financial
performance became the goal, the firm must be, in the words of one former worker,
“utterly and completely run by the financial markets. The market defines the
situation, and provides goals and strategies that of course only serve the financial
markets.”583
Workers at Siemens reacted to management’s hegemonic discourse the same
way as workers at IBM and Infineon. Management’s framing of the employment
relationship in parallel discourses of economics and science led workers to develop
an occupational identity balanced unstably between these two discourses. Despite
their orientation to the scientific value of their work, workers at Siemens were
nonetheless also disposed to accept management’s discourse of shareholder value
as persuasive.
Workers at Siemens understood their situation through management’s
primarily financial discourse of shareholder value, confirming that management
succeeded in establishing a hegemonic discourse in the workplace. Workers
understood the employment relationship and the history of Siemens through
managers’ contradictory conception of the relationship between workers’ agency
and their working conditions. While they believed that their technical skills drove
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firm performance, workers also acknowledged that external market forces played
an important role:
We developed our own ‘Video on Demand.’ But nobody wanted it. The
product was never sold and we put it away. And I think five or ten
years later, the entire world had Video on Demand, and it was
someone else who earned money with it. Sometimes you develop the
right products but at the wrong time. Why doesn’t the market take
them? Sometimes it’s irrational.584
As irrational as market forces might be, according to workers, they still set
parameters on Siemens’ performance. At the same time, workers recognized that
they were the ones who developed the products that could have increased Siemens’
revenue. Siemens managers thus succeeded in establishing a hegemonic discourse
in the workplace, because they led workers to rely on management’s framing in
order to explain the causes of the firm’s performance. This discourse, however, was
based on a contradiction, presenting both external market forces and workers as
driving Siemens’ financial performance. While hegemonic, the contradiction
underlying management’s discourse offered resources for works councilors to
mobilize workers because it suggested an account of workers’ agency where they
had the power to shape working conditions.
Workers at Siemens exhibited an occupational identity similar to workers at
IBM San Jose and Infineon not just because they were disposed to be persuaded by
management’s discourse of shareholder value, but also because of their antagonism
toward unions. In the late 1990s, IG Metall redoubled its efforts to recruit members
at Siemens, especially at ICN. However, workers believed that unions were not for
them. Like their counterparts at Infineon, workers at Siemens believed that their
status as tech workers made unions irrelevant: “Before [dismissals were
announced], I always thought, ‘I’m an engineer, a physicist, I’m good, I will be
needed, I’m important, I don’t need that [IG Metall.] That’s for the workers, for the
Author Interview, Former Siemens Worker, Munich, November 20, Author Interview,
2014.
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blue-collar people.’”585 Given their disposition to accept management’s hegemonic
discourse and their opposition to unions, workers at Siemens ICN had as few power
resources as workers at IBM and Infineon. Similar to those workplaces, the best bet
for protecting against dismissals lay in exploiting the contradictions underlying
management’s primarily financial discourse.
3. Works councilors exploit management’s contradictory discourse
This section explains what led workers at Siemens to mobilize against dismissals
despite their disposition to believe management’s account that collective action
would be ineffective. I present the works council’s discursive strategy, showing how
they challenged management’s justification for dismissals and presented workers
with an alternative business strategy. Workers were persuaded by the works
council’s critique and alternative, and they chose to mobilize because they believed
that mobilizing against management could be effective in protecting their jobs. After
illustrating the role of the works council’s discursive strategy in mobilizing workers,
the next section documents how mobilization was in fact effective in defending
against downsizing.
Organizers at Siemens exploited the contradiction underlying management’s
hegemonic discourse in order to amplify managers’ account of workers’ agency over
their working conditions. Management’s hegemonic discourse presented working
conditions as though they were shaped by an unstable balance between market
forces and workers’ agency. Therefore, in order to demonstrate to workers that they
had greater agency over their working conditions, the works council minimized the
degree to which external market forces shaped the employment relationship. For
instance, the works council rejected management’s argument that market forces
absolutely required dismissals and instead demanded that managers release
business data so that works councilors and workers could develop alternative
business strategies. In a newsletter to workers, the works council wrote:
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…they [management] will have to give us more information swiftly
and not just swiftly ‘complain’ (the market has collapsed, the clients
already have all they need, our competitors are also hurting, etc.). We
need useful economic data, so that we can explore alternatives to
mass dismissals and solutions that are reasonable not only for the
employees but which are also fair to the assets of Siemens AG.586
The works council acknowledged that external market forces may set some
parameters on working conditions, but they distinguished their approach from
management’s by insisting that there was still room for creative action.
Furthermore, the works council indicated their closeness to management’s
discourse by emphasizing that they were acting in the firm’s interests as well as
workers’.
In addition to minimizing management’s framing of market forces as setting
tight parameters on the employment relationship, the works council at Siemens
explicitly strengthened workers’ perceptions of their agency. Once they received the
necessary business data from managers, works councilors made a point to involve
workers in crafting alternative business strategies that avoided dismissals:
We asked the employees in their divisions… development, strategy,
marketing… We invited the employees to reflect, in their divisions,
where are the shortcomings? Why was Cisco outperforming
Siemens?... Why is that, and what has to happen at Siemens? And we
didn’t say that as the works council. We said, ‘think about it yourself,
where are the shortcomings? What must be done?’587
The works council’s involvement of workers in designing alternative business
strategies not only implied that workers had agency over Siemens’ performance, it
actively created a situation in which workers did in fact play a role in shaping the
firm’s strategy. Furthermore, inviting workers to compare their suggestions to
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managers’ allowed workers to directly confront managers’ incompetence, which led
to the “delegitimation of the top managers, not just because they violated widely
held norms, but because, technically, they understood nothing.”588 In addition to
challenging the substance of management’s downsizing strategy, the works council
at Siemens redeployed management’s own financial discourse in order to persuade
workers that they had the power to protect their job security. By involving workers
in developing alternative business strategies that avoided dismissals, the works
council presented workers with plausible evidence that collective action could be
effective against management’s threats.
The works council’s counterhegemonic strategy was effective because it
persuaded workers that they had more agency over their working conditions than
what management explicitly acknowledged. Workers recognized their agency as a
group, through collective action, because the works council provided plausible
evidence that each individual worker had meaningful agency over their working
conditions. According to one former worker, “The works council’s strategy was very
good for the staff. Each could decide for himself what was best for him.”589 Because
workers could trace a clear path from their involvement in crafting alternative
business strategies to alternative outcomes for firm performance, they believed that
participating in collective action could potentially protect them from dismissal.
Workers believed that collective action could be effective because works councilors
framed mobilization in the financial discourse that workers found persuasive.
At Siemens, management’s adoption of the shareholder value orientation led
them to establish a hegemonic discourse in the workplace to control workers based
on the conception that market forces external to the firm set tight parameters on
working conditions. While hegemonic, this financial discourse also provided
resources for workers to mobilize against dismissals. The works council at Siemens

588
589

Former Works Councilor, Siemens Hofmannstr., Munich, October 9, 2014.
Quoted in Schuhler, Der Wandel der Unternehmenskultur, 32.

267

succeeded in developing a counterhegemonic strategy that undermined
management’s discourse by amplifying workers’ agency over their working
conditions. Workers councilors were thus able to illustrate the potential
effectiveness of collective action. Redeploying management’s own conception of an
unstable balance between external market forces and workers’ agency in shaping
working conditions, works councilors exploited the contradiction underlying
management’s hegemonic discourse. As I show in the following section, the works
council’s counterhegemonic strategy succeeded in persuading workers to
participate in collective action that was, in fact, effective in protecting their jobs.
4. Effective mobilization
Despite management’s efforts to persuade workers to acquiesce to dismissals,
workers mobilized against downsizing. Workers contested dismissals in court, and
as Siemens began to lose each case, management realized that their dismissal plan
was going to be much more expensive than originally intended. This economic
pressure was due in part to the structure of the Dismissal Protection Act and to the
effective formal arguments that works councilors developed against management.
However, workers’ widespread participation in the legal cases played an important
role in convincing judges that management was in the wrong, and each additional
case increased the potential cost of dismissals. After illustrating that workers
exerted pressure on management by engaging formal institutions for dismissal
protection, the following section shows how the works council succeeded in
mobilizing workers because their counterhegemonic discourse fulfilled the two
conditions necessary for mobilization.
In the month after management announced dismissals, the works council
organized three all-employee meetings and two demonstrations, which took place in
Munich’s main square and attracted significant media attention. Meanwhile, the
works council negotiated with management, reaching a compromise in late October,
which included decreasing the number those dismissed by 1500 and increasing
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incentives for early retirement. 590The Handelsblatt attributed management’s
readiness to accept some of the works council’s demands to workers’ participation
in public demonstrations: “Siemens has now abandoned its unusual path of
confrontation. First, the resistance of the workers was tougher than expected. But
also the image of Siemens as a model employer was deeply wounded.”591 Echoing a
tactic common to social movements and social movement unionism, the works
council used a demonstration to pressure managers by threatening Siemens’ public
image.592 This likely played a role in leading managers to reach a compromise with
the works council, but the effectiveness of these public demonstrations was also
critical in ensuring workers’ long-term support for collective action by showing
workers that mobilization could indeed protect their jobs.
The works council’s success in persuading workers to participate in
collective action is illustrated by the proportion of dismissed workers who filed a
legal case against Siemens, along with workers’ public showing of solidarity in a
series of demonstrations. All but seven of the 366 workers who received dismissal
notices decided to file a legal objection, which translates to 98% of the selected
workers participating in the coordinated legal action. However, the effectiveness of
the works council’s discursive strategy is perhaps clearer from the handful of public
demonstrations they organized, which were attended even by workers who were to
keep their jobs.
Beginning in September 2002, workers at Hofmannstr. participated in four
notable mass demonstrations. On September 7, 2002, between 500 and 600
Conrad Schuhler, “Der Kompromiss der Betriebsvereinbarung,” Schöne Neue Siemens Welt,
March 2003, 28.
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workers gathered in Marienplatz, the central square in Munich, in order to voice
their opposition to the dismissals and to support IG Metall’s installation of an
information stand, which was supposed bring the dismissals to the attention of the
broader public. At an all-employee meeting following the action, the works council
praised the workers for participating, but suggested they could do better, noting
that it was “good participation for an information stand. Also a sign that we have
more to give.”593 Workers responded positively, and more than 3000 participated in
an October 11 demonstration at Siemens’ headquarters on Wittelsbacher Platz in
Munich.594 On January 14, with dismissals delivered and the works council’s
objections complete, more than 200 workers joined the works council in marching
the 22 kilograms of objections into the Munich Labor Court.595 Ten days later,
approximately 300 workers demonstrated outside the annual meeting for Siemens’
shareholders where they demanded that investors pressure management to uphold
the firm’s traditional values of respecting its workers.
These demonstrations were significant because they represent a mode of
collective action highly unusual for tech workers. As noted above, workers at
Siemens generally opposed unions and believed that the forms of collective action
that unions supported, such as demonstrations and picket lines, were appropriate
for blue collar workers but not for them. Furthermore, workers’ disposition to view
the employment relationship in financial terms led them to harbor no illusions that
public demonstrations would directly reinstate their jobs. In an online forum, for
instance, one worker posted, “That a demo won’t save a single job is clear to
everyone. But it’s important to bring to the public’s attention that there are

Works Council, Siemens Hofmannstr., “Presentation Notes from All-Employee Meeting,”
September 18, 2002.
594 Conrad Schuhler, Schöne Neue Siemens Welt (Munich: IG Metall, Bayern, 2003), 9; Tanja
Moung, “Angestellte pfeifen auf Siemens-Bosse,” Münchner Merkur, October 12, 2002,
http://www.merkur-online.de/lokales/regionen/angestellte-pfeifen-siemensbosse119560.html; Oliver Hinz, “Protestpremiere bei Siemens,” taz, October 12, 2002, sec.
Wirtschaft und Umwelt.
595 Schuhler, Schöne Neue Siemens Welt, 33.
593

270

alternative plans to downsizing.”596 Indeed, each demonstration garnered
significant attention from the press and helped workers secure the support of
political parties across the spectrum. Moreover, participation in public
demonstrations played a critical role in building the solidarity necessary for
inspiring workers to object to dismissals in the first place, as well as the support
they needed to sustain their efforts through the years-long legal disputes.597 Facing
the prospect of dismissal after twenty years at the firm from which they expected to
retire, many workers first needed to process their emotions before they could make
steps toward a practical response.598 Building solidarity through collective action,
mass demonstrations thus helped push workers to bring legal cases against
Siemens. As I note below, the sheer quantity of workers’ legal objections helped
persuade the labor court to rule in their favor, so public demonstrations did in fact
rather directly save jobs.
Workers’ participation in the works council’s legal strategy played a
significant role in their success in court, where Siemens’ defeat was foretold from
day one. The legal process of contesting dismissals began on February 24, 2003,
with the Gütetermine, which are designed to bring the parties together in the hope
that they can find an acceptable compromise before going further through complex
and expensive litigation. In each of the 22 cases reviewed on this first day, the court
found no grounds for a compromise.599 Given that labor court judges are strongly
oriented to finding consensual solutions, this is a remarkable outcome, and
indicated that Siemens would face significant challenges trying to convince the court
that the dismissals were legally valid.600
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The first cases concerning the legality of the dismissals at Siemens were
argued on June 5, 2003, and it did not take long for a pattern to emerge. Siemens lost
the first 19 cases in a row.601 Facing the prospect that the firm might lose every
single one of the 359 cases, workers began to be concerned that such legal pressure
would cause lasting damage to the firm. A group of workers wrote an open letter to
Siemens CEO von Pierer asking him to call off the terminations so that the firm could
save face:
Especially remarkable is the expedited proceedings according to §102
of the Works Constitution Act, where the firm has lost every case, and
predictably lost. Despite this, [management has] continued the costly
and, for our firm, incredibly embarrassing process, without any
prospect of success. This is lasting damage to our company image!
Judges talk of a “management rampage” and “firing blindly,” because
of all the open positions at Siemens, and the complete lack of a firmwide Sozialauswahl.602
Siemens had long been considered a flagship firm of the German economy, known
for its profitability, innovation, and humane working conditions, and workers feared
that negative publicity would ruin the firm’s reputation. Even more importantly, the
costs of these legal processes would threaten Siemens’ business position.
The works council’s legal objections to dismissals at Hofmannstr. convinced
the Munich Labor Court to rule in workers’ favor because they gathered compelling
evidence that management had violated national dismissal regulations. The
Dismissal Protection Act requires employers to provide works councils evidence
that “urgent operational conditions” leave no choice but to terminate a worker.
Siemens, however, failed to provide evidence of a causal link between operational
conditions and the dismissals. According to one judge, Siemens “simply informed
the works council that the employer’s decision was causally responsible for the
disappearance of the plaintiff’s position, but not the reasons for that decision…Thus,
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they gave conclusions, but no facts.”603 Citing a standard legal commentary, the
judge underlined that employers cannot give general descriptions, but must provide
concrete evidence “why the employee is no longer needed.”604 Management’s
dismissal letters had informed workers that, because of “the business situation of
Siemens’ Information and Communication Networks Division, the division is forced
to undertake significant workforce adjustments.”605 However, according to the
standards of the Dismissal Protection Act, Siemens failed to provide evidence that
managers had been “forced.”
While the works council succeeded in protecting workers from dismissal due
to its ability to gather evidence for compelling legal arguments, its success also
depended on mobilizing workers for collective action. A closer look at judges’
opinions suggests that workers persuaded judges to rule in their favor not only on
the strength of the arguments they made, but also because judges understood the
participation of hundreds of workers in collective action as evidence that
management had systematically violated the law. A single worker with a single
complaint might require some detective work to figure out whether the worker’s
claims were valid. When 359 workers file the same complaint against the same
managers, the burden of proof is on the firm.
Judges explicitly referred to other ongoing cases at ICN in order to
substantiate the claims of individual workers. When Siemens argued, for instance,
that workers’ objections were invalid because the works council had made a
procedural error, judges looked to see what their colleagues had concluded in the
other cases at ICN that had already been decided. One judge wrote, “in several
parallel investigations, the Labor Court of Munich uncovered evidence concerning
the compliance of the [works council’s] personnel committee in objecting to the
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intended dismissals of other employees. In every case, the court came to the
conclusion that decisions underlying the objection meet the legal requirements.”606
Armed with a sample size large enough to observe patterns across multiple cases,
judges were able to conclude that management’s argument was unfounded, leading
them to rule in workers’ favor.
Mobilizing workers to assemble hundreds of parallel cases against the firm,
the works council at ICN improved workers’ chances of success in court by
providing judges with reliable evidence that managers had violated the law. In
addition, the works council encouraged workers to attend hearings, so that, for
instance, 120 workers were present for the first round of hearings in February
2003.607 Demonstrating that workers collectively opposed the dismissals at ICN
helped illustrate to judges how management had broken social norms, which can be
reasonably assumed to have affected judges’ discretion. As workers’ letter to von
Pierer notes, judges repeated the language that workers used during public
demonstrations, such as describing the dismissals as a “management rampage.”
Thus, while the quality of works councilors’ formal arguments in legal briefs was
important in contesting the dismissals in court, their success in mobilizing a
sufficient quantity of workers was also critical to limiting management discretion.
Workers’ resistance to dismissals at Siemens was successful because their
collective legal cases exerted significant economic pressure on the firm. Siemens’s
2003 Annual Report provides some justification for management’s decision to call
off dismissals on February 10, 2004. By that point, the firm had lost every one of the
89 cases brought before the Munich Labor Court thus far.608 In discussing Siemens’
overall performance in 2003, the Annual Report notes that, “Severance programs

“Judgment of Munich Labor Court,” 17.
NCI, “Stattgefundene Gütetermine.”
608 IG Metall, “Konsequente Interessenvertretung,” 2; Although it is worth noting that the
court reached only partial judgment in three cases litigated on August 13, 2003. See NCI,
“Kündigung ArbG Prozesstabelle.”
606
607

274

negatively impacted cash flow during fiscal 2003 and we expect payments from
these programs to continue in fiscal 2004, but at a lesser amount.”609 At ICN alone,
dismissals cost the firm €218 million in 2003, which amounted to 3.1% of sales that
year, and severance alone consumed 1.7% of sales.610 This represents a significant
impact on the firm’s bottom line, especially when compared to 1999, when
severance constituted only 0.3% of sales.611 Against these figures, Siemens’ decision
to call off dismissals in 2004 appears as the most rational course of action, because
doing so likely saved the firm millions.
The formal terms of dismissal protection legislation in Germany are
relatively strict in comparison to other OECD countries, and if a firm is found guilty
of violating these terms, the consequences can be expensive. If courts find that a
dismissal is legally invalid, the firm must provide backpay from the date of
dismissal, in addition to a severance payment determined by the court, as well as
significant legal fees to lawyers and consultants. Courts calculate severance
payments based on workers’ age, tenure, and salary, so given that the majority of
the dismissed workers were over 45, had been at the firm for more than 20 years,
and were highly paid engineers and programmers, Siemens faced staggering costs if
it were to be found guilty of violating dismissal protection regulations.
The magnitude of these costs can be illustrated by tracing the path of one of
the 359 objections. I spoke with one terminated worker whose monthly salary, as a
first-line manager, was €6678. Once it became clear that Siemens was losing every
single case, this worker received an offer from management to withdraw his
objection in exchange for a payment between €86,1867 and €151,543.612 This may
be a significant sum, but it pales in comparison to what Siemens stood to lose.
Because the firm filed appeals after the first round of cases in the Munich Labor
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Court, many found their way to the Bavarian Labor Court, which added months to
the process. In the case of the worker above, if his were the last case decided, it
would have been 29 months between his termination and the court’s decision.
Backpay alone would thus amount to €4.8 million. On top of this, Siemens would
need to provide a severance payment determined by the court, in addition to legal
fees accrued over the period. Not every worker contesting their dismissal earned as
much as this first-line manager, but the point remains that the prospect of losing
each of the 359 cases could require the firm to pay more than €1 billion in just
backpay, which would constitute nearly 15% of the division’s sales in 2003. 613
Furthermore, these 359 cases were just the first wave of the planned dismissals.
Workers’ legal objections thus posed a credible economic threat to managers at ICN.
Even after management called off dismissals in 2004, the cases continued to
hurt the bottom line. The firm’s 2004 Annual Report notes that, “The loss of €366
million a year earlier included significant charges for severance, as well as writedowns of venture capital and other investments,” and, in 2005, that, “the earnings
development of Fixed Networks was affected by severance charges and the division
recorded a significant loss,” indicating that these effects extended to earnings in the
coming quarters.614 Workers at ICN succeeded in protecting their jobs because they
used institutional resources to exert significant economic pressure on Siemens.
Workers chose to participate in collective action because they believed that
mobilizing could be effective in protecting their jobs. As I show in the following
section, the works council persuaded workers that dismissals were not necessary to
ICN’s continued operation by presenting workers a detailed critique of
management’s justification for dismissals along with an alternative business
strategy that avoided dismissals. Workers recognized that if they were able to
generate enough pressure, they might be able to force management to consider
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rescinding dismissals and reinstating the workers who were already fired. Collective
action was indeed a reasonable course of action for workers at ICN because works
councilors succeeded in fulfilling the two conditions necessary for mobilization.
5. Works councilors’ discourse fulfills the two conditions necessary for
mobilization
Works councilors demonstrated the potential effectiveness of collective action soon
after management announced dismissals and they did so in a discourse that workers
at ICN found persuasive. The works council’s strategy convinced workers not only
that dismissals were avoidable, but also that mobilizing to support an alternative
business strategy could be effective in saving their jobs. They did so by redeploying
management’s primarily financial discourse.
From management’s first announcement of downsizing in August 2002, the
works council carefully framed their response in the primarily financial discourse
that workers found persuasive. In their first newsletter to workers about
downsizing, the works council emphasized, “Nobody contests that there is a crisis in
the telecommunications sector, but does it always have to be the workers who bear
the costs?”615 The works council thus acknowledged management’s primarily
financial framing of dismissals, demonstrating to workers that they were realistic
about the surrounding economic conditions. At the same time, the works council
insisted that downsizing was not the most appropriate strategy to overcome the
firm’s business challenges. Instead of dismissals, the works council suggested that
management shorten working times across the division, and they defended this
strategy in financial terms, arguing that retaining existing employees would
“promote the development of new, market-ready products, which can achieve a
competitive advantage on the market.”616 Recognizing that workers were disposed
to find management’s primarily financial framing of the employment relationship
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persuasive, the works council was careful to use this discourse to frame downsizing
and the appropriate response.
The works council immersed themselves in the division’s business strategies
in order to develop an alternative path forward, which allowed them to demonstrate
the potential effectiveness of collective action in a discourse that workers found
persuasive. As illustrated above, workers at ICN identified with the financial
discourse surrounding production, and the works council encouraged them to
mobilize by illustrating the potential effectiveness of collective action in precisely
this discourse.
Reviewing ICN’s various products in relation to the division’s technical
expertise and external market conditions, the works council proposed to pivot ICN’s
strategy by focusing on a handful of products that management had let fall by the
wayside. One of these products was SURPASS, which migrates traditional
telecommunications infrastructure to IP-based networks. In an all-employee
meeting in mid-September 2002, the works council argued that focusing resources
on SURPASS would enable the division to attain significant revenue growth, “which
means that, with intelligent management, and if ICN grows at least at as much as the
market, it is urgently recommended to retain the staff.”617 The works council’s
identification of SURPASS as the focal point for the division’s resources was based
on an extensive analysis of ICN’s market position, which they presented during allemployee meetings and published in newsletters to employees. Works councilors
supported their analysis with detailed data on the division, which enabled them to
present workers with clear figures and graphs that illustrated the plausibility of
their alternative strategy. This strategy would not just increase ICN’s revenues, but
would also require retaining workers in order to sustain the division’s growth
trajectory once the market picked back up. In order to implement this alternative
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strategy and avoid downsizing, however, workers would need to pressure
management to take it seriously.
Just as management intentionally framed dismissals in financial discourse to
persuade workers to acquiesce, works councilors intentionally redeployed this
framing when addressing workers. The works council’s selective use of a primarily
financial discourse is illustrated by contrasting their statements to workers with the
statements they made in reaching out to political parties and during public
demonstrations. In a presentation to the local contingent of the Christian Social
Union (CSU), works councilors framed dismissals in terms of broader political
economic developments: “With privatization, deregulation, and technological
development, telecommunications has become just an investment tool on the
financial markets.”618 In public demonstrations, the works council encouraged
workers to carry signs framing the dismissals in a normative discourse. In one
demonstration in September 2002, a female worker carried a sign that said, “we
can’t live without mommy’s money.”619 However, when addressing workers, the
works council framed dismissals in a primarily financial discourse and presented
workers with detailed critiques of management’s justification.
In the weeks following the announcement of dismissals, the works council
consistently challenged management decision to downsize during the multiple allemployee meetings they held. In October 2002, the works council distributed a
pamphlet titled Wege aus der Krise [Ways out of the Crisis] to workers that
summarized their critique of management’s justification for dismissals and
supported their critique with detailed analysis of the division’s business position. In
the pamphlet, the works council argued that dismissals were a consequence of
management abandoning its decades-long commitment to a “technology-oriented
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[business] model” in order to adopt a “develop to cost” (DTC) model.620 The former
model “secures [Siemens’] market share, revenue, profit, and ultimately
employment by using the best engineering talent to develop state of the art
products.”621 Under DTC, however, Siemens employs developers only to meet
customer demand, which “for Hofmannstr. means that there is a real danger that the
current competitive dip in telecommunications providers will be used in order to
outsource the development capacity that will be needed in the near future, and
therefore to make it extremely flexible.”622 The pamphlet arrives at this conclusion
after a detailed analysis of the segments where the telecommunications division was
active, showing that management reduced investment in segments where the firm
had a smaller market share, even though its existing technical expertise put it in a
strategic position for future growth.
The works council presented the example of fiber optics in order to illustrate
how management’s incompetence had led to downsizing. Siemens controlled 21% of
the fiber optics market, which was expected to grow in the next 4 to 8 years. Their
market position had been won through years of investment, because “optics is
extremely development intensive, because this is what fundamental developments
for optical routers and terminal devices depends on.”623 Nonetheless, despite the
prospect of recouping these sunk costs with market growth in the coming years,
management was trying to sell the optics department. The works council thus
demonstrated to workers that management lacked the business sense to direct
investment strategically. Rather than critiquing dismissals on political or normative
grounds, the works council crafted their critique to resonate with workers’
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disposition to find financial argumentation persuasive by showing that Siemens’
long-term success depended on pursuing an alternative business strategy.
By presenting workers a detailed argument for an alternative business
strategy, the works council demonstrated to workers that collective action could be
effective in protecting their jobs in the primarily financial discourse that they found
persuasive. In contrast to IBM San Jose and to Infineon, workers at ICN decided to
participate in collective action to protect their jobs. Workers chose to mobilize
because the works council framed collective action in a discourse that resonated
with their occupational identity. Moreover, the works council used this framing to
critique management’s business strategy and to make clear that downsizing could
be avoided. Workers mobilized because they believed that doing so could be
effective in protecting their jobs.
5.1 Workers find works councilors’ discourse persuasive
Works councilors’ calls for collective action persuaded workers to participate
because it resonated with their occupational identity. In particular, the works
council’s framing of dismissals resonated with workers’ identification with the
financial aspects of producing technological innovation and reinforced their existing
frustrations with management.
Works councilors framed dismissals in the unstable discourse that
management had established as hegemonic in the workplace. As illustrated above,
workers at ICN identified with producing technological innovation, which they
understood through a primarily financial framework. Workers understood the
employment relationship through management’s framing, which led them to believe
that working conditions were shaped by financial factors. They saw how
management responded to pressures external to the firm and they believed that
managers’ decisions were hurting more than helping. According to a former
software engineer at ICN,
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lots of value was just thrown down the tubes. It was said again and
again: we can’t test a [software] version so well, because nobody’s
paying for it. And if it runs without any mistakes, that will be too
expensive. So it’s better just to leave in a couple problems, release it,
and sell it.624
Like many at Siemens, this worker recognized that management faced financial
pressures external to the workplace, and understood that they needed to make
changes within the workplace in order to respond properly. However, against
management’s short-term strategy to release products as soon as possible, workers
believed that ensuring the division’s long-term success required producing quality
products, which required longer development times and a higher level of
investment. Workers’ disposition to view the employment relationship in primarily
financial terms led them to critique dismissals not on normative grounds, but on the
grounds that dismissals extended this series of poor business decisions that would
not rescue Siemens from the market challenges it faced.
The works council’s characterization of dismissals as caused by market
forces external to the firm in combination with management’s poor decision making
resonated with workers’ occupational identities. While workers accepted that ICN
faced significant challenges in the marketplace, they still held management
responsible for the division’s position. In an online forum for workers at ICN, one
worker posted, “So why are we in this position today? Because, until recently,
management’s assessment of the situation was completely wrong.”625 Many workers
in the forum expressed similar views, with some listing poor business decisions that
management had undertaken, and others simply stating that, “You shouldn’t blame
the global economy for everything, [because] lots of problems should be fixed
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internally first.”626 Just as workers at IBM San Jose and at Infineon, workers at
Siemens were shaped by management’s contradictory characterization of workers’
agency. As a result, they believed that the employment relationship was shaped by
factors within firm, namely management’s decisions, in combination with factors
external to it, namely broader market forces.
When the works council presented workers detailed evidence that
management had chosen the wrong strategy to address ICN’s business challenges,
workers found the works council’s argument persuasive. Works councilors had
articulated workers’ fundamental beliefs about the employment relationship in their
critique of management’s strategy. But once the works council presented their
alternative business strategy, workers responded by articulating and extending the
works council’s arguments: “Firing the people now is completely crazy. In a year, the
market will come back, and then we won’t have the Know How. With only young and
new workers, you’re not going to do it. You need the right mix of young and old.”627
Workers were persuaded by the works council’s alternative business strategy
because works councilors presented the data that workers needed to see in order to
believe that the analysis was accurate. According to one worker: “They [the works
councilors] understand their job. Against all the naysayers, they showed that they’ve
really got it together technically.”628
Of course, some workers doubted the works councilors’ competence in
business analysis. According to one worker, the works council’s alternative business
strategy was “nothing really. In principle, it was just hope.”629 However, this worker
insisted that all business strategies are little more than hopes, because it is
impossible to predict future market developments. Nonetheless, even this worker
gibt es denn eine Strategie?, “gibt es denn eine Strategie?,” Diskussionsforum, October 11,
2002; Neue Struktur / neue Probleme, ICN Intranet Diskussionsforum, October 28, “Neue
Struktur / neue Probleme,” ICN Intranet Diskussionsforum, 2002.
627 Quoted in Schuhler, Der Wandel der Unternehmenskultur, 29.
628 Quoted in Schuhler, 32.
629 Former Infineon Works Councilor, Author Interview, Munich, October 24, 2014.
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chose to attend a handful of meetings “simply to get informed, [because it] could
only be an advantage, [to learn] what was going on.”630 He related how attending
these meetings persuaded him to participate in mobilizing against management:
I recognized that it was a good thing, that it was not just polemics and
holding talks, but there was action…. it is not a gossip club, and not
just dominated by the union. It wasn’t just talking and discussion, but
instead, real action, that helped in concrete ways… ‘OK, how and when
does the Dismissal Protection Act [apply], and where do we meet, let’s
take a look. How do you do it right, what’s the wrong way, or what
should we do.’ It was very concrete, practical help.631
Even those workers who doubted the validity of the works council’s business
strategy were willing to concede that collective action could be effective in
protecting their jobs. While not every worker chose to participate in collective
action because they were convinced by the works council’s economic arguments, the
works council’s alternative business strategy was critical in motivating many
workers at ICN to mobilize.
Many workers at ICN participated in collective action because they believed
that the works council’s alternative business strategy stood a chance in protecting
their jobs. One worker wrote in the online forum that, “As a dutiful and simple
Siemens employee, I’m not used to acting this way. But the outstanding work of our
works council must be supported.”632 Workers at ICN were not accustomed to filing
legal cases against their employer or attending mass demonstrations, but, faced with
persuasive arguments that mobilization could protect their jobs, workers chose to
participate in collective action.
6. Conclusion
This chapter argued that workers at Siemens mobilized to protect their jobs against
dismissals because works councilors developed a counterhegemonic discourse
Former Siemens Worker, Author Interview, Munich, November 20, 2014.
Former Siemens Worker.
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convincing them that collective action could be effective. Workers at Siemens faced
the same set of threats as workers at IBM and Infineon. Management’s adoption of
the orientation to shareholder value led them to establish a hegemonic discourse in
the workplace that framed technological innovation in both a scientific and an
economic discourse. Unstable as this discourse was, it nonetheless disposed
workers to find management’s economic justification for dismissals plausible. As a
result, workers at Siemens seemed as unlikely to resist dismissals as their
counterparts at IBM San Jose and Infineon. Works councilors at Siemens, however,
creatively interpreted and redeployed management’s discourse to mobilize workers
by developing a counterhegemonic discourse that demonstrated to workers that
they could save their jobs by participating in collective action.
Comparing the path of dismissals at Siemens to the path that unfolded at
Infineon illustrates that the effects of Germany’s institutions for industrial relations
on the workplace are contingent on workers’ agency and, in particular, on works
councilors’ creativity. Workers at Infineon had access to the very same institutional
resources as workers at Siemens, but workers at Siemens were able to protect
themselves against dismissals, while workers at Infineon were not. Works
councilors at Infineon confined themselves to formal channels of negotiation, which
led them to effectively acquiesce to dismissals, but works councilors at Siemens
were able to develop the resources most essential for labor organizing. Leveraging
their close familiarity with workers and their access to the firm’s business data,
works councilors effectively became labor organizers.
Not only were works councilors at Siemens able to inhabit the role of labor
organizers, which is largely absent from German industrial relations, they were also
able to introduce union resources to the tech sector, which is highly unusual. Before
management announced dismissals, less than 6% of the workers at ICN belonged to
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IG Metall.633 In the course of the conflict, more than 900 new members joined, which
more than doubled union density at the site. 634 One union official described how,
after years of being shunned, “every all-employee meeting was a ‘home game,’ as
you would say in football.”635 Workers joined IG Metall en masse because the union
promised legal advice to dismissed workers, and because the works council showed
workers that the union had resources that would help them protect their rights.636
Workers trusted the works council, especially once works councilors
demonstrated their business competence, so they followed the works council’s
suggestion that building organization strength among workers would enhance the
works council’s ability to negotiate with management. One worker explained that he
joined IG Metall, “so they could say, ‘we represent 40 percent of the employees.’
Otherwise they could only say, ‘we represent 10 percent of the employees.’ In order
to strengthen the union’s bargaining position. That was the motivation.”637 By
illustrating to workers that IG Metall could help them, works councilors in fact
enabled the union to do so. In addition to providing legal advice to individual
workers and to the works council, IG Metall also provided the financial resources to
print the newsletters and brochures that enabled workers councilors to
communicate their alternative business strategy to workers.638 IG Metall thus
played an important role in protecting workers from dismissals at Siemens, but
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their involvement was as contingent on works councilors’ discursive strategies as
workers’ decision to mobilize.
Works councilors’ creativity at Siemens enabled them to protect workers
against dismissal by developing power resources to resist management’s discretion
over the employment relationship. This chapter focused on the discursive aspects of
that strategy and showed how works councilors relied on the surrounding national
institutions to develop an effective counterhegemonic discourse. Highlighting how
the effects of national institutions on workers’ conditions are contingent on creative
action in the workplace underlines how the political economic transformation
accompanying the transition to the knowledge economy does not necessarily
undermine workers’ job security. As I argued above, workers are no doubt
vulnerable to dismissal when managers decide to deliver value to shareholders
rather than produce advanced technologies. However, dismissals are always the
result of managerial discretion rather than faceless structural forces, which means
that, even in what appear to be dire economic circumstances, workers can find ways
to pressure management to reconsider. Given the centrality of hegemony to
management’s control of the workplace, I have suggested that counterhegemonic
discursive strategies can be one promising path for workers attempting to protect
their jobs in an era of liberalization.
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Chapter 9. Conclusion
This dissertation developed a discursive approach to liberalization in order to
illustrate the causal mechanisms that shape worker power in the knowledge
economy. As the OECD’s wealthy democracies adopt models for economic growth
based on services, the tech sector has assumed an increasingly central role in the
political economy of capitalist democracy. Workers in the tech sector earn high
wages and relatively expansive benefits, but they are as vulnerable to management
discretion as workers in other sectors. Tech workers’ distance from labor’s
traditional power resources positions them as a harbinger of liberalization, and I
focused on explaining variation in their job security in order to identify the
dynamics of worker power in twenty-first century liberalism.
While some have argued that workers’ vulnerability to dismissal is a
structural characteristic of the knowledge economy, the discursive approach to
liberalization illustrates that workers can defend against downsizing by developing
counterhegemonic strategies in the workplace. The threat to workers’ rights under
liberalization has more to do with the primarily financial discourse of shareholder
value that employers have adopted than with the structure of production in the
knowledge economy. This discourse encourages managers to downsize when their
firms face business challenges, and it disposes workers to be persuaded by
management’s economic justification for dismissals. Despite the proliferation of this
discourse, workers can nonetheless protect their rights by redeploying
management’s primarily financial discourse to undermine managers’ justification
for downsizing, and to demonstrate to workers that collective action could be
effective in defending their jobs. By developing a counterhegemonic discourse,
workers can fulfill the two conditions necessary for mobilizing in the workplace.
The preceding chapters developed and tested this argument by tracing
workers’ responses to downsizing at four workplaces in the United States and
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Germany. By exploring how a single causal mechanism functions in different
settings, these case studies make clear that developing a counterhegemonic
discourse can effectively protect workers’ rights under both Fordist and postFordist structures of production, as well as in institutional settings as different as
the US and Germany. Demonstrating that this causal mechanism can travel
reinforces its relevance for explaining variation in worker power across a broader
universe of cases.
This chapter highlights some of the upshots of the discursive approach to
liberalization developed in this dissertation. In particular, I propose a discursive
account of institutional change, and show how this bolsters attempts to explain the
transformation of institutions for economic governance in the US and Germany.
Before doing so, however, I review the four case studies and address a potential
objection to the argument developed in the previous chapters.
1. Reviewing the four case studies
The four case studies presented in the preceding chapters illustrated the
explanatory value of the discursive approach to liberalization by developing an
account of worker mobilization in the knowledge economy. I argued that two
necessary conditions must be fulfilled in order for workers to mobilize. First,
organizers must demonstrate to workers that collective action can be effective in
protecting their rights. Second, organizers must do so in a discourse that workers
find persuasive. These two conditions may always be challenging to meet, but the
transition to the knowledge economy has made doing so more difficult because it
encourages employers to frame the employment relationship in the primarily
financial discourse of shareholder value. This discourse disposes workers to believe
that their agency over working conditions is extremely limited, so that resisting
downsizing is hardly a rational decision because it will be ineffective at protecting
their jobs. As a result, in the knowledge economy, workers are likely to acquiesce to
downsizing. Nonetheless, I argued that organizers can meet the two conditions
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necessary for mobilization when they develop a counterhegemonic strategy to
redeploy management’s primarily financial discourse.
At Siemens and IBM Burlington, organizers redeployed management’s
hegemonic discourse in order to provide workers persuasive evidence that they had
agency over working conditions. Management’s hegemonic discourse at Siemens
echoed the discursive context of production in Silicon Valley by relying on a
contradictory conception of workers’ agency. Organizers succeeded in presenting
workers a persuasive account of the potential effectiveness of collective action
because they redeployed this contradictory account in order to amplify workers’
belief in their agency over working conditions. At IBM Burlington, management’s
hegemonic discourse did not reflect the discursive context from Silicon Valley,
revolving instead around a norm of reciprocity between managers and workers.
Here too, organizers succeeded in mobilizing workers by presenting them a
persuasive account of the potential effectiveness of collective action by redeploying
management’s own normative discourse.
While organizers at IBM San Jose emphasized to workers that collective
action could be effective in protecting their jobs, they failed to do so in a discourse
that resonated with workers’ occupational identity as primarily financial actors.
Rather than redeploying management’s hegemonic discourse, organizers at IBM San
Jose simply repeated the normative discourse they appropriated from their
colleagues in Burlington. Because workers failed to find organizers’ appeals
persuasive, they decided not to mobilize. The variation observed in workers’ job
security thus depended on variation in organizers’ discursive strategies.
Works councilors at Infineon made the opposite mistake. The works council
presented workers an account of their agency that was persuasive because works
councilors engaged management’s hegemonic discourse. However, while they
addressed workers in a discourse that they found persuasive, reflecting their
primarily financial occupational identity, works councilors did not amplify workers’
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agency to illustrate the potential effectiveness of collective action. Instead, works
councilors repeated management’s discourse and reinforced the notion that
workers had no agency over working conditions, which dissuaded them from
mobilizing. (see table 9.1)

Table 9.1 Variation in organizers’ discursive strategies explains variation in
workers’ job security
Demonstrated
In a discourse
Result
potential
workers found
effectiveness
plausible
IBM VT

Yes

Yes

Mobilization

IBM SJ

Yes

No

Acquiescence

Infineon

No

Yes

Acquiescence

Siemens

Yes

Yes

Mobilization

Organizers’ counterhegemonic strategies at Siemens and IBM Burlington
were effective in mobilizing workers because they fulfilled two conditions necessary
for workers to participate in collective action. At each workplace, organizers
redeployed management’s hegemonic discourse in order to demonstrate the
potential effectiveness of collective action.
Works councilors at Siemens encouraged workers to doubt managers’
account of how external market forces placed unassailable parameters on the
employment relationship by presenting workers with management’s own data,
illustrating just one of “the ways in which challengers seek to delegitimate
hegemonic genres within a field while appropriating pieces to inflect it with their
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own subversive meanings.”639 While operating within management’s own discourse,
works councilors at Siemens “inflected” management’s conception of external
market forces to emphasize that workers’ agency could be equally powerful in
shaping their job security. Organizers at IBM Burlington similarly operated within
management’s own discourse to demonstrate to workers their agency over working
conditions.
Comparing these cases illustrates how the shareholder value orientation
associated with the discursive context that developed around production in Silicon
Valley provides management at tech firms with a concept of workers’ agency that
they can use to dissuade workers from mobilizing. At the same time, the
contradictions underlying this conception of workers’ agency can give workers a
distinct set of power resources for collective action, as long as organizers develop a
counterhegemonic strategy. With the transition to the knowledge economy,
developing successful counterhegemonic strategies requires that organizers have
the skills to perform financial analyses, and that they have access to the relevant
business data and, of course, to workers. In the previous chapters, I showed how
organizers were able to use their creativity in order to mobilize workers under the
challenging conditions of liberalization. As I show below, this account can be
questioned on at least one significant point.
2. Structure, revisited: does strengthening workers weaken the knowledge
economy?
One potential limitation of the dissertation is that the case studies do not address
what happened at each firm following workers’ responses to downsizing. According
to the structural approaches to liberalization presented in Chapter 1, we would
expect bankruptcy to follow workers’ resistance at Burlington and Siemens.
Structural approaches to liberalization suggest that when workers are stronger, the
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prospects for a successful knowledge economy decline. While I have demonstrated
that structural conditions do not require workers to acquiesce to dismissals, I have
not shown that workers’ resistance is consistent with the continued economic
health of their firms. This section takes up that challenge.
The case studies presented in preceding chapters each confirmed the view
that firms in the knowledge economy face significant business challenges due to the
structural characteristics of producing technology. Global competition and rapid
technological change can expose tech firms to significant pressure to lower costs.640
Nonetheless, while such business challenges may be a necessary feature of
competing in technology markets, the effects of these structural characteristics on
the workplace are by no means predetermined.
While workers’ collective action at Burlington did not lead management to
reinstate workers, it did succeed in stemming the tide of dismissals. A structural
approach to liberalization would thus predict that the site would go bankrupt, due
to the constraints on flexibility and management discretion. Burlington, however,
continued to function successfully for more than decade following workers’
resistance to dismissals. In 2015, the site was sold to GlobalFoundries, a competitor
in the semiconductor business.641 In comparison to the site at San Jose, which was
sold to Hitachi in 2008, it thus appears that mobilization did not weaken the site’s
performance in the manner that structural approaches would predict.
In a similar fashion, managers and analysts alike intoned the certain death of
Siemens’ telecommunications division, and indeed, the division was eventually sold
to Nokia. However, while the facility no longer exists on Hofmannstraße, the
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workers were still in Munich fifteen years later, performing the same work but for
Nokia instead of Siemens. Some years after the attempted downsizing, the division
became profitable again, and, in 2014, posted increased sales volume and profits of
€890 million.642 Some challenges that tech firms face are structural and some are
cyclical, but neither presents an unavoidable imperative to fire workers.
It may be that worker power is not just compatible with the knowledge
economy, but complementary. While Germany has lagged in adopting an effective
model for economic growth based on dynamic services, Sweden seen significant
growth in the tech sector over the last decades.643 Consistent with the trend across
the OECD, unions have declined in Sweden, but more so in traditional blue-collar
sectors than in the white collar sectors associated with tech. In 2010, white collar
unions in Sweden boasted a density of 73%.644
Similarly, Denmark is sometimes offered as evidence that supporting growth
in the tech sector necessarily requires more flexible labor markets. Zysman and
Newman, for instance, explain the growth of Denmark’s tech sector as partly the
result of balancing the tension between employment flexibility and protection by
developing policies that make both firing and hiring relatively easy.645 Providing a
more detailed analysis, Martin and Swank describe how Danish employers led the
development and implementation of active labor market policies, or “flexicurity.”646
According this perspective, supporting the production of technology does require
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undoing labor market rigidities, but well-crafted policy makes it possible to do so
without increasing inequality. However, while policy is no doubt important, 69% of
Danish workers belonged to a union in 2007, while union membership stood at 20%
in Germany and 11.6% in the US.647 Like Sweden, membership in white collar
unions actually grew from 361,000 in 1980 to 600,000 in 2005.648 Therefore,
although flexicurity may have undone some of the formal provisions for dismissal
protection, the continued strength of Danish unions illustrates that growth in the
tech sector is compatible with worker power.
Instead of looking directly to structural factors to explain variation in
workers’ job security as wealthy democracies transition to the knowledge economy,
this dissertation has proposed an approach that focuses on how actors make sense
of structural conditions. I have argued for the important role played by the
discursive context of production in shaping actors’ understanding of the challenges
and opportunities they face. The manner in which managers and workers conceive
of production provides each with a rubric for considering their agency.
Management’s framing of workers’ productive power through discourse in the
workplace and systems for compensation strongly shapes workers’ beliefs about
their agency, for “agency is productivity, productivity is agency.”649 Such beliefs
develop through the history of a particular site and vary considerably depending on
that history, not least due to the state’s attempts to regulate or support production.
As a result, large-scale structural changes, such as increased global competition or
management’s adoption of the orientation to shareholder value, can have different
effects at different worksites depending on how the discursive context of production
evolved over time.
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In arguing that the political effects of structural transformation must be
explained via their mediation of processes of interpretation, this dissertation
repeats an old argument that social science focuses on the “cultural significance of
concrete historical relations,” rather than purporting to present the “concrete
historical relations” themselves.650 Structural conditions never have a direct effect
on politics. The work of causation is performed by actors who interpret their
surrounding conditions, which shapes their preferences and strategies accordingly.
As I emphasize in the following section, these processes of interpretation shape the
path of institutional change under liberalization.
3. Institutional change under liberalization
National institutions for economic governance have undergone significant
transformation since the transition to the knowledge economy began two decades
ago. Some scholars have described an overall weakening of worker power, while
others have suggested that the changes are more distributed, with workers in the
core retaining their rights while those in the periphery are threatened.651 In what
follows, I build on observations from the preceding chapters to suggest that the
pattern of institutional change is more complicated but can be explained by focusing
on the role of discourse.
Institutions for economic governance in both the US and Germany depend on
worker mobilization for enforcement, but unions have traditionally been
responsible for mobilizing workers. As unions declined with the transition to the
knowledge economy, workers have developed novel strategies for mobilizing in the
workplace, based in part on resources provided by national institutions. While they
acted as stabilizing forces under previous models for economic growth, in the
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knowledge economy, institutions for economic governance provide resources for
workers to develop adversarial strategies for mobilizing against management. In the
sections that follow, I illustrate how institutions for economic governance in both
the US and Germany went from stabilizing industrial relations to supporting conflict
in the workplace. I focus on Germany in particular due to the history of conflictpartnership and to Germany’s long-standing role in developing theories of political
economy. I synthesize these observations propose a more general view of
institutional change that foregrounds interpretation against institutions’ formal
design.
3.1 Institutional transformation in the United States
Enforcing institutions for economic governance in the US has always relied on
worker mobilization. In order to provide an arena for resolving conflicts between
employers and workers, labor market institutions in the US not only set guidelines
for behavior, but also charge specific actors, primarily unions, with enforcement.
Given the decline of unions and their traditional strategies for mobilization,
explaining changes in the effectiveness of these institutions requires examining the
dynamics of mobilization, and, thus, workers’ discursive strategies.
At Burlington, workers relied on a provision of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) in order to gather data that formed the basis of workers’
collective legal case against IBM. As discussed in Chapter 3, reforms in 1991 to the
ADEA included the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA), which requires
employers to provide workers the ages and positions of all workers affected by a
mass dismissal, as well as the ages and positions of those not affected. Workers at
IBM Burlington relied on this provision to collect the statistics they needed to
support their claims of age discrimination. These statistics were a critical piece of
evidence that organizers presented to workers in order to demonstrate that
collective action could be effective in protecting their jobs. By displaying easy to
read graphs indicating that management had discriminated against older workers,
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organizers persuaded workers that managers were guilty, and that workers
therefore stood a good chance of prevailing in court.
However, while legal arguments might be sufficient evidence for some
workers that collective action could be effective in saving their jobs, tech workers’
occupational identity disposes them to require evidence based on the firm’s
financial performance. As argued in Chapter 5, workers’ acquiescence at IBM San
Jose demonstrates that the spread of tech workers’ occupational identity along with
firms’ orientation to shareholder value undermines the traditional repertoires that
organized labor has used to defend workers’ rights. Workers must be convinced that
collective action is potentially effective in a discourse that they find persuasive,
namely, one that is primarily financial. However, the strategies that organized labor
has developed for mobilization are based on a set of institutional resources that no
longer resonate with workers in the tech sector.
The simultaneous spread of tech workers’ occupational identity and firms’
orientation to shareholder value in the US highlights the necessity of organizers
developing counterhegemonic strategies to protect workers’ jobs in the tech sector.
Employers’ shift to serve shareholders rather than their firm’s long-term interests
increases the importance of organizers’ discursive strategies in the workplace for
four reasons. First, the spread of shareholder value is associated with management
pressuring unions by disproportionately firing workers in unionized workplaces.652
Second, as illustrated in Chapters 2 and 5, tech workers’ occupational identity
disposes them to avoid joining unions. Therefore, as unions play a lesser role in the
workplace, workers’ job security increasingly depends on their ability to mobilize
without relying on traditional unions resources. Third, the shareholder value
orientation leads management to justify dismissals in a primarily financial
discourse. Fourth, tech workers’ occupational identity disposes them to be
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persuaded by economic justifications for dismissals. As observed at Burlington and
San Jose, the content of management’s hegemonic discourse plays a central role in
determining what type of counterhegemonic strategy organizers need to develop in
order to mobilize workers. When managers justify dismissals in a financial
discourse, organizers must present workers with detailed business data in order to
demonstrate that workers have the power to shape their working conditions,
despite the influence of market forces.
While US institutions for regulating the labor market may have provided a
degree of stability to industrial relations during the 20th century, employers’
adoption of the shareholder value orientation undermines their effectiveness by
dissolving established practices of enforcement. National institutions, such as OSHA
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, set ground rules for workers’ rights, which
provide a degree of stability in the substance of the employment relationship.
Procedural regulations, such as the Wagner Act, reinforce this stability by providing
mechanisms for resolving conflicts.653 By delimiting the channels for dispute
resolution as well as the actors relevant to negotiating the content of the
employment relationship, these institutions afforded workers and employers a
degree of predictability and thus stabilized industrial relations.654 Unions are
charged both de jure and de facto with enforcing a significant portion of institutions
for regulating the labor market in the US. Therefore, as the rise of the tech sector has
undermined unions’ organizational bases among the workforce, it has also
undermined the effectiveness of national institutions. Protecting workers’ rights in
the US thus increasingly depends on organizers developing discursive strategies in
the workplace to support workers’ collective action by creatively applying national
institutions and by redeploying management’s hegemonic discourse.
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With the transition to the knowledge economy, American institutions for
economic governance have seen a significant transformation in how they affect the
workplace. In previous eras, these institutions protected workers’ rights by
delineating boundaries for management discretion and empowering specific actors,
namely unions, to enforce those boundaries. However, with the transition to the
knowledge economy, the effectiveness of these institutions depends on whether
workers are able to interpret them creatively in order to build power resources
where unions once did. The formal design of these institutions has hardly changed,
but the conditions in which they are enforced have changed dramatically.
Understanding institutional change under liberalization requires explaining the
connections between institutions’ formal design and how workers interpret and
apply them in the workplace.
3.2 Institutional transformation in Germany
In Germany, institutions for economic governance have generally been conceived of
as stabilizing conflict. The institutions for codetermination, for instance, arose
during the postwar détente between employers and organized labor. These
institutions, allowing workers a voice in management decisions, were widely viewed
as pacifying industrial relations.655 In the 1980s, for instance, works councils’
participation in management decisions constituted an element of the hegemonic
system of conflict-partnership. Their participation was part of capitalist hegemony
because works councilors defused the types of open conflict advocated by orthodox
Marxists.656 Furthermore, codetermination was a critical element of Germany’s
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institutional architecture, which along with other features, such as “patient capital,”
oriented firms toward long-term strategies for growth.657
As argued in Chapter 6, German institutions no longer adhere to the conflictpartnership model. Streeck, for instance, observes that neither firms nor labor act as
partners. Instead, industrial relations in Germany are marked by hierarchy and
conflict, and the stabilizing mix of the two dynamics no longer obtains.658 Based on
the dynamics observed in the case studies above, I suggest that the transition to the
knowledge economy has played a significant role in the dissolution of conflictpartnership. Over the past decades, German firms have increasingly adopted the
orientation to shareholder value and turned away from patient capital, in addition
to replacing their support for the “social market economy” with a primarily financial
discourse in the workplace.
Regulations concerning Germany’s financial markets have undergone
significant reforms over the past decades, largely oriented toward encouraging
German firms to pursue growth based on financial strategies.659 At the same time
that German firms were provided new opportunities to generate profits, they were
also exposed to pressure from shareholders. Increasingly relying on “impatient”
investors who push for improved earnings on a quarterly rather than multi-year
schedule, firms responded to this pressure by explicitly reorienting business
strategy to deliver shareholder value, as shown in the cases of Infineon and Siemens.
Although institutions for codetermination remain formally intact, employers have
converted these practices in order to serve the interests of capital at the expense of
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other stakeholders, especially labor.660 Adopting an orientation to shareholder
value, German firms abandoned their traditional role as social partners to labor,
observed at the national level in employers’ efforts to liberalize institutions for
industrial relations.661 In the workplace, as observed in the previous chapters,
management announces dismissal plans, rather than first negotiating with works
councilors. These changes lead workers to find new ways to protect their rights,
namely, by developing counterhegemonic discursive strategies.
Works councils’ involvement in management decision-making was not
always counterhegemonic, but the case of Siemens shows that, once managers
departed from their traditional role, the works council pursued a distinctly
counterhegemonic strategy. Although the works council relied on institutional
resources to mobilize workers, their strategy to defend workers’ job security was
nonetheless counterhegemonic. Institutions for codetermination provided the
works council access to Siemens’ business data as well as access to workers.
However, the works council’s strategy was counterhegemonic because they actively
undermined management’s business plans by questioning the justification for
dismissals.
The works council’s threat to management’s power is illustrated by
managers’ efforts to repress their activities. At Siemens, managers performed
independent research on works councilors’ external political activities in attempts
to tarnish their reputations, and brought a legal case against the chair of the works
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council, alleging that he falsified information during negotiations over dismissals.662
Furthermore, management funded and directed a group of employees to launch a
smear campaign against the works council.663
Given the openly hostile environment at Siemens, but also given that the
works council directly questioned management’s business plans, works councilors
insisted that they were not participating in co-management, but in “countermanagement.” According to a former works councilor at Siemens,
There is this concept of co-management, which is very strong in the
automobile industry, where it’s always about increasing the firm’s
competitiveness. The works councils are involved [in management
decisions] in order to increase the firm’s market competitiveness.
That is classical co-management. And at the first glance, it looked like
we were also doing co-management. But we always said, ‘we’re doing
counter-management.’664
While their strategy included an element of improving the firm’s performance, the
Siemens works council’s first priority was to protect workers’ job security. The
former works councilor further elaborated their orientation to countermanagement: “Well, there’s two logics. One is from top managers, who want profits
for shareholders. And we have our logic, which is that our existence depends on our
jobs, and therefore we want to defend our jobs.”665 Once management abandoned
the logic of conflict-partnership in order to focus on shareholder value, Germany’s
institutions for economic governance no longer provided such robust protection for
workers’ rights. Furthermore, because workers’ occupational identities disposed
them to avoid union membership, defending workers’ job security led the works
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council to develop a counterhegemonic strategy. As I illustrate below, works
councilors developed this strategy by relying on precisely the institutional resources
that had once supported stability in Germany’s industrial relations.
3.2.1 From codetermination to confrontation
In order to mobilize workers against downsizing, the works council at Siemens
developed a counterhegemonic strategy by engaging institutions that were
ostensibly designed to promote stability. As the conflict over dismissals progressed,
works councilors engaged a wide array of the institutions for codetermination, but
applied them in order to develop a counterhegemonic discourse to persuade
workers to mobilize. Just like the works council at Infineon, works councilors at
Siemens used the institutions for codetermination to establish their credibility with
workers, but they leveraged this credibility for resistance to dismissals rather than
acquiesce.
In order to mobilize workers who otherwise rejected collective action in
general, and unions in particular, the works council at Siemens relied on three
specific aspects of Germany’s institutions for codetermination. First, in order to
better acquaint themselves with workers’ specific understanding of dismissals, and
simultaneously present workers with their arguments for collective action, the
works council engaged their legal requirements to meet regularly with workers.
Second, the provision of the Works Constitution Act that requires works councilors
to be drawn from the firm’s workers provided the works council unmediated access
not just to workers, but also to the technical details surrounding production at ICN.
Thirdly, the works council’s legally mandated access to management’s business data
ensured that they were able to frame downsizing and resistance in the primarily
financial discourse that workers found persuasive. As demonstrated in Chapter 7,
the works council at Infineon also engaged each of these elements of
codetermination. The works council at Siemens, however, creatively applied these
institutional resources in order to undermine management’s justification for
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dismissal by developing a counterhegemonic discourse that resonated with
workers.
The Works Constitution Act provides works councils the means to both learn
from workers as well as transmit information to them. The law requires that the
works council hold an all-employee meeting once per quarter.666 In the 100 days
following the announcement of dismissals, the works council at Siemens held six allemployee meetings. The works council used these meetings to learn how workers
perceived dismissals, which allowed them to develop a discursive strategy that
resonated with workers. In meetings with workers in early September, for instance,
the works council collected questions from workers, which they then used to direct
the information they demanded from management.667
At the same time, the works council also used these meetings to demonstrate
to workers their competence in business analysis and strategy. On October 7, the
works council presented workers an alternative business strategy, which they
justified by referring to graphs that detailed the division’s quarterly performance.668
In addition to these all-employee meetings, the works council had further access to
workers by holding special meetings in late November to advise workers on their
legal options in the coming weeks.669 Even if they did not meet workers face-to-face,
works councilors followed their legal mandate to communicate with workers670 by
sending regular emails to all employees, and by establishing an internet site and an
online discussion forum. Each of these virtual channels further strengthened works
councilors’ access to workers. They posted important legal information on the
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works council’s site and encouraged workers to discuss their options for resisting
dismissals in an online discussion forum.671 The Works Constitution Act provided a
legal mandate for each of these efforts to communicate with workers, and the works
council applied their legal mandate in order to develop a counterhegemonic
discourse to persuade workers to mobilize against management.
To some extent, the works council’s efforts to meet regularly with workers
amounted to overkill, because they were already deeply familiar with the prevalent
occupational identities at ICN. As per the Works Constitution Act, works councilors
were themselves workers.672 When downsizing was announced in 2002, the works
council was composed of 39 members representing a wide array of professions,
from secretaries and accountants to product managers. Nearly 40% of the works
council, however, were either hardware or software developers, which reflected
ICN’s focus on producing technological innovation. Furthermore, while the Works
Constitution Act enabled nearly a third of the works councilors to put their previous
jobs on hold in order to be full-time works councilors, 66% of the works council still
worked part-time throughout ICN. Thus, works councilors’ everyday participation in
the workplace gave them detailed information about production, from their own
experience and by talking to the workers in different departments.673 This access to
workers further strengthened the works council’s ability to frame dismissals in a
discourse that workers found persuasive, and it also supplied the information they
needed to demonstrate their competence in business administration.
While works councilors could rely on personal experience and personal
contacts to gather information about the production process at ICN, the Works
Constitution Act also enabled them to request specific data from management.674
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Presenting workers with the data they received from management underlined
works councilors’ credibility with workers by demonstrating that their analyses
were based on complete information. In some presentations, the works council was
explicit that their data came directly from management. For instance, when they
presented workers with best- and worst-case scenarios for the division during the
September 18 all-employee meeting, for instance, they announced that, “this slide is
based on information from the division chiefs’ meeting from June 24, 2002.”675
Management did not appreciate the works council’s reuse of their data and analyses
and they sued IG Metall in 2003, claiming that the union had published business
secrets in a pamphlet titled Schöne Neue Siemens Welt, which repeated many of the
critiques from the pamphlet, Wege aus der Krise.676 This demonstrates
management’s sensitivity to data-driven critiques of its business strategy, further
underlining the threat the works council posed to managers’ discursive strategy to
convince workers to accept termination. Moreover, management’s suit highlights
how the works council interpreted its institutional prerogatives so creatively that
managers believed this interpretation to violate the law.
In addition to facilitating works councilors’ access to workers and their
access to the “salient information” regarding ICN’s business strategy, the Works
Constitution Act also allows a works council to hire external consultants.677 At ICN,
the works council took on an economist to help them analyze the firm’s business
strategy, as well as a lawyer from Frankfurt. According to a former works councilor:
Yeah, then it went poorly for the firm. He [the lawyer] really rang the
death toll for it to go poorly for the firm…Then there was an economic
expert. The works council must be thoroughly informed why it
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[dismissals] is economically necessary. Firms are very guarded and of
course only release the most necessary information.678
All the other facets of codetermination aside, the works council at ICN took no
chances that they might overlook an opportunity to further strengthen their
argument for workers to mobilize by improving their facility with business analysis.
The works council at Infineon also had access to consultants, such as Wolfgang
Müller, who had been hired by IG Metall to assist at Infineon. Müller was a
programmer who had helped organize the first strike in tech in the 1980s, and was
known as an expert in the sector. However, the works council at Infineon used this
access to expert analysis just to encourage workers to acquiesce to dismissals.
Works councilors at Siemens creatively interpreted this provision of the Works
Constitution Act along with those noted above in order to develop a
counterhegemonic discourse that persuaded workers to mobilize against dismissals.
At Infineon, the Works Constitution Act did little to protect workers from
management’s adversarial strategy of dismissals, while at Siemens, workers took
advantage of the legislation in order to develop their own adversarial strategy to
protect their jobs.
3.3 Toward a discursive theory of institutional change
At both Burlington and Siemens, national institutions ended up protecting workers
from downsizing, but due to organizers’ creativity as much as the formal design of
those institutions. Indeed, US institutions failed to protect workers at San Jose, and
German institutions did little for workers at Infineon. Tracing the path of
interpretation and implementation in each case underlines Berk and Galvan’s
observation that, “institutional structure is not a script or a schema, but a skill.”679
While offering formal protection against dismissals, national institutions in both the
US and Germany became effective through organizers’ skilled use of their
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surrounding conditions. I propose that explaining the transformation in institutions’
effectiveness during liberalization can be explained only by foregrounding actors’
interpretation and application of these institutions against their formal design.
Scholars have long recognized that there is a significant degree of
contingency in how an institution’s formal design affects politics because the causal
effects of institutions depend on how actors interpret and apply institutions to
specific situations.680 While institutions do not determine political economic
outcomes, they do provide resources for actors to develop and execute particular
strategies. However, “if they [institutions] do not solve (or even address) the
problems that actors have, then institutions are either ignored or changed.”681
Institutions are thus reflexive, because while they may provide a set of guidelines
for workers to mobilize, institutions are as much the result of collective action as a
cause.682 Although national institutions may play a role in explaining variation in
political economic outcomes at the national level, the effects of these institutions are
always mediated by the strategies and behavior of creative actors enmeshed in
conflict.
One upshot of institutions’ reflexive nature is that they can have unintended
consequences.683 As illustrated above, the transition to the knowledge economy has
entailed a process of gradual change to the institutions for economic governance in
the US and Germany so that, rather than stabilizing conflict, they encourage it. This
process of change is legible only when we examine variation in how managers and
workers interpret and apply these institutions in the workplace. Thus, I propose

Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, eds., Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in
Advanced Political Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
681 Gary Herrigel, Manufacturing Possibilities: Creative Action and Industrial Recomposition in the
United States, Germany, and Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 189.
682 Herrigel, 231.
683 Gregory Jackson, “Contested Boundaries: Ambiguity and Creativity in the Evolution of
German Codetermination,” in Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political
Economies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
680

309

that analyzing institutional change should focus more directly on actors’ discursive
strategies.
The discursive approach to institutions I propose builds on existing research,
particularly in the vein of “discursive institutionalism,” but pushes one step further.
Scholars supporting a discursive institutionalist approach argue that actors’
discursive strategies play a central role in forming coalitions and shaping voters’
preferences for particular policies.684 Many of these approaches focus on the state in
order to explain cross-national variation in policy responses to common challenges,
although some have also investigated how actors’ interpretive strategies shape
variation in political outcomes at the sub-national level.685 Others have integrated
discourse into their explanations for political behavior, such as Martin and Swank’s
attention to how employers’ associations in Denmark shape how firms make
decisions about flexicurity policies.686 Such approaches suggest that the effects of
national institutions depend as much on how they are interpreted as on their formal
design.
The case studies presented in the preceding chapters are consistent with
such accounts, as I showed how organizers’ creative interpretation of their
surrounding institutions was critical to whether and how they mobilized workers to
defend their jobs. However, combining within-country and cross-national
comparisons suggests that our approach to the explanatory power of institutions
should be rebalanced by moving interpretation to the foreground. Rather than
viewing processes of interpretation and application as secondary to an institution’s
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formal design, I argued that certain interpretive strategies are a necessary condition
for enforcing national institutions. Dismissal protection legislation in the US and
Germany, for instance, can be enforced only when workers mobilize, and they
mobilize only when they believe that doing so will be effective. As I demonstrated in
the case studies, workers’ beliefs about the potential effectiveness of collective
action depend directly on organizers’ interpretive strategies, and particularly on
how they use national institutions to frame downsizing in a manner that motivates
workers to mobilize. Existing approaches are correct that institutions play a critical
role in shaping political behavior, but institutions must be viewed as one factor in a
set of complex causal processes, rather than the primary determining factor.
Furthermore, after decades of research, we know far more about the design of
national institutions than we do about what makes them effective.
Scholars’ growing focus on how institutions are interpreted and applied has
begun to shift the analytical horizon from institutions’ formal design to discourse on
the ground, but this could be further extended. Future research could build on this
dissertation’s in-depth examination of actors’ discursive strategies in order to
construct a typology of techniques for interpretation that correspond to patterns of
political behavior. For instance, institutionalist approaches could be combined with
theories of mobilization from research on social movements in order to identify
patterns of interpretation associated with enforcing national institutions. Mahoney
and Thelen’s integration of institutions and creative action in their typology of
actors’ orientations to institutions could provide a model.687 Shifting the analytical
horizon from institutions’ formal design to the interpretive strategies actors use to
realize them in political life provides an opportunity to extend the existing research
on discourse among elite actors, whether policy makers or economists, to the
everyday interactions, which, summed together, constitute macro-economic
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phenomena.688 This dissertation has shown how explaining the path of liberalization
must include a close examination of political contests in the workplace.
4. Tech workers and the future of the knowledge economy
This dissertation has developed an approach to explaining why worker power
varies under liberalization by illustrating how adopting models for economic
growth based on services threatens workers’ power resources, and illustrating how
workers can mobilize against this threat. Doing so sketches a handful of possible
futures for the OECD’s wealthy democracies as they transition to the knowledge
economy. On the one hand, given their resources and abilities, and the growth of the
tech sector, tech workers could form the political core of the working class in the
21st century. On the other hand, tech workers could continue to acquiesce to a
system that exploits them and other workers. While the case studies presented
above suggest a minimalist account of tech workers as a class, future research will
need to delve into further cases in order to better uncover the political potential of
tech workers’ collective action.
Dismissal is the most dramatic threat that tech workers face — and the
threat to which they are most vulnerable — but even the highest paid workers in
Silicon Valley have been routinely exploited over the past decades. Sixty-four
thousand engineers joined a class action lawsuit in 2014, In re: High Tech Employee
Antitrust Litigation, alleging that leading tech firms in Silicon Valley, including Apple,
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Adobe, Google, and Intel, colluded to drive down their wages.689 Two aspects of the
case are worth noting in terms of tech workers’ propensity to mobilize in the future.
First, executives targeted high-paid workers, including those whose hourly wage
topped $200. While colluding allowed firms to lower production costs by driving
down these wages, the sheer magnitude of capital involved illustrates that these
workers have significant economic leverage against their employers. Second, while
unions, especially those who had at one time been active in Silicon Valley, closely
watched the case, they were unsuccessful in encouraging workers to participate in
any form of collective action more sustainable than a discrete legal case. This is an
odd choice by the workers. Many likely believed that market demand for their skills
would be sufficient for them to receive a high wage from their employer. However,
the case shows that employers are always free to exploit workers as long as workers
do not organize through non-market organizations, such as a union, even when they
apparently exercise market power. Failing to recognize this in so stark a case of
wage-theft, and where the stakes were so high, suggests that these otherwise
privileged workers remain unlikely to mobilize to protect their rights.
Tech workers’ disposition to avoid collective action is not the only challenge
they face in protecting their rights. Technology production, perhaps even more so
than other industries, is increasingly internationalized. Supply chains stretch across
national borders and are becoming ever more fragmented as suppliers further
outsource significant portions of their own production processes. As dozens of firms
may now be involved in producing a single product, workers’ ability to disrupt the
production process diminishes because the supply chain can simply be diverted to a
workplace where the workers accept less desirable conditions.690 Ownership is

David Streitfeld, “Engineers Allege Hiring Collusion in Silicon Valley,” The New York
Times, February 28, 2014, sec. Technology,
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Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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becoming more international as well, with a steady rise in cross-border acquisitions
since the end of the financial crisis.691 Traditional mechanisms for resolving labor
disputes are ineffective when workers cannot directly contact the owners of their
firm, for instance, to negotiate through institutional channels for conflict
resolution.692
To the extent that tech workers have mobilized against these threats, their
movements have not inspired much confidence. With the liberalization of
international trade in the 1990s, tech workers began to see their jobs off-shored,
and some were inspired to protest against the practice. For the most part, however,
these protests took a nativist tone, as workers argued for saving “American jobs.”693
With the rise of the right-wing in the US, Germany, and other wealthy democracies,
this tendency to view class struggle through the lens of nationalism does not bode
well for the potential of tech workers to act as a revolutionary force.
Workers afraid of losing their jobs to foreign competitors are at risk of
joining right-wing parties that promise economic nationalism. It may indeed be the
case that the best way to protect workers’ jobs from being off-shored is at the ballot
box, because politicians can pass laws for job security and against foreign
ownership. However, in the long run, these right-wing parties in no way serve tech
workers’ interests. Just as workers’ counterhegemonic strategy is limited in
challenging capitalism by its acceptance of capitalists’ logic, so does workers’
support for the right-wing confine them to a set of political possibilities that
excludes challenging the mechanisms of exploitation underlying capitalism. Indeed,
by further deepening the divisions between workers, nationalism only strengthens

Claire A. Hill and Steven Davidoff Solomon, Research Handbook on Mergers and Acquisitions
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016).
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capital’s ability to weaken workers by setting them against one another. As long as
workers are separated, whether by race, nation, or occupational hierarchies, capital
will succeed in extracting their labor power for profit.
This dissertation showed that workers are capable of shaping the large-scale
path of capitalist development in wealthy democracies by mobilizing to protect their
rights against employer discretion. Growth in the tech sector may mean more tech
workers, but it implies neither increased inequality nor increased precarity.
Nonetheless, the future is anything but rosy and these findings should be
understood alongside their limitations, which are significant. Despite the promise of
a politically active working class emerging from the tech sector, the challenges are
as immense as those facing any other segment of the working class. This
dissertation has suggested what such an opening might look like. Realizing working
class solidarity among tech workers is only conceivable once its possibility has been
elucidated and its challenges articulated.
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